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FROM THE EDITORS
The outcome of the American presidential election in November of last year is
a seismic event for not only Americans but the world. It is an unmistakable sign
of what can only be described as an ongoing crisis of globalization. In “Exporting Security: China, the United States, and the Innovator’s Dilemma,” Robert C.
Rubel reflects on the significance of the challenge to the liberal global order—and
the role of the United States as its principal sponsor—by the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Using an analogy from the corporate world, he argues that, rather
than attempting to compete with the United States directly in expanding its influence beyond its traditional sphere, China appears to be pursuing an alternative
“business model” that offers it a competitive advantage in a world decreasingly
committed to liberal values, especially with regard to trade, human rights, and
democracy. Rubel draws no firm conclusions about possible U.S. responses to this
challenge, but acknowledges there are few good options. It would be interesting
to speculate on the implications of this analysis for the U.S. Navy, with its stated
commitment to fostering international maritime cooperation in defense of the
liberal global order. Robert Rubel is the former dean of the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
As John Hanley reminds us, war gaming has been a hallmark of the Naval War
College since the late nineteenth century. During the interwar years it played
a particularly important role in preparing senior officers of the U.S. Navy to
prosecute the Pacific War to its successful conclusion. In “Planning for the Kamikazes: Toward a Theory and Practice of Repeated Operational Games,” Hanley
provides an authoritative account of recent developments in war gaming at the
College, notably the iterative, highly classified, tactical/operational-level gaming of potential near-term maritime conflicts conducted by the so-called Halsey
Groups—interdisciplinary cells made up of faculty, in collaboration with students
with fresh operational experience. He situates this discussion within the larger
context of the renewed and reinvigorated interest in war gaming manifested recently at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD), resulting in the
ongoing effort to create a “virtual community of practice” linking war-game practitioners throughout the department. This article builds on Hanley’s “Changing
DoD’s Analysis Paradigm: The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign
Simulation,” which appeared in our Winter 2017 issue. John T. Hanley Jr. is a
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former U.S. naval officer who has served in a number of capacities in the U.S.
government, most recently as director for strategy in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
One of the immediate challenges facing the incoming Trump administration
has to do with North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons capability. Sukjoon
Yoon, in “Expanding the ROKN’s Capabilities to Deal with the SLBM Threat
from North Korea,” focuses on a dimension of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) nuclear program that has received relatively little attention:
nuclear-armed, submarine-launched ballistic missiles. He provides an authoritative account of what is known of DPRK efforts in this area, what their implications are for regional security, and what South Korea specifically needs to do to
counter them or deter their use. Sukjoon Yoon is a former Republic of Korea
naval officer and senior fellow of the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy.
Much attention has been given over the last several years to the PRC’s relentless drive to establish sovereignty over the South China Sea through the development and militarization of artificial islands there. Less often remarked is the
place of China’s coast guard and maritime militia in this maritime equivalent of
so-called hybrid warfare. In “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty: The Rise of Coast
Guards in East and Southeast Asia,” Lyle J. Morris examines this transformation
in traditional coast guard roles and missions, by not only the Chinese but their
regional rivals as well, and discusses its implications for security in the region.
Lyle Morris is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation.
Finally, Steven Paget’s “Coming Full Circle: The Renaissance of Anzac Amphibiosity” offers a richly detailed discussion of the renewed, systematic attention that Australia and New Zealand are giving to amphibious operations and
capabilities, in cooperation with the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, and other
regional partners. Steven Paget is a senior fellow at the University of Portsmouth,
United Kingdom.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309).
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

On Navalization

that a leader’s primary responsibility
to the people he or she leads is to articulate clearly his vision for
the future of the organization. In my change of command speech and in subse
quent fora I have identified four broad elements of my vision: that the institution
should Operationalize, Navalize, Futurize, and Internationalize (a new element)
our efforts toward an overall goal of contributing to the professionalism and
capabilities of the nation’s future leaders. I addressed aspects of this vision in the
Autumn 2016 and Winter 2017 issues of the Naval War College Review, and in this
issue I would like to expand on the concepts inherent in navalization.
To anticipate and respond to changes in our strategic environment and best
fulfill our mission, the College will expand the navalization of its curriculum to
optimize understanding of sea control. The strategic environment of today pre
sents access challenges that make sea control more critical than ever before. The
College will align its curricula to teach joint requirements through a sea power
lens. Future war fighting no doubt will be conducted as joint and combined
operations, but the legacy of the Naval War College (NWC) and the institution’s
recognized role as the Navy’s intellectual center for considering issues related to
maritime-focused warfare at and from the sea must be the sine qua non of our
educational and research efforts.
Our Joint Military Operations Department at the College has embraced and
implemented this vision both in the Nimitz course offered by the College of Na
val Warfare at the most senior level and in the Spruance course taught by our Col
lege of Naval Command and Staff faculty. These courses are, first and foremost,
about war fighting and gaining sea control in a contested environment. Both are
designed to challenge students intellectually in the theory and practice of war
I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED
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fighting and are geared toward war fighting that will prepare our future military
leaders to fight the maritime force across all warfare domains.
The Nimitz course incorporates the College’s vision by using case studies
emphasizing the role of maritime forces and their relation to joint warfare. The
capstone design event for the 2016–17 academic year will focus on U.S. Pacific
Command and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. We also will incorporate the work being
done by various other NWC activities, such as the Halsey Advanced Research
Groups, the China Maritime Studies Institute, and the Russia Maritime Studies
Institute, to provide students with the opportunity to deal with current capabili
ties and issues.
The Spruance course objectives focus on developing future leaders able to
cope with the ambiguity of warfare in the maritime domain, and the course en
hances their skills in exercising critical and creative thought in the application
of operational art and naval warfare theory. Sessions on naval tactics have been
added to allow the students to participate in multiple active-learning events.
The use of maritime-focused historical cases is designed to enable students to
understand the evolution of naval warfare, to deduce major concepts of naval
war fighting, and to apply them to a future war at sea. Not since the interwar
years (1919–38) has such emphasis been placed on naval warfare, and with these
changes we are introducing our students to a more-focused approach to theory,
planning, and—importantly—execution.
At the macro level, both courses focus on operational art, critical think
ing, operational leadership, and naval war fighting. These concepts are carried
throughout each session and are designed to develop students who are skilled at
employing naval power across the spectrum of conflict to achieve the maritime
force of the future in support of the joint force.
We also are increasing the influence that a large dose of “salt water” has on our
research and gaming activities. In the past year, the Navy Strategic Enterprise,
through the vehicle of the Strategic Executive Group, has worked to provide more
fleet input into the selection and prioritization of war games. This effort ensures
that naval issues identified by the Chief of Naval Operations and the fleet com
manders are addressed specifically in games and exercises, and the broad lessons
learned from all these activities are captured and shared throughout the naval
force. A new vehicle for this sharing is the Wargaming Virtual Community of
Practice (known as a VCoP), which is currently in development, with an initial
operational capability occurring in fiscal year 2017 on both the unclassified and
classified networks.
Our Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) has strengthened its faculty in
areas of navalization, specifically to address issues such as future fleet design, a
reinvigorated Russian navy, and the emergence of “gray-zone” warfare at sea. The

P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O RU M

research approach the faculty is pursuing fully recognizes and incorporates ele
ments of the entire joint force, in collaboration with allies and partners, through
out the full spectrum of security operations and warfare.
CNWS also is providing expanded support to the academic mission of the
College by strengthening the naval aspect of the core courses through increased
incorporation of wargaming into the curriculum. This includes an evolving and
growing Joint Maritime Operations war game in the Spruance course curriculum
that specifically addresses the unique issues attendant to naval warfare and to
contested war at sea in conjunction with joint and combined forces. In addi
tion, the center’s Wargaming Department has teamed with the National Security
Affairs Department to develop and launch the first National Security Affairs
Decision-Making Simulation game. Exposing more students to the processes
and methodologies of wargaming provides them a deeper appreciation for this
analytical tool and an experiential learning process centered on naval and mari
time issues.
As you can see, we are making strides to be more “naval” at your U.S. Naval
War College. The imperative of sea control demands that we make it so. The
great John Paul Jones once said, “Without a Respectable Navy, alas America.”
Our efforts will help keep our Navy and joint force focused and relevant in the
years ahead.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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EXPORTING SECURIT Y
China, the United States, and the Innovator’s Dilemma
Robert C. Rubel

C

hina’s emergence as an economic and military power has absorbed considerable energy on the part of U.S. policy and strategy makers and pundits. One
of the big questions is whether China will be content as a regional hegemon with
global interests or will seek to displace the United States as the primary global
power. A direct answer to this question is not possible, of course, because even
Chinese leaders may not have settled on an explicit strategy. More likely, they will
react to events as they occur and seek to take advantage of perceived opportunities.
On the other hand, a new perspective on geopolitics might help us develop
insights that could underpin an explicit grand strategy for the United States that
would serve its long-term interests regardless of what Chinese intentions are or
might become. To be clear, this article will not espouse a particular grand strategy; it simply will offer an insight into how Chinese policies might trend, possible
U.S. strategies to counter such policies, and the implications of such strategies.
The insight offered is that China is developing a web of commercial and political relationships with countries with which the United States has conflicts or that
are not a focus of American policy, and that in the long run this might upset the
existing global power structure.1 This is good grist for alarmist and perhaps realist mills, but it is not offered in that spirit. Rather, the issue is as much about the
intrinsic character of the United States as it is about any scheme by China. The
argument required to get to this understanding is a bit intricate, but in the end
the visualization of the problem is pretty straightforward. In the process, we will
need to rearrange the map of the world and to draw in some innovation theory
from the business world.

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 11

2/22/17 9:32 AM

12

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

EMBRACING THE EDGE: MERCATOR GEOPOLITICS
Anyone who has read Halford Mackinder’s seminal work Democratic Ideals and
Reality has seen his schematic depiction of the world as a group of circles of different sizes that depict the continents in terms of either land area or population.2
Eurasia—or, in Mackinder’s parlance, the World Island—is like the sun, with the
lesser continents and islands its satellites.
There are a couple of interesting subliminal messages embedded in such a depiction. The continents are blobs: self-contained, with smooth exterior surfaces.
North America is pushed off to one side, and Africa does not even make the cut
to be shown. The implications of this made sense in 1942; nations were sovereign
entities, and it was state power that governed their interactions. Moreover, as
would be natural from a British geographer’s perspective, Eurasia lay to the east
and America to the west. The world was composed of smooth-surfaced globules
of sovereign power, with the Eurasian colossus in the middle. By 1992, of course,
whatever the globular nature of Eurasia might have been previously, real or potential, it had burst into a bunch of smaller bubbles.
If we now consult Mercator charts of the world, we see that they tend to be
published in one of three ways: with the Americas in the center and Eurasia split
in half; with the Americas on the left and Eurasia on the right, with the Pacific
Ocean split in half; or, less often, with the Americas on the right and Eurasia
on the left, with the Atlantic split in half. The three depictions reflect both cartographic convenience and cultural bias. None of these depictions contain any
inherent geopolitical meaning. However, there is a fourth way to lay out the map
that does have such meaning. In the spring of 2012, the Naval War College created a massive twenty-four-by-forty-four-foot world map that was used as the basis
for a fleet synchronization conference attended by almost all the U.S. Navy’s top
admirals. On this map were arrayed hundreds of ship models and unit markers
representing where USN forces would be on a particular date in the future. The
most revealing and interesting aspect of the whole thing was not where the ship
models were placed, but how the map was configured. The war-gaming faculty,
as a matter of mechanical convenience, had laid out four constituent strips, of
ninety degrees of longitude each, with North America split in half and Eurasia in
the center. The West Coast of the United States was positioned on the right side
of the map and the East Coast on the left.
The first compelling impression to arise from this arrangement was that the
U.S. Navy does not deploy out from the United States; rather, it converges on
Eurasia. While perhaps a new insight, the actual practice of convergence has been
the norm since 1944; Samuel P. Huntington codified it brilliantly in his 1954 U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings article “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.”3
However, on deeper reflection, we see that convergence is simply a physical
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manifestation of a more fundamental geopolitical reality: the United States is
simultaneously a Pacific and an Atlantic power. But even this relatively obvious
truism floats on a yet deeper reality. The fact that the United States could be split
in half and consigned to the edges of the map implies that there is nothing of geopolitical importance happening between New York and Los Angeles. This reflects
the unified political control on a continental scale that so spooked Mackinder.
Another way to put it is that the United States is a continent-sized island; but this
also is too confining a perspective. Rather, the United States is viewed best as an
“edge” power; an externality; the New World grown up and powerful, extending
its economic and ideological tentacles into Eurasia from the edges of the map.
But that is not the end of it. Because the United States must reach out across
the seas, it is inherently a maritime power. An authoritarian continental power
worries about the internal security of the regime first, but what happens on its
borders runs a close second. The United States, as a democratic maritime power,
looks at the world in a fundamentally different way. As far back as when Hamilton was writing (many of) the essays in the Federalist Papers, the following logic
was operative, at least in the mercantile New England and Mid-Atlantic states: if
what happens overseas affects what happens here (and of course it always has),
then the United States must have a voice in and influence on what happens over
there. This outlook informed Hamilton’s reasoning that a strong federal navy
operating in the Western Hemisphere could exert influence on European powers
to extract favorable economic and security policies.4 The maritime perspective
focuses on movement and communications, not borders and positions. Maritime
powers, by means of securing command of the sea, maintain sanctuary for their
economies during war, maintain credible contact with allies, and retain various
strategic maneuver options. Webs of allies, trading partners, and friends are essential elements of a successful maritime approach to grand strategy.
For all these reasons, the bisected view of the United States on a Mercator
world map produces useful insight. Whether the United States is categorized as a
global hegemon, an economic empire, or simply a global leader, this perspective
illustrates to us that a convergent engagement with Eurasia is almost a geopolitical inevitability; true isolationism never was, nor ever will be, a viable policy.
As an edge power, the United States always is looking inward on the rest of the
world, not outward from its coasts. Amplifying this effect is the national sense
of mission created by the American philosophy of governance as embodied in
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The values of liberty and
human rights are assumed to be universal, and they are protected best by means
of a democratic form of government. This is an affirmative ideology that must be
proselytized to confirm legitimacy.
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Owing to geographic and historical circumstances, the United States is the
only nation that could be an edge power. Other nations have made and will
make bids for global dominance, but none are situated so perfectly, imbued so
liberally with key resources (e.g., arable land, water, energy, minerals), and politically cohesive. While not claiming that the ascendance of the United States is an
inevitable and permanent feature of the world, the edge view indicates that the
geopolitical deck is stacked in its favor.
However, reading between the lines, as it were, we can see that American
policies and strategies matter greatly in Eurasia because the United States cannot
leave well enough alone. Influence and intervention have been the norm, not the
exception. For Eurasian continental powers, this makes the United States, in effect, a nosy and pushy great power on their borders.
COPING WITH THE CENTER: MACKINDER’S GEOPOLITICS
Life is tough in Eurasia, especially for those who wish to govern. Its history is a
sweeping panorama of invasions and counterinvasions, of empires created and
destroyed. The latest grand redrawing of national borders occurred when the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea and
fomenting of rebellion in Ukraine are still boiling. It is hard to regard frontiers as
settled matters in Eurasia; a number of active boundary disputes still exist.
The complex geography of Eurasia has spawned multiple, highly distinct
cultures that, while mutually enriching in various ways, are frequently hostile to
each other. Repeated invasions and migrations over the millennia have created
an ethnic patchwork that virtually guarantees that any geographically expansive
great power that emerges is bound to be some form of polyglot empire within its
so-called national boundaries. Most often, this results in an authoritarian regime.
Strongpoints—garrisons—must populate the national territory to prevent pieces
from breaking away.
Eurasian continental powers thus look from the center outward in terms of
national security. Security starts with the capital and radiates outward. Borders,
for a continental power, are frequently problematic. In the best case, they are
formed by mountain ranges or great rivers that represent an obstacle to invasion
or migration—in or out. When the border is an artificial line drawn across flat
terrain, it is seen, necessarily, as a potential avenue for invasion. The continental
power therefore prefers to have weak, dependent states as neighbors. Even better,
if possible, the continental power’s army garrisons these buffer states. However,
the outer frontier of a buffer state is still a frontier, and eventually the logic of
continental security requires a buffer for the buffer, and so on. There is no logical end point to buffering, perhaps best illustrated by the organic growth of the
Roman Empire; but sooner or later it is halted by collision with another power.
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The continental geopolitical situation has produced two strategic rules that
the principal Eurasian powers generally have followed or tried to follow: (1) do
not engage in two-front wars, and (2) do not allow a great power to develop on
your frontiers.5 Germany violated the first rule and suffered destruction; Russia
and China have been more careful. The second rule is more problematic. Recent
scholarship has revealed that Russia had a hand in fomenting revolution in China
in 1905 and continuously supported multiple opposing parties over the years to
keep the turbulence going and
[T]he United States is viewed best as . . . the
prevent the formation of a
New World grown up and powerful, extendstrong, unified Chinese state.
ing its economic and ideological tentacles into Eventually Mao Zedong and
Eurasia from the edges of the map.
the Communists won out, and
now, after many vicissitudes
for both countries, Eurasia is populated by a strong, economically vibrant China
abutting a weakened Russia. Complicating matters, Russia faces an expanded
NATO to the west, China a rising India to its south. These geopolitical circumstances are difficult enough; but the real problem is the United States.
For the reasons previously mentioned, the United States, as an edge power
looking into Eurasia with a maritime outlook and missionary zeal, threatens both
strategic rules for a continental power. First, because its interests, and thus its
power, are forward, it constitutes a virtual great power on the continental power’s
borders. At various times, American military bases have been established in central Europe, the Middle East, the “stans,” Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. The
United States has conducted major military operations all around the Eurasian
periphery. Second, because of its command of the seas and the inherent mobility
of naval forces, and its web of alliances, economic arrangements, and friendships, the United States can pose or create a multifront challenge for any Eurasian
power. For these reasons, regardless of whether the specific interests of the United
States and a Eurasian power converge or diverge at any particular moment, the
inherent logic of the edge versus the center makes the United States a strategic
headache for the continental power. Détente and economic interdependency are
good mitigating factors, but in the final analysis, it is U.S. ideology, combined
with its economic and military power and its uniquely advantageous geopolitical situation, that makes the country corrosive to the strategic comfort level of
Eurasian continental powers.
Another way to describe the Eurasian strategic headache is to take another
look at our global Mercator chart. Again we see the United States on the edges of
the chart, but a second look reveals the United States as enclosing the Eurasian
world. As an enclosing power, the United States imposes limits on what Eurasian
powers can do. This is true because of the U.S. propensity for and success in
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cobbling together alliances, economic rule sets, and dependencies of one sort or
another. The broad rubric to describe this array of arrangements is the export of
security. Whereas the United States sees all these arrangements as wholesome
measures meant to avert another world war and to advance human rights, a Eurasian power is bound to see pernicious meddling and impediments to the kind
of security (buffer states and neutralized nascent powers) it instinctively desires.6
For these reasons, Eurasian powers struggle against two kinds or layers of
enclosure. The first kind, geographic enclosure, consists of bordering nations,
one or more of which may be competitive, and obstructed access to the world
ocean. This latter issue is a consistent theme in strategic writings from Germany
to China. They view the world in terms of positions and strongpoints, and cannot
help but view straits and offshore islands as prison bars, regardless of who owns
them or is adjacent. Even China, with an extensive coastline, sees its maritime
flank enclosed, and therefore threatened, by the “first and second island chains.”7
Breaking jail necessarily means either politically neutralizing the ownership of
these geographic features or outright seizure.
Even if these geographic obstacles are overcome—and they never have been,
completely or permanently—there remains the suffocating web of U.S. sea power
and all the alliances and arrangements it makes possible. Here again, the United
States sees a “global system” of voluntary members whose growing economic interdependency is a natural and positive trend that enhances prosperity.8 It is the
United States that possesses bases and leased facilities around the periphery of
Eurasia; no Eurasian power has anything remotely similar near the United States,
partly because of the advantageous American geography—the coasts are clear of
islands (other than in the Caribbean) that could be used. When the Soviet Union
made a clumsy attempt to use Cuba, it precipitated a nuclear showdown. What is
out beyond the geographic prison yard of Eurasia is the network of U.S. security
relationships, ranging from formal to tacit—a strategic field of barbed wire.
Conversely, from the American perspective, the world is a wide-open, inviting
place. Only this kind of outlook would permit the adoption of a Clintonian policy
of “engagement and enlargement” in the 1990s and the adoption of an equally
expansive maritime strategy in 2007 based on defense of the global system and a
universal invitation to all navies of the world to cooperate in securing the seas.9
Strategically, life is good for the United States; it is just a matter of keeping the
inmates of the Eurasian prison calm.
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: WORKING THE INTERSTICES
To shift metaphors, the United States is a strategic itch for Eurasian powers that
is hard to scratch. Attacking it militarily has proved suicidal. Its political system,
despite being fractious—or maybe because it is so—has produced a cohesive
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polity; it is not feasible for an outsider to break it. And the United States enjoys
relative (and increasing) resource autarky. What purchase might be found to gain
some type and degree of neutralization?
The answer might lie in the very maritime nature of the United States. A
maritime approach to grand strategy, as previously mentioned, features webs
of alliances, economic pacts, and numerous other forms of interdependencies.
If these links could be broken, the United States would be less able to act as an
edge or enclosing power. Such is an easy concept to describe, but much harder
to accomplish. Eurasian powers, from Rome to the Soviet Union, have not been
very attractive to peoples outside their cultural metropoles. With the temporary
exception of republican Rome, Eurasian powers have been and still are authoritarian states. Such a form of governance might be necessary and even accepted
by the regime’s own people, but extension of this form to others, even if their own
country is anything but democratic, is not received well.
More or less understanding this (although the Tibetans and Uighurs might
disagree), China has adopted a different approach. After Deng Xiaoping overturned Mao Zedong’s dogmatic and sequestered approach to economic development, China began its remarkable ascent. Seeking to head off any reflexive
action toward containment on the part of the United States, China adopted the
mantra of “peaceful rise” and proceeded to join, at least partway, in the process
of globalization that was in full swing after the fall of the Soviet Union.10 China
actually had some political credibility because of its loudly announced policy of
nonintervention. If China was the “Brazil” of Asia, then perhaps here was a nation with which others could deal with confidence—not like a meddling United
States that was always harping about human rights, while its Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) perhaps messed around in one’s internal affairs. When China
eventually got its economy booming, it brought real money to the table, and it
was agnostic on how one ruled one’s own country. Moreover, it knew how to do
corruption right.
Thus, China began working the interstices of the American global network.
Initially, the going was tentative and slow, with mistakes made and lessons
learned. However, as China’s wealth grew and its manufacturing expanded, it
became more dependent on foreign sources of energy and materials. Rather
than accept the risk and dependency that reliance on the global market involves,
China adopted a form of mercantilism in which it attempted to create exclusive
arrangements with foreign companies and nations.
As Chinese global initiatives gather steam, it is interesting to note a certain
pattern. While certainly not ignoring the major economic and political players,
China seems to be trying to establish various kinds of relationships with a variety
of smaller countries that are not much on the radarscope of U.S. interests. These
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include a number of Latin American and African nations as well as countries
such as Greece, whose economy is in shambles and whose attachment to NATO
is not as strong as it once was.11 This pattern of engagement may or may not be
the result of an explicit strategy of breaking enclosure, but the net effect might be
the same regardless. To understand the potential significance of this pattern, we
must shift our focus from geopolitics to the world of business.
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA:
HAZARDS OF BEING A FRONT-RUNNER
In 1997, Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen published a
book entitled The Innovator’s Dilemma that explained the demise of several highprofile companies. Christensen showed how embryonic technologies or business
methods, while not competitive initially with highly refined and successful ones,
through progressive improvements eventually supplanted them, and drove their
producing companies out of business. He termed these embryonic technologies
and practices “disruptive”—as indeed they turned out to be for the companies
that were their victims.
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation involves the relative performance
of companies in a particular market, but one that is characterized by multiple
“value networks”: groups of customers that have differing needs that produce
different sets of values they place on various product criteria. Christensen cites
the computer disk drive industry of the 1990s. Mainframe producers (as customers for disk drives) placed much value on capacity and response times. Desktop
producers (and emerging technology) valued small size and cost. Companies
that focused on building drives for mainframe producers focused on improving
their relatively large drives in the realm of those criteria their customers valued.
Companies producing small disk drives did the same. However, over time, the
general improvement of small disk drives gave them the capacity to satisfy the
criteria of the mainframe customer value network, but at a lower cost. The mainframe value network thus adopted the smaller drives, but, more significantly, the
desktops improved to the point where they could displace mainframes. Thus the
mainframe value network was eliminated, and with it the producers of large disk
drives (which, for various reasons, would not enter the small-drive market).12
Using Christensen’s analysis as an analogy, we might regard the market to be
security. It would seem that all great powers must export security if they are to
achieve the key national imperatives of defense of the homeland, economic wellbeing, and a favorable world (or at least regional) order. Security comes in different flavors, and its character especially differs when seen from the continental
standpoint as opposed to the maritime perspective. Security for a continental
power consists of such things as buffer states; economic autarky, at least in the
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form of a mercantilist empire; and, of course, having no great powers on the border. A maritime power sees security differently, with free markets and collective
defense being key elements. Thus a continental power exports security by building buffer states (you may be tributary to us, but we will protect you) and mercantilist arrangements (you will have a secure market if you sell exclusively to us).
Maritime powers seek to achieve collective security through the establishment of
free-market regimes (a rising economy floats all boats) and webs of alliances (all
of us against the big, bad continental powers).
Thus the United States is an exporter of security of the maritime sort. Because
of the nature of its political philosophy and its experience in World War II and
the Cold War, it exports security on the basis of (1) its massive military superiority and (2) its commitment to
Chin[ese] . . . security comes at a much lower a liberal, international, freecost than American security: no commitments market world order. Those
to refrain from subsidizing domestic industries nations that become allies
. . . , no necessity to respect human rights, and or are willing to abide by the
no pressure to democratize.
rules of the order enjoy the
security umbrella the United
States provides, under U.S. proprietorship. In the post–Cold War world, the
United States had a near monopoly on the market, a bit like IBM’s lock on the
mainframe world in the 1960s. Its value network was nearly universal.
However, in the wake of September 11th, the invasion of Iraq by the United
States started to unravel its value network. Additionally, some nations were
finding the price of system membership to be onerous. “Structural reforms” demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed hardships such as
rising food prices on countries such as Egypt, which had a role in spawning the
Arab Spring revolution there.13 The global financial meltdown of 2008 further
damaged the value network. Add in the alienation of Russia from the West, Arab
hostility toward Israel, neo-populism in Latin America, instability in Africa,
and financial crisis along the southern European rim, and a potential customer
base is growing for an alternative type of exported security. This emerging value
network sets more value on regime security than on human rights, free-market
access, or democracy.
Enter China. Desiring to break enclosure, China seeks to establish a mercantile system of exclusive commercial rights and contracts for resources it needs
to power its economic growth. In doing so, it has a lot of money to throw at the
problem, and the strings it attaches to its purchases and investments are different from and less onerous than those attached to American-system money (IMF
loans, for example). Money of this sort represents security for regimes that are
generally more authoritarian and more socialist. The rather less rigorous quid pro
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quo is an agreement to grant exclusive rights to China for various things, generally the right to buy the country’s resources. Also, it means allowing Chinese
workers into the country; again, in many cases, at least in the early going, this is
a nonthreatening arrangement. Finally, of course, a certain support for Chinese
interests, perhaps in the UN, would be expected.
To date, the pattern of such Chinese initiatives is such that it excites little concern by the United States. After all, countries such as Nicaragua (where Chinese
companies are proposing to dig an interocean canal), Venezuela, and Rwanda
are not of particular security interest and have governments that do not comport
with U.S. values. However, Greece, while it is capitalist and democratic and even
in NATO, is in economic crisis. It is now the recipient of attention from China—
and it may be receptive to its overtures, since Germany and the wealthier European Union (EU) countries are balking at bailing it out. This appears to represent
the expansion of a disruptive technology (Chinese-style security export) into the
American value network. What if Italy remains mired in financial crisis, and it is
China that makes an offer? The potential danger is that, if this process continues,
there will come a point at which the American value network will be displaced,
just as the mainframe computer value network was.
One of Christensen’s tenets is that large, successful companies failed precisely
because they attempted to serve their value network via product improvement. In
so doing they were unable or unwilling to offer a different product that originally
had served a different value network but improved sufficiently to serve a highend value network. The result was that the high-end value network collapsed and
the companies, if they could not adapt, went out of business. America’s product
is security, but it comes with the cost of abiding by IMF rules, respecting human
rights, and adopting democracy (generally, although there are exceptions, such
as Saudi Arabia). The benefit has been a call on the military might of the United
States when salvation is needed, such as with the Republic of Korea in 1950,
Kuwait in 1990–91, or Kosovo in 1999. China has a new, disruptive product.
Regimes in its emerging value network generally gain security (internal vice
external) by having money to buy off the opposition or to pay internal security
forces. China can provide such money, and this security comes at a much lower
cost than American security: no commitments to refrain from subsidizing domestic industries such as agriculture, no necessity to respect human rights, and
no pressure to democratize.
Christensen reports that the disruptive technology initially can satisfy only
the demands of the “low-end” value network. However, continuous incremental
improvement of the product eventually results in it being able to satisfy the demands of the high-end value network. Of course, security is not the same thing as
disk drive capacity, but still we must consider the incipient receptivity of Greece
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to Chinese investment initiatives in, among other things, ports and railways.14
Greece is not a third-world country; it is a member of the EU and NATO, thus—
heretofore—a member in good standing of the American security-export value
network. We may regard this as an indicator of a Christensen-like trend in the
security-export business.
THE WORLD AT CHRISTENSEN’S CRISIS POINT
Christensen’s study was precipitated by the observed failure of several leading
companies across a range of diverse industries. His narrative diagnosis of these
failures reveals that once a disruptive technology is embraced by a start-up company there follows a period during which the start-up establishes a value network
for the new technology and proceeds to improve it to the point that it starts to
meet the needs of the value network of the established high-end company. More
time elapses, during which the disruptive technology progressively takes over the
high-end value network. At a certain point, the established high-end company
finds it no longer can stay in business; this is what we will term Christensen’s
crisis point.
If this analogy is valid for modern global geopolitics—more specifically, in
the great-power security-export market—what would the world look like if the
Chinese disrupted the market for U.S.-exported security?
First, we must remind ourselves that the global system, while dependent on
U.S. military dominance, is not simply a function of it. Rather, it consists of a set
of rules, institutions, and mechanisms that regulate commerce, especially financial flows; provide for some elemental security and justice; and facilitate travel
and communication. Almost every U.S. administration avers that it desires to see
established a rules-based international order. While the U.S. military is clearly
the strongest by far in the world, and while the massive U.S. economy exerts
profound influence around the world, the global system is nevertheless not only
a voluntary club; it is dependent on the willing participation of its constituent
members, both large and small. It is, to put it in Christensen-speak, a value network that generally, since the end of the Cold War, has expressed demand for the
kind of security the United States exports.
But what if China is able to concoct a “disruptive technology,” a new style of
exported security that is parasitic on the existing global system? Providing valuefree regime security, as previously described, while taking advantage of existing
international mechanisms, China’s product spreads not only among small states
but, because of the persistent global financial crisis and structural issues, into
medium-sized or even large countries. Thus is formed a new value network that
eventually might reach such size that it commands a majority in the UN General
Assembly. At this point, perhaps, the U.S.-led global outer enclosure of Eurasia
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would come apart. We already may be seeing the start of this process in the Philippines, with recently elected President Rodrigo Duterte making a very public tilt
toward China, followed closely by Malaysia.15
Given the repeated failures of the Doha Round of global economic talks to
reach consensus on a number of trade reforms aimed at lowering barriers, not to
mention the massive and violent demonstrations that greet the major meetings,
it is not outside the scope of the plausible that structures such as the World Trade
Organization and the IMF either would be neutralized or disestablished. We
then might see the imposition of defensive economic policies around the world,
and coincidentally the establishment of hostile trade blocs. Given the uneven
distribution of resources around the globe, competition, perhaps armed, would
occur over access to them.
The United States, being
[I]f the United States persists in its approach
powerless to arrest this slide,
to exporting security, . . . it risks finding out
likely would establish its own
one day that its value network has collapsed.
economic and security bloc,
basing it on the North American Free Trade Agreement (i.e., NAFTA) and what
is left of NATO. Plausibly, we would see the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
All this would occur because the market for U.S.-style security was taken over in
large part by China, or at least the U.S. near monopoly was broken.
Having broken the external global enclosure, China could work more safely on
breaking the local enclosure. By virtue of its global client list, China could induce
Taiwan, the Philippines, and perhaps others to cut deals or cede islands, such
that China could garrison key geographic features that would turn the ringing
island chains into portals vice obstacles.16 Once this occurred, strategic enclosure
would be broken, so the strategic itch would be scratched, the strategic headache
cured. Assuming the United States finds both the money and the motivation to
maintain a strong navy, the evolution of affairs just described would usher in a
new geopolitical era, unlike any in the past. China would not displace the United
States as the global great power, as was the case when the United States displaced
Great Britain. Rather, China would become a true peer in a way the Soviet Union
never was: it would enjoy global freedom of maneuver, almost commensurate
with that of the United States.
We could use this scenario as a jumping-off point to imagine all kinds of futures, but that is not in keeping with the purpose of this article. Our speculations
to this point seem to indicate that China’s breaking of strategic enclosure would
not be immediately fatal to the United States but would tear apart the securityexport value network the United States painstakingly built over the course of the
twentieth century. It also indicates that the United States has powerful incentives to keep its existing security-export value network intact. However, to take
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a cue from Christensen, if the United States persists in its approach to exporting
security, like the high-end, successful companies that failed by following good
management practices and attending to the needs of their high-end customers, it
risks finding out one day that its value network has collapsed.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS: A DOG’S BREAKFAST
Assuming that an American administration took the view of events espoused in
this article, what strategic options might it consider? Normally, operational military planners like to concoct a list of course-of-action options that is collectively
exhaustive; that is, the aggregate list contains all possible options. Second, the list
should consist of options that are mutually exclusive; if you do one, you cannot
do the others. This goal is hard enough at the military operational level; at the
strategic level it is nearly impossible. Therefore, the options presented here are
not mutually exclusive and, while they do seem to represent the potential range of
things that could be done, there likely are an infinite number of other approaches.
Hence, these options should be regarded as illustrative rather than prescriptive.
Option 1: Stay the Course
Of course, the first option is always just to keep doing what you are doing. For
the United States, that means exporting high-end security as it has done since the
fall of the Soviet Union. The 1995 National Security Strategy clearly lays out the
characteristics of exported American security: “Our national security strategy is
based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and
containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more
that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world,
particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation
is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”17 In other words,
nations that democratize and adopt free-market capitalism will prosper, thereby
becoming more secure and, of course, producing a world order favorable to the
United States.
The great thing about this option is that it comports well with the American
value system. Just as we established a constitutional democracy of majority rule,
we seek (we say) a rules-based international order. This would eliminate war as a
source of insecurity and, of course, leverage the inherent advantages the United
States enjoys in terms of economic power. The problem is that the democratization wave seems to have crested. A number of countries around the world that
democratized in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse have backslid into either
authoritarianism or chaos. Populist and socialist movements have popped up in
places such as Ecuador and Belarus. The global economic meltdown aggravated
this process by dulling the burnish of democracy and reducing U.S. ability to aid
liberalization by providing resources.
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Staying the course is potentially analogous to the actions of the big companies on which Christensen reported—enterprises that failed precisely because
competent management catered to the high-end value network that demanded
the characteristics of their products. Analogously, the American high-end value
network consists of what Thomas Barnett termed the “Functioning Core,” those
nations that are integrated into the global system of commerce and security.
However, Barnett chose to include both China and Russia in that categorization,
which made some sense in 2004.18 However, Russia is one of the democratic backsliders and China never was democratic. While both are theoretically capitalist,
their versions do not comport well with the American notion of a level global
economic playing field. China can be thought of as a start-up company that has
a new, disruptive technology it is trying to market. The danger, as Christensen
points out, is that the high-end company will appear to be doing fine—until all
of a sudden the bottom drops out of the market.19
Option 2: Compete in the Alternative Value Network
Competing in the alternative value network would involve trying to beat the
Chinese at their own game. The United States metaphorically would hold its nose
and prop up nondemocratic or socialist regimes, essentially making them a better
offer than the Chinese. Of course, the United States is no stranger to this strategy,
having befriended any number of questionable governments so long as they were
anticommunist or at least anti-Soviet. The problem with this approach in this day
and age is that the Internet and pervasive media make it hard to do such things on
the q.t. Any administration that gets caught in the act will have a lot of political
damage control to do, both at home and with the members of its high-end value
network. Administrations have been getting away with befriending such authoritarian regimes as Saudi Arabia’s simply because they generally can take care of
themselves. When they cannot, as was the case with Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, a
U.S. administration is in no position to assist.
Another problem with this approach is that it costs money, especially the kind
that is hard to track, as it ends up in places not suitable for public affairs releases.
Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples of this. Huge amounts of U.S. aid ended
up in the pockets of friends and family members of Ayad Allawi, Hamid Karzai,
and other power brokers. For the Chinese, this kind of thing is no problem.
Moreover, the United States is a little short of funds right now, and it is harder to
generate funds that can be moved around “off balance sheet.”
Christensen cites companies that have adopted this strategy successfully by
creating their own internal start-up companies to sell the disruptive technology
and compete in the low-end value network. While this might work for business, it is hard to see how the United States might do such a thing, other than by
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commissioning some other nation to act in its stead. But what nation would be so
inclined, especially given the value compromises that appear necessary?
Option 3: Sabotage the Competitor
If you cannot beat your competitor at his own game, why not take him down directly? This is, of course, what we did to the Soviet Union through containment
and, some say, the Reagan military buildup. This would mean adopting some
combination of containment and economic warfare against China. However,
China is not the Soviet Union. Such a strategy might undercut our own economy,
given the interdependencies that have grown up. In addition, given the particulars of China’s increasingly assertive policies in its “near abroad,” including the
first island chain, such a policy could lead to regional conflict and war, which,
in this age, could find their way into the United States proper. Moreover, such a
strategy likely would alienate our current value network, which is also economically interdependent with China.
It is this option, or at least gradations of it, that many hawkish “dragon slayers”
find attractive. It is realism personified, and has a certain simplicity of concept
that is congenial to those who like to produce weapons, ships, aircraft, etc., and to
those who yearn for the clarity, if there was such, of the Cold War. This is perhaps
a key danger of this policy: it becomes self-referential. To justify the policy, we
define China as the enemy; China reacts in a hostile manner, thus confirming the
going-in assumption. This is otherwise known as a security dilemma.
Option 4: Disrupt the Alternative Value Network
Disruption has been an auxiliary to option 1 over the decades. The United States
covertly subverts regimes that it finds obnoxious for one reason or another.
Since the late nineteenth century there have been at least a dozen instances,
mostly during the Cold War when the United States feared that a communist or
communist-sympathetic government would advance Soviet interests. One problem with such a tactic is that it can backfire and produce a worse regime, from the
U.S. perspective. The displacement of the shah of Iran by a theocratic regime was
the unanticipated result of the CIA-engineered coup that brought him to power.
On the one hand, it would seem at least instrumentally permissible to engage in
such activities if the idea is that the replacement government will be democratic
and respectful of human rights. However, in many cases it has not panned out
that way. Moreover, a number of the countries China is courting already are at
least ostensibly democratic.
Pursuing this option would force the United States to look at itself in the
philosophical mirror. Whereas inciting regime change, whether for ideological
or realist reasons, might have been seen during the Cold War as justified in the
larger context of stemming a global communist revolution, today, in the context
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of Chinese overtures, it would take on a more baldly hegemonic cast. At the least
this would convey the impression of a double standard: internally, the United
States is all about government by the consent of the governed; externally, it is
about security above all—a stance not that different from a Eurasian continental
authoritarian power’s. The United States always has seen itself as an exemplar
of freedom and constitutional government, but pursuit of an inherently cynical,
security-based foreign policy would tarnish that image, ultimately compromising
the security it seeks to achieve.
ANALYSIS: THE PROMOTION OF VALUES IN A COMPETITIVE
WORLD
Many will recoil from the menu of options just presented, and it is called a “dog’s
breakfast” for good reason—there is nothing appetizing about it.
One way to escape from the logic is to deny the analogy, to object that the
global market for exported security cannot be likened to business dynamics.
One major factor undermining the analogy could be the desire of nations for
autonomy. Whereas nations have ceded some degree of sovereignty in the face
of a common threat—for instance, by creating NATO during the Cold War—
generally speaking, countries will hew to as independent a line as their strength
or position will allow. Thus the idea of a value network composed of nations vice
companies is a bit porous. On the other hand, we do see certain attempts, such
as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and some loose coordination among
Central and South American populist countries, to counteract the overwhelming U.S. influence. To the extent that China can knit together elements such as
these, a value network of sorts is created. Admittedly, the analogy is novel and
certainly cannot be pushed too far, but it is at least a different lens through which
to observe the world, and it would be unwise to dismiss it simply because it is
threatening to one’s values and existing worldview.
What is it that comes into focus if we peer at the world through the lens ground
by this article? Most fundamentally, we see the difficulty of attaching American
values as part of the U.S. package of exported security. This attachment seemed
most appropriate and well received in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
However, the emergence of a competitor that at least potentially has the wherewithal to export a different kind of security on a global basis, with a different set
of values attached, now makes our attachment of American political and moral
values too expensive a product for quite a few nations—or, better stated, regimes.
We have to look no further than the crises in Syria and Egypt to see the problem. A desire to displace autocratic rule in Syria has spawned an armed rebellion
that has attracted jihadists and helped spawn ISIS. The displacement of Mubarak
in Egypt produced a democratically elected Islamist government that rapidly
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became theologically autocratic, so in turn was displaced in a military coup, a
result that seems to reflect the will of the majority. Attaching American values to
security makes it almost impossible to render aid to either the Syrian rebels or
the Egyptian military, but this is precisely what Christensen would call for in a
business scenario: compete in the new value network.
Americans hold the values enshrined in the Declaration of Independence to
be universal; the justification for separation from Great Britain rested on that
assumption. The way we preserve those values for ourselves is through a constitutional federal republic. We thus have conflated values and structure, as was made
clear in the quote previously cited from the 1995 National Security Strategy. So,
the American-exported security package carries with it both explicit and implied
costs that may produce an existential dilemma for any number of regimes. Because many nations are polyglot—that is, they are an amalgamation of multiple
tribes or cultures—the self-identity of their citizens is cultural rather than political, so they do not cohere as naturally as the post–Civil War United States.
While the desire for freedom, security, and justice reasonably can be thought
of as universal, the mechanism by which these are achieved is bound to vary in
each case. Because of the unique geographic and historical circumstances of the
United States, Americans generally subscribe to the notion that freedom comes
first, with security and justice being possible only if freedom obtains. In countries
whose circumstances are different, this outlook is almost antithetical to their
cultural identity. Justice is valued above all, with security running a close second;
freedom is something to be desired, but must be regulated in the service of the
other two values. Conflation of values and structure prevents the United States
from perceiving and accepting this. If the United States is to compete successfully
in the alternative security value network, it will have to find a way to become
comfortable with decoupling these two elements.
In the twentieth century, the United States came to be the leviathan that
established and maintained a liberal, trading world order. The nature of the
competition—the Soviet Union—was a defective combination of malignant
ideology and military assertiveness. In this competition, the United States could
export security on the basis of conflating its values and its military might. It won
this competition; but success is a poor teacher of both limits and incisive perception. There is a new competitor and a new kind of competition in the world, and
the United States must both recognize it for what it is and adjust its securityexport strategy to account for it.
This article offers a diagnosis of the nature of the competition that is emerging. While it offers no specific formula for a new competitive grand strategy, it
is hoped that this analysis provides insight into what would be necessary for an
effective new one to be developed.
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PL ANNING FOR THE K AMIK AZES
Toward a Theory and Practice of Repeated Operational Games
John T. Hanley Jr.

O

perational gaming, which includes war gaming, in this context means a
simulation that does not involve actual operations, one in which the flow of
events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those events
by players representing the roles of those involved in shaping the outcomes.1 In
1957, operations analyst Clayton Thomas wrote that “there is no body of theory
that sanctions the common use of operational gaming to seek a solution of a game
through repeated plays.”2 Little in operational gaming has changed since then.
The purpose of this article is to suggest possible
John T. Hanley Jr. earned a doctorate in operaapproaches to, and the value of, repeated operations research and management science at Yale
tional gaming, either by one institution repeating
University, writing his dissertation on war gaming.
A former USN nuclear submarine officer and fleet games or by accumulating data from games played
exercise analyst who employed military modeling to
anytime, anywhere to explore what is essentially
conduct campaign analyses, he used gaming extensively during his service with the first eighteen Chief the same contingency.
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Groups as an
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in 1960 stated:
analyst, program director, and deputy director. He
“[T]he war with Japan had been re-enacted in
also served as special assistant to the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific, in the Office of the Sec- the game rooms here [at the Naval War College]
retary of Defense (Offices of Force Transformation; by so many people and in so many different ways
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Stratthat nothing that happened during the war was a
egy), and as deputy director of the Joint Advanced
Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense
surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze
Analyses. After serving as director for strategy at the
tactics towards the end of the war; we had not
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, he re3
tired from government in 2012 and is now an inde- visualized those.” Although this is an overstatependent consultant.
ment, it is true that repeated operational games, at
the tactical and strategic levels, did allow Nimitz
© 2017 by John T. Hanley Jr.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2017, Vol. 70, No. 2
to understand developments as they happened and
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to adjust his strategy for fighting in the Pacific.4 By the start of World War II, 99
percent of all USN flag officers were graduates of the College.5
This article proposes that repeated operational gaming provides an unparalleled technique for predicting factors governing battles and campaigns and
anticipating actions that would be reasonable for adversaries and allies / security
partners to take, thus eliminating most surprises, thereby better informing operational planning, force allocation, and force development.
Since 2003, the Naval War College has been conducting “Halsey” games with
its students, similar to the way it was done at the College from shortly after 1887,
when William McCarty Little introduced war gaming there, until World War II.6
An analysis of the Halsey games, using some elements of game theory, suggests
promising ways to learn from repeated gaming.
This article addresses a version of the questions that George H. Heilmeier, a
highly respected director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(1975–77), posed when he was determining whether to approve a new project.
WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO?
We are trying to understand the factors governing emergent developments in
the real world through mastering the complexity created by the interaction of
sentient actors—represented by role players, umpires, and game control—whose
behavior, with an admixture of luck and the randomness of nature, affects what
happens. More specifically, we are trying to develop understandings of how U.S.
courses of action (COAs) would interact with those of both allies / security partners and potential or actual adversaries to achieve U.S. security aims.
Specific cases include anticipating the strategies that potential adversaries
such as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Russian military and paramilitary forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and military forces, and Islamic
militants would use against U.S. forces in combat, so as to develop appropriate
capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat them.7 Armed conflict in the future
also will involve a greater admixture of cyber and movements comprising small
groups and individuals that can wreak havoc with terror and weapons of mass
destruction at a level that only states could accomplish in the past. Over the past
decade, Intelligence Community (IC) Title 50 authorities have become a larger
component of operations that are still dominated by Department of Defense
(DoD) Title 10 authorities in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Improvements in our
ability to identify and track “persons of interest” through advances in sources
of information, including biometrics, and the processing of “big data” portend
an expansion of “shadow wars” beyond counterterrorism as the United States
extends these new tools to missions such as counterproliferation, counterintelligence, and long-term competition with potential state adversaries. Going beyond
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the war-gaming techniques of the period between the world wars, we are trying
to anticipate future equivalents to the kamikazes.
This effort involves two major objectives. The first is to understand the logic of
the competition under study to identify governing factors and anticipate how the
key players may act. The second is to create a common vision and commitment
to action among relevant policy makers and commanders. Gaming is a powerful
method for simultaneously mastering complexity, enhancing communication,
stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus and a commitment to
action.8
HOW IS THIS DONE AT PRESENT?
The major militaries of the world have used war gaming for over two centuries to
simulate the logic of combat. Before the development of operations research (OR)
in World War II, war gaming and field exercises were the primary techniques
military organizations employed to create the synthetic experience of war. While
using operational gaming to predict the outcomes of engagements is exceedingly
problematic, given the number of factors not under the control of the participants, war gaming has a history of predicting accurately the factors governing
battles and campaigns that actually emerged during subsequent operations.9 War
gaming was a continuing activity at places such as the Naval War College and
within German and Japanese military commands, by which participants studied
operational challenges during the years between the world wars.
Following World War II, computer-based combat and campaign simulation
largely replaced war gaming within the Pentagon, although the earlier practice
continued in military colleges and operational commands. Repeated operational
gaming within DoD is rare today. Although many institutions within DoD game
elements of the same contingencies, these institutions and their supporting contractors have few incentives to share game details and outcomes.10
As noted, the role of war gaming in military decision making diminished significantly from the World War II era with DoD’s adoption of OR’s cousin, systems
analysis. DoD largely turned to computerized combat and campaign simulations
for operational, force, and procurement program planning. The models used in
these simulations are direct descendants of those developed during World War
II. When computerized combat simulations are used for operational planning,
the forces and systems available are generally fixed, and alternative operational
courses of action are explored; when these simulations are used for systems
analysis, the operational concepts are fixed, and alternative systems are explored.
This process does not capture the coevolution of technology and operational concepts as well as operations, gaming, and field exercises did in the past. Furthermore, when using computer simulation, it is the analyst developing the models

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 31

2/22/17 9:32 AM

32

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

and analyzing the results who derives the experience rather than those directly
involved in making policy or military decisions. In contrast, games provide decision makers themselves with direct experience in working through anticipated
contingencies.
Recently, DoD leadership has directed a reinvigoration of war gaming.11 The
vast majority of games that DoD elements conduct explore a “wicked problem”
for a day to a week to gain some insights. Characteristics of a wicked problem
include that the problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution, and that the solution uncovers other problems to be resolved.12 These games
explore essentially one course of action, which is principally a function of the
scenario and the participants in that game.
In 2003, the Naval War College initiated the Halsey series of games to provide
students with in-depth experience in developing campaigns against potential opponents they might face when occupying more-senior positions later in their careers.13 Some of these games have used a two-sided “metagame” approach for examining alternative Red (i.e., opponent) objectives. This approach gives one side
foresight of the other side’s strategic concept for conducting its campaign, and
then turns the tables iteratively until neither side can do better.14 Once neither
side can gain by changing its strategy—known in game theory as a “Nash equilibrium”—the games move on to examine a different Red objective and campaign
approach. This is a valuable technique that explores a broader strategy space than
single games and leads to interesting equilibriums that suggest what would be
reasonable behavior for the various traditional and nontraditional forces involved
in the fight. However, the number of games a Halsey team can play is limited. The
program began playing one game per trimester, which evolved to one iteration
per year to allow detailed exploration of tactical and logistical details. The Halsey
approach is unique to the Naval War College.15
Few gamers know or appreciate game theory and how it should inform their
gaming efforts. John von Neumann initiated game theory in 1928 as a rigorous
approach to games such as poker and to economic and sociological problems that
“involv[e] . . . questions of parallel or opposite interest, perfect and imperfect information, free rational decision or chance influences.”16 In 1944, along with Oskar Morgenstern, he published these concepts in Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Although the mathematics is relatively simple, game theory is arcane,
requiring detailed study to apply, and has few military practitioners. The comprehensiveness of the concepts, the focus on game-theoretic “solutions,” and the
application to economic behavior based on Homo economicus rather than deontic
logic have deterred gamers from studying game theory, and thus the perceived
value of applying game theory to gaming has been limited.17
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Although several papers in the 1950s and ’60s were published applying game
theory to military topics, finding instances where game-theoretic analyses have
influenced military decisions is rare, particularly recently.18 Whereas war games
are rich (complex) in detail, the vast majority of game-theoretic results come
from toy models that strip away context important to actual decision makers.
“For some games, game theory will suggest a ‘solution’ to the game, that is a best
way of playing the game for each person involved; but for most games describing
real problems all it can do is rule out some types of decision and perhaps suggest
which players will [have incentives] to work together.”19 Careful application of
game theory can illuminate structural details underlying operational gaming that
assist in the formulation of strategy.
The core of OR techniques involves mathematical programming for optimization using deterministic models, stochastic models incorporating probabilities, and statistics for estimating expectations.20 None of these techniques
accommodate complex adaptive systems, such as human decision and learning.
Approaches for dealing with complexity to understand the logic of the underlying phenomena, enabled by advances in computer simulation and biological
rather than statistical and mechanical paradigms, are relatively new. Techniques
such as genetic algorithms employing fitness landscapes, cellular automata, and
agent-based models for understanding self-organization and emergence of new
phenomena have blossomed over the past three decades, but as yet are on the
margins of DoD and IC analysis.21 Entities such as the Santa Fe Institute and the
New England Complex Systems Institute have formed to bring together scholars
from a wide range of disciplines and educate a new generation of analysts in these
techniques.
Commercial gaming technology has advanced. Outside DoD, computerized
games have become a ten-billion-dollar industry, with 67 percent of U.S. households playing video games for an average of eight hours per week.22 An even
larger fraction of the population in countries such as the Republic of Korea enjoys
computer games. Within DoD, the Naval Postgraduate School and its sponsors
have pursued efforts such as the Army Game Project for familiarization and recruiting and the Massive Multiplayer Online Wargame Leveraging the Internet
(known as MMOWGLI) to foster innovation through crowdsourcing. The Navy
originally developed a game for training and tactical development that became
Harpoon Advanced Naval Warfare. Jane’s Combat Simulations / Electronic Arts
teamed with companies that do simulation and training for DoD to produce
games such as 688-I and Fleet Command. These games contain high-quality data
for expected systems performance. The PLA recently developed similar games
to promote public interest and recruitment. However, a wide gulf exists between
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the commercial and military gaming communities, with the former incentivized
by the entertainment value of the game and the latter emphasizing the validity of
combat models.23
WHAT IS NEW AND WHY MIGHT IT BE SUCCESSFUL?
In a sense, this article’s central proposal is far from new. A century ago, Rear
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske recommended a similar approach in The Navy as a
Fighting Machine:
By this scheme, a body of officers at the Navy Department would occupy their time
wholly in studying war problems by devising and playing strategical and tactical
games ashore and afloat. After each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of
the staff, each distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed
in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture film. In the solution
of problem 99, for instance, there might be 50 situations and therefore 50 photographs. These photographs, shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of the
successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes in books on chess
and in newspapers. Now if the film photographs were so arranged that the moves in
the approved solution of, say, problem 99 could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and
as quickly as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games could be
conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that would probably come up
in war would be portrayed; and the moves made in handling those situations would
form valuable precedents for action, whenever situations approximating them should
come up in war.24

Now, with the Internet, war games played anywhere, or online, can contribute to portraying a wide range of situations that probably would come up in the
event of war. Whereas Fiske proposed using photographs, the proposed approach
for developing and applying a theory of repeated games involves capturing, in
extensive form, “manual” and online operational games played either sequentially by one organization, along with their context; in different times and places
by various organizations; or many times online. In manual games (which may
employ computer calculation in adjudication and may be played online), players
must make decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially, during each of their
moves, taking into account what they know about the current situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the player’s decisions must be quite
clear to the players and simple enough for the players to understand.25
Presentation of game data in extensive and strategic forms (see next section)
allows a combination of game-theoretic and, for larger strategy spaces, complex
adaptive science techniques to analyze the games. Given that this approach
showed promise in analyzing the Halsey games, this type of analysis might
be successful.26 Tapping into games played anywhere but exploring the same
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contingency would increase the space of strategies evaluated beyond what one
team could do at an individual institution.
Useful Elements of Game Theory
Game theory “provides a language for the description of conscious, goal-oriented
decision making processes involving more than one individual.” It furnishes a
methodology to make amenable to analysis such subtle concepts as state of information, choice, move, strategy, outcome, and payoff.27
Games presented in extensive form as a “tree” illustrate these concepts most
clearly. Representing games in extensive form captures the timing of the players’
moves relative to relevant events and representations of what the players knew
about others’ choices when they selected their moves. Figure 1 illustrates two
simple, two-move games in extensive form involving players Red (R) and Blue
(B). The players make sequential moves in 1a, where Blue knows Red’s choice
when making its move, and “simultaneous” moves in 1b, where both sides select
their moves without knowing the other’s choice.28 For simplicity, these games
represent Red having three and Blue having two choices, one branch representing
each choice. A move involves selecting one of the possible choices—a COA. The
moves are numbered and the outcomes are indicated with subscripts that relate
to the players’ moves, e.g., Oij indicates the outcome should Red select COA i
and Blue select COA j. The payoffs to Red and Blue are indicated similarly by
Rij and Bij, respectively. The payoffs are the value (utility) of the outcome to each
player. Should the value of all outcomes be equal and opposite for Red and Blue
(i.e., Rij = –Bij for all Red COAs i and Blue COAs j), the game would be zero-sum.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a method for expressing the utility of an outcome to an individual player as a specific quantity. However, this
FIGURE 1
GAMES IN EXTENSIVE (TREE) FORM
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method is difficult to employ and is made conceptually and practically much
more difficult when attempting to quantify a single utility for multiple players representing different organizations or groups of individuals. In general,
although some situations, such as winning or losing a duel, may be modeled
usefully as a zero-sum game, the more complex the description of the outcome,
the less valuable modeling the game as zero-sum is likely to be. Halsey game
summaries provide descriptions of the tactical outcomes resulting from player
moves and the operational outcome of the game, but the payoffs (i.e., the player’s
evaluation of the outcome and preferences among alternative outcomes) need to
be inferred from the descriptions.
Figure 1b also illustrates two ways to represent simultaneous moves and the
information available to players when they chose their next move. The bubble
(ellipse) around the positions at which Blue selects its move indicates that Blue
does not know which move Red has selected when it makes its choice. The lower
figure is an alternative representation of the same situation.
In a game with more than two players, the sequence of player choices and
moves is represented, adding to the detail above. Game controller and umpire
decisions are treated similarly to a player’s, representing their adjudications as
moves in the game.
If the focus of the analysis is on strategy and payoffs, representing a game
in strategic form may be more useful than the extensive form. A two-person
game in strategic form (also called the normal form) is represented as a twodimensional matrix. Each player represents a dimension, requiring games with
three players to be drawn as cubes; games with more than three players are even
more challenging to illustrate. Figure 2 illustrates the same games as in figure 1,
but in strategic form.
In shifting to the strategic from the extensive form, the move sequence and
information structure loses many details. However, the strategic form of these
simple games shows the importance of information (intelligence). Blue has many
more COAs available when acting with knowledge of Red’s COA than without
that knowledge.29 A strategy in game theory is complete description of the play,
accounting for all contingencies. Here the strategies, or COAs, available to Blue
going from the simultaneous to the sequential game go from selecting either
COA 1 or 2 to selecting among eight along the lines of (1,1);(2,1);(3,1), which
means Blue selects 1 if Red selects 1; Blue selects 1 if Red selects 2; Blue selects 1
if Red selects 3. Blue has one COA for all combinations of the three Red moves
and its two Blue moves. Although transitioning from a multimove game in
extensive form to one in strategic form boils down to a matter of careful bookkeeping, accounting for all combinations of possible COAs in games with many
moves is daunting.
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FIGURE 2
GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM (MATRICES)

(1,2);(2,1);(3,2)

(1,2);(2,2);(3,2)

(R12,B12)
(R21,B21)
(R32,B32)

The strategic form is often easier to use than the extensive form for identifying equilibrium points and any absence of a pure strategy equilibrium point.30
Formally, an equilibrium point is “a vector of strategies such that no one player,
regarding the others as committed to their choices, can improve his lot.”31
The Halsey Games as a Case Study
The proposition presented at the beginning of this article was that capturing the
Halsey game moves in extensive form would provide a comprehensive way to
illustrate the decisions that Blue and Red commanders made in executing their
COAs so that others could see quickly what had been attempted and follow a
narrative of what worked for each side and what did not. This would allow those
others to benefit from the experience of the games. Also, the games in extensive
form would allow direct alignment and analysis of multiple games played over a
span of time.
Figure 3 diagrams Halsey game 15 in extensive form. The game begins with
Red and Blue deployments, followed by Red considering three choices and selecting one. The solid line represents the move; the dashed lines represent choices
not pursued. The numbering convention illustrates which team made the move,
the number of the game, and the date/time of the move. The game involved Red,
Blue, Green, and White, representing different countries. One of the Red choices
not selected in game 15 became the Red move in game 16, which allows adding game 16 to the game tree for analysis (while complicating the illustration).
Following Red’s initial move, Red and Blue, followed by Blue and Green, made
subsequent moves without any intelligence updates to the various role players
on those teams, creating effectively simultaneous moves. Then the umpire and
control team adjudicated a tactical outcome on the basis of the role player moves.
The focus of the Halsey games is on move assessments and the exploration of
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FIGURE 3
HALSEY GAME 15 IN EXTENSIVE FORM

alternatives. The “meat” of the games is in the deliberation of alternatives.32 The
game continued to a culminating point for the purposes of that game.33 In this
way, the moves and outcomes for a play of a game representing one Red campaign
approach may be captured.
Figure 4 illustrates the set of Halsey games at an operational level. Campaignlevel games began with game 10. In these games, Blue knew Red’s strategic concept, though not the tactical details. Blue then gamed one of its principal strategic
concepts against Red’s, using variations over several games, as Red also varied the
details of its strategic concept on the basis of what had been learned in previous
games.34 The variations did not affect the overall operational outcome resulting
from the pair of strategic concepts, which suggests that the governing factors
identified in the games are robust across the variations in the specific COAs
considered. (Although Green also made moves in the games, they did not affect
the game outcomes significantly beyond the initial game conditions, so are not
represented in the diagram.)
Games 10–14 explored Red pursuing one campaign strategic concept, games
15–17 explored another Red campaign strategic concept, and game 19 explored
a third. (Game 18 explored a completely different contingency involving Red
attacking a different opponent.) The U.S. IC provided the initial Red strategic,
operational, and tactical concepts. The Halsey teams then refined these estimates
as they enhanced the effectiveness of Red approaches against Blue and Green.
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FIGURE 4
HALSEY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL GAME TREE

Blue responded with various COAs to each Red approach. The figure illustrates
that Blue strategic concept 1 provided the best operational outcome against Red
strategic concept 1, Blue strategic concept 2 provided the best operational outcome against Red strategic concept 2, and Blue strategic concept 3 (combining
several possible Blue COAs) provided the best operational outcome against Red
strategic concept 3, of those examined. Red and Blue “other” provide place marks
for concepts not yet examined in the Halsey series as of the date the analysis was
conducted. The diagram provides a concise chart for an extended narrative on
the play and outcomes. It illustrates how the games proceeded over time, with
games 10–14 at the top, games 15–17 in the middle, and game 19 at the bottom.
The first game of a new COA spent significant time exploring the motivations
and timing of the players’ moves for establishing the initial conditions.35 Figure
5 depicts a typical set of decisions that Blue and Green would address in each of
these games.
Each game began with Green and Blue either observing Red posture or receiving a démarche. Green then had to decide whether to capitulate or resist, and, if
choosing to resist, whether to preempt Red on warning or to defend following a
Red attack. Blue then had to choose whether to wait or come to Green’s support
immediately. Although the Halsey team explored some branches of the tree in
figure 5, for the purposes of the study Green always chose to resist and defend,
and Blue to support Green. This is a type of subgame for which a rich gametheoretic literature exists, and one example of where existing game-theoretic
work could be used to inform the gaming.36
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FIGURE 5
BLUE-GREEN INITIAL SUBGAME



   

Gaming often is criticized for a lack of rigor and a limited ability to accumulate knowledge. A standard for rigor is whether another group could replay the
game, recognizing that different player or umpire/control adjudication, including
chance moves, will dictate different tactical outcomes, some of which may affect
the operational outcome. The Halsey games demonstrate that, with appropriate
documentation, games conducted by one organization sequentially, or by many
organizations in different times and places, can be arranged to provide a detailed
understanding of sets of feasible and acceptable tactical and operational COAs
from Red’s perspective, and feasible and acceptable Blue COAs for each Red
approach.37
The Halsey games demonstrated that standardized game documentation
should include the following:
• Player moves, adjudication, and tactical outcomes using a consistent indexing system that identifies player, game, and time references.
• Blue should use appropriate portions of joint operations planning procedures, and other teams should use their best understanding of adversary/
allied planning procedures. Benefits of using operations planning procedures include both educating officers in writing orders and improving the
use of gaming in analyzing courses of action. Using the planning procedures of adversaries/allies highlights the state of understanding about how
they approach the situation under study. The war-gaming “process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and
provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that
might otherwise be difficult to achieve.”38 Educating officers in writing
orders was a key benefit of German war gaming between the world wars.39
• The mission analysis should document COAs considered but not played.
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• The geographic displays and synchronization matrices used in the games
for decision making help communicate the concept of operations rapidly
and should be part of the move documentation.
• Control logs should document the tactical outcomes from each individual
adjudication made, providing the “true” state of the world as a consequence of the adjudication.
• The tactical outcomes (intelligence updates) provided to each side, to clarify
the information conditions.
• The control team should consider carefully the trade-off between open
information and contingency planning. As Quade notes (from RAND’s
experience in its SIERRA Project of gaming, which had many features
in common with the Halsey Alfa games), having less information about
adversary moves encourages contingency planning.40
• Routinely documenting the alternative branch points—the COAs—
considered would suggest alternatives for future games, better support
meshing operational games as they are played, and provide information
needed for more in-depth, formal analysis of the games.
• Documentation of any paths that were replayed, if that occurred during the game.
Relevant combatant commanders have sought the results of the Halsey games
to inform their planning, and the Halsey team has proposed a set of low-cost
measures to enhance fleet capabilities to the Navy staff, some of which are being
adopted now.
Extending the Approach to Online Gaming
Conceptually, it is also possible to capture online games in extensive form by capturing the moves of each player in the game electronically, potentially expanding
the COAs examined as more players play the game more frequently. This might
allow the identification of equilibriums and dominant strategies that prevail
against all adversary COAs.41 Whereas manual war games such as Halsey involve
a mix of free-form and semirigid adjudication (using some standard calculations), online games use rigid adjudication, dictating an outcome for each interaction as it occurs. Games such as Fleet Command allow command organizations
and involve adjudicating multiple tactical interactions in a game that approaches
the operational level of war.
Online games usually specify the mission or provide a choice of missions.
Player setup of the scenarios in such games provides much of the information
(e.g., friendly and enemy forces) contained in mission analyses and operations
orders. However, the commander’s intent and concept of operations may be less
clear in online gaming.

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 41

2/22/17 9:32 AM

42

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

This raises the issue of act and action meaning.
[T]he data for behavioral science are not sheer movements, but actions—that is, acts
performed in a perspective which gives them meaning and purpose. Plainly, it is of
crucial importance that we distinguish between the meaning of the act to the actor
(or to other people, including ourselves, reacting with him) and its meaning to us as
scientists, taking the action as a subject-matter. I call these, respectively, act meaning
and action meaning. . . . The behavioral scientist must first arrive at an act meaning,
that is, construe what conduct a particular piece of behavior represents; and then he
must search for the meaning of the interpreted action, its interconnections with other
actions or circumstances.42

In online gaming, capturing a move, such as one unit engaging another, represents an act meaning and is conceptually easy. However, without clear statements
of the commander’s intent and concept of operations, the action meaning must
be inferred.
If the objective of an analysis is merely to assess which COAs provide better
combat outcomes, the act meaning may be sufficient, given a very large number
of COAs being explored. No matter the intent, the moves that provide better outcomes may be clear. Current large-scale, computer-based campaign analyses use
this approach. However, if the game involves any forms of signaling, deterrence,
or uses of force for influence rather than simply defeating enemy forces, capturing the action meaning is essential.
Employing Game-Theoretic and Complex Systems Analyses
Since translating games in extensive form into games in strategic form is a matter of detailed bookkeeping, once games are captured in extensive form, creating
computer programs to represent them in strategic form is feasible. Once the
games are represented in strategic form, finding dominant strategies and equilibriums is conceptually straightforward. With close attention to information
conditions, these data also could support more-sophisticated game-theoretic
solution concepts.
The major complication is in evaluating payoffs, using the description of outcomes. Where those contemplating an operation can review and rank outcomes
quickly from a limited number of player-strategy pairings (or vectors, for more
than two players), doing so for a large number of outcomes created by online
gaming would require scoring criteria. Conceptually, the subjective judgment
involved in selecting scoring criteria is little different from that employed in
quantitative adjudication. Different participants will have different ideas about
the value of a specific outcome, depending on their sophistication and ability to
think through actions beyond the time frame and scope of the game. The commander’s intent should provide the basis for evaluating outcomes, although this
too should be evaluated for how the intent supports national security aims. For
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FIGURE 6
FITNESS LANDSCAPES
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the process to be objective, the adjudication and scoring should be apparent to
the players and analysts involved and allow for reclama and adjustment, if disagreements occur.
Beyond game-theoretic solution concepts, these data may be used to develop
fitness landscapes in which the height of a point on the landscape represents the
value of the courses of action.43 The outcomes of a two-person, zero-sum game
(where the value to one player is the negative of the value to the opponent) may
be envisioned as a mountain range where the height of each mountain is the
value resulting from the outcome of paired courses of action of the players. A
player trying to minimize the maximum is akin to someone looking for the lowest passage through the mountain range. This analogy suggests a way to capture,
depict, and analyze the implication of the values to each player of a set of actions
(moves). Figure 6 depicts fitness landscapes for what payoffs might be involved
in a two-person, zero-sum game and the payoffs to two players in a multiplemove, non-zero-sum game, showing the payoffs over time for the COAs each
side selects on each move.
The intuition is that, just as armies in Europe used the same routes over the
centuries on physical landscapes to attack and retreat, fitness landscapes may anticipate logical paths that a conflict could follow. The analogy of physical terrain
to fitness landscapes could be particularly useful in understanding cyber operations, leading to traditional mission, enemy, troops, terrain, timing, and civilian
effect analysis (referred to as METT-TC) in what is otherwise a conceptually
challenging space to depict. More broadly, fitness landscapes may allow application of developments in complexity sciences.
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IF YOU’RE SUCCESSFUL, WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE?
WHAT IMPACT WILL SUCCESS HAVE? HOW WILL IT BE
MEASURED?
The first level of success would be to involve a much broader range of national
security professionals, particularly members of the military, in synthetic experiences that would inform their preparations for operations, both in operational
planning and force allocation and development. The second level of success
would be to provide decision makers with deeper and more-accurate appreciations of the challenges and opportunities at hand, resulting in wiser policies and
strategies. The third level of success would be a phase change in DoD’s and the
IC’s analytical cultures, weaning them off methods and tools inappropriate for
the complexity of the age.
The thresholds for the first level of success would be the extent of adoption of
the manual operational gaming process by military colleges, then by the broader
officer corps, and then by the Pentagon for force-development analysis. The
threshold for the second level would be the time that senior decision makers devote to gaining synthetic experience, rather than taking briefs, and the effects of
this on security and defense policy and strategy. The threshold for the third level
would be the extent to which this approach replaces the reliance on inappropriate
computer combat and campaign models in DoD and supplements international
relations / political science techniques in the IC. Using operational gaming, in
conjunction with fleet/field exercises and complementary forms of analyses, we
would not expect to create Hari Seldon’s psychohistory (from Isaac Asimov’s
Foundation series), but would expect to take significant steps in understanding
many of the factors that govern the logic of competition and cooperation.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND THE PAYOFFS?
The proposed approach requires multidisciplinary teams, involves both technical
and methodological challenges, and faces headwinds from the current culture of
and incentives enjoyed by the military modeling and simulation community and
industry. Adoption of the approach would require military and commercial gamers to work with game theorists and scholars of complex adaptive systems—each
of whom is not fully familiar with the others’ disciplines. Currently, need-to-know
and proprietary restrictions bar the sharing of detailed game data within DoD
and the IC.44 This prevents accumulation of knowledge from games within these
communities except in superficial ways. The first experiment with representing
the Halsey set of games as a game in extensive form demonstrated challenges in
representing actions at different echelons of command as game moves and attaching values to the outcomes.45 Capturing moves and outcomes from online games
is apparently unprecedented (although commercial games are tuned routinely as
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players discover dominant strategies).46 Analysis of fitness landscapes is at the
early stage of development and has relatively few practitioners.
Employing institutions that are dedicated to education and research and have
long experience in manual and online war gaming (such as the military colleges)
and complexity sciences (such as the New England Complex Systems Institute)
would mitigate the risks of experimenting and demonstrating the conceptual approach.47 In March 2016, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps established a virtual community of practice, or vCOP, for a
limited group of sailors, Marines, and civilians with an interest in war gaming and
provided funding to the Naval War College to provide web-based war-gaming/
experimentation repositories.48 This effort could serve to share the data needed
to construct and analyze games in extensive form.
The major obstacle is the analytical culture in DoD and the IC, as amplified
by the large contract base employed in conducting analyses for these communities. The major payoff would lie in changing this culture and producing moreinsightful analysis that affects senior policy-maker and military decisions more
frequently. Hopefully, part of DoD’s reinvigoration of gaming will result in senior
officials taking the time to participate in games rather than just receiving briefings on them.
HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?
The answer depends on the scale of the effort. The principal costs are in creating
interdisciplinary teams, some of whose members may be part-time consultants.
A team should consist of leads from military planning and gaming, a lead who
has experience working with the commercial gaming industry, a game theorist,
and a complex adaptive systems lead with experience in fitness landscapes. Consultants should include those familiar with combat/campaign models, statistics,
behavioral economics, history, and political science (preferably with experience
in agent-based models). Software licenses likely would be required for commercial gaming technology. Establishing standards and training war-gamers for data
collection would entail additional costs. Several million dollars per year should
be sufficient to develop the practice and exploitation of repeated gaming.
HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
This program should use rapid spiral development. Four years should be sufficient to make or break the concept, although early failures can be anticipated.
The aim for the first year should be to establish game documentation and sharing standards, while using commercial games to demonstrate the techniques
required for online gaming. Military college and other DoD/IC game data
should be available in the second year to learn what works and to transition the
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theoretical approach into early practice. A focus on cyber warfare, with the aim
of developing and analyzing cyber fitness landscapes, would test the limits of the
concept.
WHAT ARE THE MIDTERM AND FINAL “EXAMS” TO CHECK FOR
SUCCESS? HOW WILL PROGRESS BE MEASURED?
Early elements required for success are the ability to document and share manual
games, and to track online game moves and outcomes and represent them as
games in extensive and strategic forms and as fitness landscapes. The next exam
would be the ability to derive the logic of the competition from game-theoretic
analyses and these landscapes. Then the measures of adoption discussed above
will come into play.
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EXPANDING THE ROKN’S C APABILITIES
TO DEAL WITH THE SLBM THREAT FROM
NORTH KOREA
Sukjoon Yoon

T

he navies of both Koreas are capable of conducting effective underwater operations. The North Korean navy possesses more than seventy submarines
that, while aging and relatively obsolete, remain difficult to detect. They are
tasked mainly with disrupting South Korean sea lines of communication. The
Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy (ROKN) enjoys European technological support
and coordinates its operational tactics with the United States; the ROKN belatedly has deployed advanced littoral patrol submarine forces against the threat of
North Korean submarines.1
Although earlier tests, presumably from a Sinp’o-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSB), were of debatable success, North Korea’s test firing on August
24, 2016, of an indigenous submarine-launched
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technologies and the extent to which its land-based missile technologies can be
adapted to SLBMs without further innovations. Regardless, this development
certainly poses a new challenge for the ROKN; its ally, the U.S. Navy; and the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). This challenge requires effective
countermeasures using sea-based antiair and antimissile assets to enhance antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, as well as improved naval cooperation
among the three navies to deter North Korean maritime threats, both conventional and nuclear.
Unfortunately, few good countermeasures are available to the ROKN, and
the situation is complicated by a heated debate between those who believe that
North Korean deployment of a full-fledged and effective SLBM capability is
imminent and those who are not convinced that the three test launches during
2016 represent an urgent threat. In any case, it seems very likely that within a
few years North Korea will deploy SSBs with some limited SLBM capacity. The
ROKN needs to strengthen its readiness to respond to such North Korean missile
and submarine threats, and must seek a way to secure strategic credibility for its
deterrence posture.
This article considers the options open to the ROKN, in the context of its maritime cooperation with the U.S. Navy, to deal with these intractable North Korean
SLBM threats. What is the best approach to take, and what types of naval assets
can reduce the strategic ramifications of North Korean deployment of SLBMs?
The only feasible option appears to be for the ROKN to improve its submarine
forces, placing greater reliance on subsurface forces to provide strategic deterrence. This should keep North Korean SSBs at bay without incurring excessive
reactions from North Korea or other regional states.
NORTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT OF SLBMS:
ANOTHER RISKY STRATEGY
North Korea seems determined to expand its nascent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities to the maritime domain around the Korea Peninsula.
This is the most opaque of all war-fighting domains, and North Korea is deploying its underwater assets with WMD capability against the United States and
South Korea, and even against China, if recent speculations are to be believed.4
For North Korea, operating any class of submarines—whether conventional or
of a more modern type, and whether large or small—represents an attractive new
asymmetric strategic option.5 This was proved by the sinking of the ROK ship
(ROKS) Cheonan in 2010 by an indigenous North Korean midget submarine that
launched a torpedo attack against the corvette in the West Sea (i.e., the Yellow
Sea).6
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North Korea claims that on May 8, 2015, just off the coast of the Korea Peninsula in the East Sea (i.e., the Sea of Japan), it successfully test fired an SLBM
it calls Bukkeuksong-1.7 South Korean analyses, drawing on U.S. defense intelligence agencies’ resources, indicate the missile was launched by a Sinp’o-class SSB,
which are declared by North Korea’s Nodong Sinmun (Worker’s Paper) to be “strategic submarines.”8 These vessels are sixty-six to sixty-eight meters in length, with
a beam of 6.6 meters. The large conning tower is fitted with a single vertically
mounted tube. North Korea has had access to several types and classes of submarines capable of operating as SSBs, through the use of either “Shaddock” tubes or
a very large conning tower tube. These submarines were built by the Soviet Union
at Komsomol’sk-na-Amure and Severodvinsk from 1958 until the mid-1960s
(notably the Yankee/Golf classes) and by China at Dalian in 1964. The first Sinp’oclass SSB, a conventional ballistic-missile submarine, was built in November 2014
at Sinp’o shipyard. There is also some evidence of preliminary SLBM testing at
that time.9
North Korean deployment of submarines carrying one to two ballistic missiles, each capable of delivering a miniaturized nuclear warhead, would be a
very significant threat. Such vessels would be challenging to locate and track and
would provide a mobile launch platform able to attack from any direction and at
a significant distance from the Korea Peninsula. South Korean military analysts
anticipate the North Korean navy will be ready to deploy a nine-meter SLBM
with a range of two thousand kilometers within a few years.10
North Korea’s decision to develop an indigenous SLBM capacity appears to
be an extension of its nuclear brinkmanship strategy.11 Acquiring a sea-based,
second-strike nuclear option complements the nuclear weapons assumed to be
deployed on land-based ballistic missiles. Two major motives underlie these policies: the North Korean regime is pursuing a blackmail strategy to demonstrate
its “true nuclear power status,” hoping thereby to attract more attention from the
United States and perhaps from China; and Kim Jong Un is trying to establish
himself as North Korea’s absolute leader, building a personality cult to match
those surrounding his father and grandfather.12
Kim has a two-pronged policy of simultaneous nuclear expansion and economic development, known as the “byongjin policy,” but only the latter prong
was declared a core political issue for the ruling North Korean Workers’ Party’s
Seventh National People’s Congress, which was held in May 2016, following
an unexplained thirty-seven-year hiatus.13 That Kim Jong Un’s rule is yet to be
consolidated fully is shown by the top-to-bottom purges of political and military
leaders since the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Tak, in December 2013. Kim
Jong Un is hoping to use the development of SLBM capacity to demonstrate his
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vision for a new era, differentiating him from his late father, Kim Jong Il. Kim
wants to be seen as improving living standards for the North Korean people,
but also as building a strong North Korean nation, to which end he is striving
to make it a genuine and acknowledged nuclear power. In this way he hopes
to put pressure on the international community, including China, and also to
bolster his personal support through North Korean patriotism and anti-Western
sentiments.
Kim deliberately has gotten directly involved with the new SLBM system and
also with the new ship-to-ship missile known as the KN-01. The latter is likely a
reverse-engineered version of the Russian SS-N-6, launchable from either Sinp’oclass SSBs or surface platforms.14 According to the official (North) Korea Central
News Agency (KCNA), Kim observed the test firing of the surface-launched
antiship missile on February 7 and of the SLBM on May 8, 2015. These events
were meant to be viewed as a dramatic success, especially in comparison with the
satellite launch that occurred in December 2012.15 That launch was part of North
Korea’s efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable
of delivering a nuclear warhead to targets as far away as the continental United
States. The ROKN and the U.S. Navy tracked the three-stage rocket from its boost
phase to its midcourse phase over the Yellow Sea and recovered debris from the
initial propulsion stage—to North Korea’s humiliation.16
The two-pronged policy of developing nuclear weapons and the country’s
economy simultaneously seems likely to present grave problems for North Korea,
which experienced a severe drought in 2014–15 and is likely to face a serious
shortage of food and a variety of social problems. These will be exacerbated by a
reduction in aid from China and probably Russia and by sanctions over nuclear
and missile development by South Korea, the United States, and Japan. With the
basic incompatibility of the two prongs becoming obvious, North Korea is seeking
a way out of its dilemma by attempting to terrorize the United States and South
Korea. This new threat, of a second-strike nuclear capability, represents a potent
counter to the possibility of surgical military operations by the United States and
to proactive tactics against North Korean military provocations by South Korea.
Majority opinion perceives this scenario as a strategic nightmare, although some
have argued that it actually stabilizes the situation, since North Korea no longer
needs to rely on preemptive attack or a launch-on-warning policy.17
A further ratcheting up of tensions came on January 6, 2016, with a fourth
North Korean nuclear test. KCNA claimed the test was of a hydrogen bomb, but
this is generally disputed. On February 7, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth
satellite launch via long-range ballistic missile.18 The private, U.S.-based research
institute 38 North also has reported that the North Korean Sohae satellite launching station has been upgraded by construction of fuel-storage bunkers; it argues
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that this indicates that the launch of a fifth North Korean long-range rocket,
presumably another ICBM test, is upcoming.19
In summary, Pyongyang seems committed to grabbing the attention of Seoul,
Washington, and Beijing by continuing to pursue a policy of nuclear blackmail to
force their recognition of North Korea as a true nuclear power—which is central
to Kim Jong Un’s consolidation of power.
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES FOR NORTH KOREA’S
DEVELOPMENT OF SLBMS AND SSBS
The true extent of North Korean capabilities remains unclear, and observers’
skepticism abounds.20 Even in the absence of credible evidence that North Korea
is capable of launching any SLBM, let alone a nuclear one, and from a true SSB,
the apparent test firing of its first SLBM could be a game changer that disrupts
the balance of naval power between the two Koreas.21 This view has dominated
press coverage in South Korea.22 If North Korea’s new capability is confirmed, its
sea-based nuclear-power status could strengthen significantly the strategic credibility of the country’s nuclear deterrence posture toward the United States and,
by extension, toward South Korea.
For the near term, however, the SLBM test firing of May 2015 may well impose
some strategic costs on Kim Jong Un’s regime. For instance, the North Korean
pursuit of an SLBM capacity is in clear violation of four UN Security Council
(UNSC) resolutions condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation:
Resolution 1718 (2006), Resolution 1874 (2009), Resolution 2087 (2013), and
Resolution 2094 (2013).23 It also caused South Korean president Park Geun Hye
to take a firmer line with the North, since her most significant diplomatic accomplishment was her strong working relationship with China, on the basis of which
she offered the North the prospect of a “unification bonanza,” conditional on
military restraint.24 President Park’s insistence was clear during the North-South
dialogues held in November 2015: “Unless you demonstrate your commitment to
denuclearization, you will get nothing from the South: you should be convinced
of this fact.”25 President Park’s subtle diplomatic maneuvering, intended to influence China’s attitude toward the two Koreas, can be seen in her courageous participation in the 2015 China Victory Day Parade, a distinctly military occasion,
despite strong objections from Washington and Tokyo.26
Indeed, following the latest round of sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution
2270 following North Korea’s January 6, 2016, fourth nuclear test, President Park
insisted that the North abandon its nuclear ambitions entirely: “[D]espite North
Korea’s continuous saber rattling through nuclear and missile tests and its defiance of UNSC resolutions, any future provocations will be met with robust retribution.”27 The security situation on the Korea Peninsula has deteriorated further

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 53

2/22/17 9:32 AM

54

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

since the latest sanctions, with North Korea repeatedly firing short- and mediumrange missiles and also broadcasting video mock-ups of military landings and
preemptive drills targeting South Korea’s capital and U.S. cities.28 Meanwhile, U.S.
president Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” has given North Korea
scant room to maneuver, despite the United States becoming more accommodating toward Cuba and Iran. More seriously, from Kim Jong Un’s perspective,
China has become a less reliable ally for North Korea, with ideological ties being
given less weight than before.29
Various commercial satellite images indicate, and some military and private
intelligence agencies monitoring North Korean SLBM and SSB development suggest, that the North Koreans are encountering some serious technical difficulties:
they are using liquid propellant rather than the superior solid variety, as shown
by a distinct lack of white smoke in images; and there are problems with the condensed air propulsion to eject the SLBM above the water’s surface, as evidenced
by the use of a vertical launch tube to push the missile out of the conning tower.
Further problems arise from the need to adapt to the length and beam of the
available SSBs, which are rather too small to accommodate the SLBMs’ “plug-in/
plug-out” design. North Korea’s SSB is apparently the product of reverse engineering 1970s vessels built by Russia and China.30 The London-based IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly analyzes the North Korean KN-11 SLBM as being similar to the
Soviet R-27 Zyb / SS-N-6 Serb SLBM; North Korea is known to have acquired
some of these missiles in 2003.31
It also has been reported that on November 28 and December 12, 2015, attempted follow-on test firings of KN-11 SLBMs from Sinp’o-class SSBs resulted
in failure, so perhaps North Korea’s Sinp’o-class SSB will remain nothing more
than an impractical prototype, similar to those of Russia and China during the
1960s.32 Furthermore, even if SLBMs can be launched reliably, a great deal more
would be involved before the North Koreans could establish a submarine-based
second-strike nuclear attack capability, and they are very far from achieving the
operational capabilities and technological innovations required for the continuous at-sea deterrent nuclear capability that other powers maintain. Indeed, South
Korean analyses suggest that North Korea may acquire just a single prototype of
the Sinp’o-class SSB, with a single vertical launch tube for SLBMs.33
In summation, U.S.-ROK combined military intelligence agency analyses
conclude that this submarine was built at the Sinp’o shipyard, on the basis of
1960s technologies, by reverse engineering Golf-class SSBs acquired from the
Soviet Union; that it can carry a maximum of three KN-11 SLBMs; and that it
would be incapable of operating as a far-sea strategic nuclear deterrent without
significantly enhanced far-sea command-and-control systems and capacities.34
Russia and China have preferred to deploy their SSBs and SSBNs in a near-sea
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environment—the so-called bastion strategy, whereby nations with a continentally oriented naval strategy, lacking sufficient deep-sea control, seek to maximize
the chances of operating an effective second-strike capability.35 It therefore seems
impossible that North Korea could deploy its SSBs for far-sea strategic-deterrent
patrol operations, since this would require surface combatant task units centered
on aircraft carriers.
Even if North Korea succeeds in building indigenous SSBs by copying Russian
and Chinese models, ejecting an SLBM from a vertical launch tube through the
large conning tower of the Sinp’o-class SSB remains a formidable challenge. The
Washington Free Beacon, an online news site, reported on December 10, 2015,
that a Sinp’o-class SSB had been damaged after it failed to eject a KN-11 SLBM
(or perhaps a submarine-launched cruise missile [SLCM]) properly off the coast
of Wonsan in North Korea.36 If this U.S.-originating report is correct, the failure
represents a serious setback for North Korea’s SLBM and SSB program.37
Those with a skeptical view of North Korea’s progress can point to the small
size of the Sinp’o-class SSB, which seems inadequate for SLBM launching. A
South Korean think tank has argued that the SLBM test firing was completely
fabricated to support Kim Jong Un’s pretensions to lead a true nuclear power and
to bolster the personality cult of the Kim family.38 Since the KN-11 SLBM’s length
is nine meters, the Sinp’o-class SSB’s length appears too small, unless North Korea
has redesigned the submarine; and since the KN-11 SLBM has a range of less than
two thousand kilometers, the Sinp’o-class SSB is not capable of carrying out an
attack on the continental United States, for which a much larger vessel (of more
than three thousand tons) would be required.39 Moreover, analysis of the recovered debris from the first stages of North Korean rockets launched in December
2012 and February 2016 has revealed that North Korea lacks the materials and
the fabrication skills that other navies with SLBM capability employ.40 China’s
Global Times revealed that, surprisingly, the main body of the KN-11 SLBM appears to be made of reinforced glass fiber rather than the carbon fiber usual for
modern, advanced missiles.41 Chinese military analysts also have argued that
North Korea appears to lack confidence in its preliminary SLBM trials: apparently it conducted ejection tests using a stationary submersible platform.42
Such doubts about North Korean capabilities have been partially resolved by
photographs and video footage released by KCNA of the three launches on April
23, July 9, and August 24, 2016.43 One day after the latest test, North Korea’s
state-run website Uriminzokkiri claimed a fully successful flight test of an SLBM
following the earlier ejection tests. The missile was fired at a very steep angle
and flew about five hundred kilometers (311 miles) toward Japan, falling into
the East Sea within Japan’s air defense identification zone; had it been fired at a
shallower angle, it could have flown more than a thousand kilometers. The U.S.
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and South Korean militaries report that the 2016 tests were probably powered
by solid rather than liquid propellant, and also confirm that they were launched
from below the surface of the water, presumably by compressed gas, judging by
the narrow translucent exhaust plumes; this cold-launch technology represents
a significant milestone. Some video images of the loading and launch appear to
show a larger submarine than the Sinp’o-class SSB used for the previous tests;44
it seems that this latest test was conducted from a new type of SSB, of the Gorae
class (after the Korean word for dolphin), displacing approximately two thousand tons and equipped with a vertical launch tube.45 Both the Sinp’o and Gorae
classes have limited endurance and missile-carrying capabilities, however, and
South Korean analysts have speculated that the Gorae class is an experimental
prototype intended to pave the way for larger SSBs with better endurance, which
may well be nuclear powered.46
This demonstration of several important SLBM technologies, including underwater ejection and initial attitude control and an improved underwater platform, lends weight to the fear that North Korean SLBM capabilities could mature
much more quickly than previously believed.
IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN SLBMS FOR SOUTH KOREA
AND ITS NEIGHBORS
There are two distinct schools of thought about the viability of North Korea’s capacity to operate its KN-11 SLBM system. Opinions differ on the progress North
Korea has made toward the miniaturization of nuclear warheads for long-range
delivery, the authenticity of its SLBM test firings, and the feasibility of deploying
full-fledged SSBs in the East Sea.
The Optimists
Some see little immediate cause for concern, arguing that North Korea’s missilerelated technologies and systems for submarine-launched and long-range missile
strikes are insufficient.47 They also cite its lack of far-seas operational experience
and proficiency, the inadequacy of Russian and Chinese Golf-class SSBs, and
the weakness of the Sinp’o naval base where the SSBs are constructed—satellite
imagery shows the base has a simple flat-top design, in contrast to the complex
zigzag features of Russian and Chinese naval bases, implying a lack of sophistication in the comparable Sinp’o facilities. Rumors abound that during the mid1990s North Korea purchased Chinese and Russian Golf-class SSBs as scrap,
using them as the Chinese navy did in developing its first-ever aircraft carrier
in 1997 from a Russian vessel.48 Such views mainly come from U.S. and South
Korean defense experts, who believe that North Korea would need considerable
time and effort before it could deploy SSBs with SLBM capability to conduct true
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strategic-deterrence patrol missions, and that doing so would require clandestine
technical support from both China and Russia.49
The Pessimists
In contrast, many serving and former naval officers are very worried about North
Korean progress in operating SSBs with SLBM capabilities. They cite North
Korea’s secretive technological collaboration with China and Russia on ballistic
missiles and submarines; its long experience in developing land-based, threestage ballistic missiles under the pretext of launching commercial satellites; and
the many circumstantial indications that it has miniaturized its nuclear warheads
successfully. The recent ceremonial military parade in Pyongyang provided especially noteworthy evidence:50 display of a modified version of the liquid-fueled
KN-08 ICBM, apparently with a small nuclear warhead. The KN-11 SLBM appears to be a new version of the KN-08.51 These naval officers also mention recurring evidence of land-based tests of a submarine ejector system using vertical
launch tubes, conducted at an island off Sinp’o.
Common Concerns: South Korea, Its Neighbors, and Its Allies
Both sides agree, however, that the North Korean test firing used an SLBM, not
an SLCM; that problems remain with miniaturizing nuclear warheads and with
developing missile-ejection technology; and that North Korea intends to acquire
SLBM capability with WMD warheads, whatever the costs and consequences. It
is therefore just a matter of time before North Korea deploys indigenous KN-11
SLBMs in Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs. However, in addition to this SLBM threat,
some South Korean naval and security experts argue that North Korea may
be able to develop SLCMs as well. In October 2015, the Russian Project 636.3
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine (SSK) Rostov-na-Donu fired multiple Kalibr
(3M-14) SLCMs through its torpedo tubes, from the Caspian Sea into Syria’s Ar
Raqqah province. Many lesser naval powers have acquired Kilo submarines, and
North Korea may be intending to make use of the Russian SLCM experience and
technologies.52 Kalibr SLCMs carry a five-hundred-kilogram warhead, have a
range of two thousand kilometers, and are accurate within a few meters.53
The two sides differ on the timescale of when North Korea will be able to deploy indigenous SLBMs carried by Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs, with the pessimists
anticipating sometime in 2017 as the earliest this might occur.54 If such views
prove correct, this would be a grave concern for South Korea and other countries
in the region, as well as for the United States.55 Military experts and security
analysts from both sides of this debate, in Seoul and in Washington, were caught
out by North Korea’s development of an SLBM capability, which further increases
the threat its weapons of mass destruction pose.56 It is certainly true that missiles
launched from underwater assets are more difficult to detect and intercept than
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land-based ones, and as North Korea’s SLBM capabilities expand into the deep
seas this problem will become more serious, threatening South Korea, Japan,
and U.S. bases in Northeast Asia, and also complicating U.S.-led theater missiledefense planning. The wider regional character of North Korea’s agenda is clear
to the military establishments in Seoul and Washington.57
These developments also affect South Korean plans for an indigenous missiledefense system intended to guard against potential missile attacks from both
China and North Korea.58 South Korea’s National Security Committee considers
that North Korean SSBs carrying land-attack missiles would complicate regional
missile-defense planning seriously, since the system under development and due
for completion by 2020, known as the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD),
only targets North Korean aircraft.59 Therefore the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is attempting to change the conceptual framework of KAMD from
a proactive defense posture to a preemptive one. North Korean SLBMs would be
targeted in ports capable of harboring SSBs.
Accomplishing this likely would require U.S. cooperation to enhance KAMD’s
competency. Moreover, bilateral negotiations are taking place between the U.S.
Department of Defense and the ROK MND about deploying the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on South Korean soil, although the U.S.
Army would operate it; however, the results of the recent election in South Korea
have cast doubt on the political feasibility of this deployment.60 The Japanese
defense minister also recently referred to this issue publicly for the first time, in
the context of protecting Japanese and U.S. forces in Japan.61 On June 28, 2016,
the U.S. Navy, the JMSDF, and the ROKN conducted their first joint missiletracking naval exercise, code-named PACIFIC DRAGON, off the coast of Hawaii,
on the sidelines of the Rim of the Pacific exercise (known as RIMPAC). PACIFIC
DRAGON focused on improving tactical and technical coordination among the
three navies. It included live ballistic target tracking, with each navy’s Aegis
ballistic-missile defense (BMD) system sharing tactical data.62
North Korea and China
Even China has expressed serious concerns about North Korea’s third SLBM
launch, on August 24, 2016, and its fifth nuclear test, on September 9, 2016,
and has criticized North Korea’s claim to be a nuclear-armed state.63 In light of
the WMD threats from North Korea, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s ambitious
but ambiguous “True Maritime Power” initiative may be impacted, with China’s
neighbors wondering who is responsible for North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy
and perhaps also having second thoughts about participating in China’s “One
Belt, One Road” initiative, given the prospect of wider geopolitical fallout. 64
North Korea also fears President Xi’s ambitious plans to establish a “New Type of
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Great-Power Relations” with the United States. China is distracted further by territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Indeed, there is some evidence
of a shift in Chinese policy toward North Korea, especially China’s collaboration
with the United States and Japan to pass stricter sanctions, via UNSC Resolution 2270, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM tests in January and
February 2016.65 Despite Xi Jinping’s apparent endorsement of Kim Jong Un in a
formal letter in October 2015, the Chinese are surely aware of the geopolitical and
strategic implications of North Korea’s latest nuclear test, on September 9, 2016.66
The growing disharmony between China and North Korea has been manifest
even in the dimension of popular culture: a five-day Chinese tour by the allfemale North Korean musical group Moranbong in December 2015 was called
off suddenly—just three hours before the first performance. Sources from the
Chinese Communist Party attributed this to “communication issues at the working level” with the North Korean Workers’ Party, although it is rumored that this
debacle may have been China’s response to Kim Jong Un’s hints about developing
a hydrogen bomb.67
In general, China seems less inclined to provide the political and economic
commitment that North Korea desires; yet Chinese supplies of cash, food, arms,
and energy remain crucial for North Korea. With China proving less tractable, it
is no longer unreasonable to suppose that an impoverished North Korea may be
trying to exert pressure on Beijing, as well as on Washington and Tokyo. Hence
the continued nuclear brinkmanship as a strategy intended to overcome such
external difficulties.68
Yet, although the Chinese are scrambling to avoid being blamed for North Korea’s disruptive behavior, they are unlikely to go beyond the stern words already
uttered; it probably will be business as usual, with China doing the minimum to
ensure North Korean survival and to avoid the threat of North Korean collapse,
which for China would be an even worse outcome than the status quo.
A Chinese monthly magazine dealing with naval matters has referred openly
to the fact that China considers the proliferation of various types of submarine
operations in the East Sea to be a serious problem. China is concerned that North
Korea could create sanctuaries within the East Sea where its low-value SLBM
submarines could operate within a “bastion,” emulating the classic Soviet and
Chinese strategy.69 China is worried that this would convert the East Sea into an
operational theater for Western submarines, disrupting Chinese plans to use it
as a sea route for supplying bituminous coal from three poor northern Chinese
provinces to the country’s prosperous eastern cities. Another problem for China
is that North Korean SLBMs might prompt the ROK to set aside its long-standing
complaints about Japan’s historical transgressions to forge a closer trilateral
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military alliance with Japan and the United States—something China has worked
hard to prevent.70
China doubts the plausibility of North Korea’s modification of the Sinp’o/
Gorae-class SSB to carry and launch its indigenous ballistic missiles. But, beyond
the possibility of North Korea actually operating SLBMs, China seems upset by
North Korean grandstanding in the East Sea in general.71 The Chinese understand that SLBM submarines would need extensive protection from other naval
forces to respond rapidly to hostile forces seeking to restrain the SLBM submarines in confined seas. The prospect of a North Korean deployment of Sinp’o/
Gorae-class SSBs in the East Sea drawing more attention from the ASW forces
of the ROKN, the U.S. Navy, and the JMSDF is most unwelcome to the Chinese
military, especially if such scrutiny extends into the West Sea—a very sensitive
area for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which bases its North Sea
Fleet at Qingdao.72
Although North Korea’s rhetoric remains focused on the United States, alarm
bells are beginning to ring for China as North Korean WMD threats become
reality.
The KN-11 SLBM clearly represents an advance toward building a genuine
SLBM capability, one that North Korea is intent on developing. Recently North
Korea implicitly claimed a successful test (though not a flight test) of a new
ICBM engine that would enable it to strike the North American continent with
a miniaturized nuclear warhead. Several steps remain before North Korea could
realize its ICBM aspirations, but there have been indications of some progress in
miniaturizing nuclear warheads; in testing reentry technology to allow an ICBM
to return through Earth’s atmosphere without breaking up; and in building a
solid-fuel rocket engine, which expedites launch preparation.73 North Korea has
vowed to expand its nuclear and missile programs in defiance of the latest round
of tougher UNSC sanctions imposed in March 2016.
It would be a serious mistake for the United States to overlook the gravity of
the nuclear threat that North Korea represents; this issue will remain near the top
of the U.S. national security agenda.74
THE ROKN’S REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATION: A PREEMPTIVE
ANTI-EXIT STRATEGY
If the worst-case scenario materializes—North Korea technically and operationally perfects its SLBM capabilities and miniaturizes its nuclear warheads for longrange delivery (it is believed to have stockpiled six to eight nuclear warheads)—
the ROKN certainly will need to carry out a wholesale revision of its concepts of
naval warfare.75 It should continue to deter North Korean maritime subsurface
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threats through its existing littoral ASW and antiair warfare (AAW) approaches,
but also must develop new capabilities for submarine deterrence patrols and antiexit operations, as well as intensive air and surface ASW operations, sea-based
special operations, theater missile defense, and enhanced antisurface warfare
(ASUW).
It has been reported that after observing the North Korean SLBM test firing,
President Park Geun Hye immediately ordered the ROK MND to develop appropriate preemptive measures, focusing especially on sophisticated underwater
assets and indigenous air- and missile-defense capabilities.76 The initial emphasis
is on countering North Korean SLBM threats through an innovative military
doctrine, called the “4D military posture” for defend, detect, disrupt, and destroy.77
But it is also essential to establish new operational countermeasures. While the
operational abilities of North Korean SLBMs remain unproven and the specifications of the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs are still mysterious, the ROKN should deter
North Korean submarine and WMD threats by a well-defined preemptive antiexit strategy that entails sustainable long-duration submarine operations beyond
the South Korean area of operations (AOR). To accomplish this, the ROK MND
is planning an “underwater KAMD system.” Detection will employ militaryintelligence surveillance satellites and strategic, high-altitude, unmanned aerial
vehicles to monitor North Korean Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs berthed at their naval
base; tracking will be done by dispatching Aegis-equipped ROKN destroyers and
frigates to the scene; and destruction will rely on intercepting SLBMs with antiair
missiles such as SM-2s launched from surface combatant ships.78
The ROK MND recently published a five-year defense improvement plan,
which proposes supplementing the limited ability of the current Aegis air-defense
system by developing an indigenous theater ballistic-missile defense function or
an air/missile defense capability.79 The ROKN is known to have wanted to implement a limited sea-based BMD system for the existing Aegis-equipped KDXIII destroyers with the SM-6 missiles under development, but this BMD was
considered inadequate for the ROKN’s long-term requirements, and the project
was derailed by political difficulties during the liberal administration of the late
president Roh Moo Hyun. The ROKN’s next three King Sejong the Great–class
KDX-IIIs will be equipped with the Aegis Baseline 9 naval combat system that
features an integrated air- and missile-defense capability, including Lockheed
Martin’s SPY-1 multifunctional radar system. The ships will be constructed by
South Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries and are expected to come
into service in 2020, 2021, and 2022.80
Both the SM-6 and the SM-3 were developed for the U.S. Navy for either
land- or sea-based missile defense. The SM-6 has only a limited capability as a
missile interceptor, so the U.S. Navy relies primarily on the SM-3; but this is a
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very expensive option for intercepting North Korean ICBMs, especially when
the latters’ ability to carry nuclear warheads is still in doubt.81 The U.S. Navy
and the JMSDF collaborated on the development and deployment of the SM-3,
but the ROKN so far has not used this missile on its King Sejong the Great–class
KDX-III destroyers. Having chosen to stay outside the U.S.-led BMD architecture
intended to counter regional WMD threats, the ROK is faced with a difficult
decision. The indigenous KAMD system, even if bolstered by U.S. assistance,
will offer only a brief window of defense against the short-range ballistic missile
threat from North Korea, and both the ROK and its ally, the United States, remain
in the crosshairs of North Korean SLBMs. ROKN acquisition of SM-3s to counter
such WMD threats is not an absurd idea, but it would be extremely expensive to
accomplish.82
North Korea’s SLBM aspirations have provoked operational and tactical turmoil in the ROKN. If it is not feasible to acquire SM-3s or SM-6s to function as
interceptors as part of an underwater KAMD system, there is an urgent need to
enhance far-seas ASW operational capability. The ROKN still is operating its
obsolete P-3C Orions for littoral ASW missions, and has yet to secure defense
budget allocations to acquire replacements. Many naval experts have proposed
acquiring P-8 Poseidon far-seas maritime security surveillance aircraft to support the ROKN’s underwater KAMD system and to enhance its ASW operational
capabilities.83 The Poseidon is the world’s most capable maritime patrol aircraft,
with a state-of-the-art networked ASW system; next-generation sensors, such as
fourth-level, low-frequency, active sonar; and reliable, high-efficiency turbofan
engines. ROKN acquisition of the P-8 would allow greater interoperability with
the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF, which are already operating these aircraft throughout the Indo-Asian-Pacific region, and would enhance greatly the ROKN’s ASW
abilities to detect North Korean underwater assets.84
It is essential for the ROKN to establish a robust and rigorous new concept
of submarine-based ASW to exploit the technical and functional vulnerabilities
of the North Korean SLBMs and SSBs so as to contain them within the bay of
Sinp’o. This will require two major operational changes: increasing the capacity
for preemptive submarine operations and extending the operational areas beyond their present limits. Despite the ROKN’s substantial experience with ASW
in its East Sea AOR, it will not be an easy task to detect SSBs in such a cluttered
and noisy body of water and then to destroy them in the face of North Korean
antisubmarine operations.
Conducting preemptive anti-exit strikes on North Korean naval bases under
the concept of the underwater KAMD doctrine will require changes to several
aspects of current South Korean practice: expanding the AORs, revising rules
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of engagement (ROEs), and deploying ROKN submarine forces in the near
sea around the Sinp’o naval facility. Under the current rather basic guidelines
of defense-oriented ROEs, which regulate how to fight against North Korean
military provocations, the ROKN would have very limited options in deploying
its far-seas ASW assets to deter North Korean SLBMs preemptively beyond the
existing AOR. Open publications from the ROKN and ROK MND explicitly
mention how the ROKN AORs are limited by the northern limit line (NLL) and
indicate that this prevents the ROKN from conducting an effective preemptive
anti-exit strategy.85
In this regard, urgent negotiations with the United States also are needed to
implement a conditional wartime transfer of operational control to the ROKN.
One of the top priorities of an ROK-led wartime operational plan is the expansion of the ROK’s AORs to deter North Korean WMD threats that currently are
being allowed to develop in the shelter of the NLL and the Demilitarized Zone.
Relatively silent SSBs with a low acoustic signature provide very little indication
of their presence and can launch SLBMs without warning. In the complex and
noisy underwater domain of the East Sea, such vessels, once submerged in deep
seas, are very hard to detect, presenting a serious challenge to South Korea’s national security.86
The ROKN therefore needs to move beyond its current littoral ASW operations, mostly conducted by surface combatant platforms in the existing limited
AOR. Two constraints severely hamper these operations: the armistice agreement
between the North Korean military and the UN Command, and the prevailing
operational plans under the guidelines of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, established in 1978. Under the current defense-oriented naval doctrine,
the ROKN is exercising only very limited littoral ASW capabilities, targeting
the aging North Korean Romeo-class submarines and midget submarines. All
ROKN platforms operate within the currently designated AORs: the East Sea,
and south of the NLL in the West Sea. The emerging threat from North Korean
Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs makes an early expansion of the limited South Korean
AORs essential.
Under the current implementation of the ROEs, according to the armistice
agreement, the ROKN can deploy no preemptive assets into North Korean waters, so it is not possible to deploy submarine forces to detect North Korean SSBs
or to conduct comprehensive far-seas ASW operations against North Korean SSB
patrols.87 To meet the newly formulated ROK MND 4D military doctrine, the
ROKN’s operational capacity in the East Sea needs to be expanded significantly
within the next few years.88 Preemptive anti-exit operations in the underwater
domain will require larger underwater assets capable of sustaining long-duration
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missions.89 The 4D military posture also will require technological advances to
detect, track, and attack the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs in today’s increasingly cluttered and noisy maritime environment.90
The ROKN has concentrated mainly on AAW and ASUW, with littoral ASW
capabilities being essentially self-defensive. The kinds of mission so far prioritized
are represented by the ROKN’s acquisition of Gwanggaeto the Great–class KDX-I,
KDX-II (a.k.a. Yi Sun Shin–class KDX-II), and KDX-III (a.k.a. King Sejong the
Great–class KDX-III) destroyers; Ulsan-class FFX frigates; and Chang Bogo–
class KSS-I and KSS-II (a.k.a. Sohn Won Il–class KSS-II) submarines.91 With the
advent of North Korean SSBs, however, surface vessels are clearly vulnerable to
attack unless the ROKN has the resources to conduct intensive ASW operations.
The ROKN is operating an organic ASW air asset, the P-3C Orion, and would
benefit greatly from establishing an underwater sound-tracking system in the
sensitive seas by integrating the ASW resources of friendly navies. In addition,
with the prospect of a near-term North Korean deployment of its SSBs carrying
SLBMs in deep-sea domains of the East Sea, the most opaque of all war-fighting
theaters, the ROKN is urging more sustained development of its underwater firepower with better and more capable sensors and weapons.92 Its next-generation
submarines, the Chang Bogo–class KSS-IIIs, and the Gwanggaeto-class KDX-III
destroyers are expected to have a long-range, land-strike capability, using indigenous long-range cruise missiles, code-named Haesong-III, with a range of more
than a thousand kilometers.93
ROKN OPTIONS
How can the ROKN implement a preemptive anti-exit strategy in the underwater domains to counter North Korea’s SLBM-oriented nuclear brinkmanship
strategy? It needs to acquire strategic ASW platforms to facilitate comprehensive
ASW operations and enhance its ability to contribute to joint or combined ASW
operations with the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF. This will send a strong signal to
North Korea that its plan to operate its SLBM submarines by emulating the Soviet
or Chinese bastion strategy will be riskier than expected. The essential requirement is to bottle up North Korean SLBM submarines and hunt them down in
confined waters, thus effectively countering the North Korean bastion strategy.94
As to the specifics, there are several options for the ROKN to enhance its
comprehensive ASW capabilities: purchase P-8s, build an ASW-oriented aircraft
carrier (CV), or build nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs).95
Submarines
Some important work is already in progress: the ROKN’s submarine force command, established in mid-2015, has demonstrated its effectiveness quickly; and
on January 4, 2016, the ROKN set up a task force to design and configure the first
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batch of Chang Bogo–class KSS-III submarines. The project’s defense industrial
partner is Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, which has demonstrated
its capacity for first-in-class construction with the Chang Bogo–class KSS-I/II,
with the KSS-I being constructed under license and the KSS-II using indigenous
technologies and designs.
Unofficial sources contacted by the Seoul Broadcasting System have revealed
that a decision on the propulsion system for the second and third batches of the
Chang Bogo–class KSS-III submarines has yet to be made. It seems not unlikely,
then, that the air-independent propulsion mode of the first batch may be replaced
by an indigenous nuclear propulsion system for the subsequent batches.96 It also
has been reported that the ROKN plans to build a total of nine Chang Bogo–class
KSS-III submarines between 2027 and 2043; these will have a three-thousandton displacement and be equipped with vertical missile launchers.97 The Sohn
Won Il Forum (the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy mechanism for discussing maritime security issues) has recommended that the subsequent batches be
capable of long-endurance underwater operations (preferably 50 percent longer
than Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs), high speed, and improved maneuverability at
various depths in the complex underwater spaces around the Korea Peninsula.98
Nuclear power plants using highly enriched uranium fuel may be the best option,
although they would be limited to less than 20 percent enrichment to meet the
ROK-U.S. nuclear agreement signed when the ROK abandoned its secret nuclear
weapons program during the 1970s.99
Carriers
The ROKN has been negotiating with the ROK MND and joint chiefs of staff
about acquiring a next-generation Dokdo-class batch 2 landing helicopter dock
(LHD). An ASW-oriented aircraft carrier would be invaluable for integrating a wide variety of naval component operations in the open seas, including
comprehensive ASW operations in the surface, air, and underwater domains to
counter the proliferation of conventionally powered quiet submarines capable of
extended submerged operation.100
An ASW-oriented CV of this kind would provide the ROKN with many benefits: advanced, long-range, underwater, high-/low-frequency sound sensors; air
and surface tactical ASW data integration at the theater level; close operational
coordination by a dedicated shipborne ASW commander; and active ASW weapons, including heavy torpedoes. An ASW CV, by providing firm sea control, also
would provide the SSNs already discussed with greater survivability and sustainability in conducting long-duration, deep-sea deterrent patrols. A very capable
ASW CV thus would be able to implement the necessary preemptive anti-exit
strategy. Such a highly integrated surface platform could deliver far-seas ASW
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functionality beyond the current AORs and adopt more-active ROEs to detect,
identify, and attack North Korean SSBs.
In addition to ASW, the ROKN CV could coordinate many related functions:
dispatching special operations forces; using attached submerged vehicles; and
launching long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
Choices, Combinations, and Collaboration
Nuclear-powered submarines can operate in deep waters, and can both chase enemy submarines and elude torpedo attacks on themselves. Fast and stealthy SSNs
are an offensive asset, capable of conducting submarine-to-submarine operations
and land-attack warfare. South Korean SSNs could prevent North Korean SLBM
submarines from operating in distant seas, obliging them to stay close to shore.
Whether the ROKN will be able to build an indigenous ASW CV or SSNs or both
in the near future is uncertain; but, if it becomes necessary to choose among ASW
assets, SSNs are probably the best option.
In addition to the capabilities mentioned above, SSNs can detect unknown
submarines acoustically, but this is not easy; only an ASW-oriented naval task
force will be able to conduct effective ASW operations in the complicated underwater environment around the Korea Peninsula, in which sound distortion is
commonplace. Even with SSNs, the ROKN’s offensive capabilities would remain
very limited, so ROKN SSNs would have to be capable of supporting a USN CV
strike group, which would include assets able to project power inland from the
littoral, such as a USN Zumwalt-class destroyer designed for land-attack missions. The ROKN still would lack underwater assets for far-seas operations.101
What models are available for an ROKN ASW CV? The Royal Australian
Navy’s Canberra-class LHD is an interesting example. Austal USA produced
a trimaran littoral combat ship for the U.S. Navy, and the same company has
suggested a trimaran CV capable of carrying many unmanned aerial combat vehicles.102 If North Korea succeeds in deploying a submarine force with an SLBM
capacity, a CV-based organic ASW air wing capacity would provide an effective
deterrent. An ROKN ASW CV should not be regarded primarily as an offensive
naval platform, but essentially as a defensive asset intended to deny access to any
potential adversaries’ underwater assets in the near seas of the Korea Peninsula.
Another issue concerns U.S. plans to redeploy more than 60 percent of its naval combatants to Asia by 2020. According to the recently revised “Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” now subtitled “Forward, Engaged, Ready,”
the U.S. Navy’s current and upcoming budget submissions will provide for a fleet
of more than three hundred ships and a forward presence of about 120 ships
by 2020, the latter up from an average of ninety-seven in 2014. The strategy includes a statement that “[t]he centerpieces of naval capability remain the Carrier
Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group. . . . These ships, aircraft, Sailors,
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and Marines have deterred and defeated aggression since World War II and will
continue to do so well into the future.”103 However, as China seeks to become a
true maritime power and disputes in the East and South China Seas grow hotter,
the U.S. Seventh Fleet may be drawn away from Korean waters in the near future.
Therefore the ROKN may have to take responsibility for preserving maritime
security around the Korea Peninsula and for handling North Korean maritime
threats. An ASW CV and SSNs would be immensely helpful for fulfilling this
enhanced role. USN cruisers and destroyers assigned to monitor, track, and
intercept North Korean WMD threats currently have insufficient air wing ASW
assets and underwater platforms to conduct effective ASW operations, so it is
only sensible for the ROKN to provide complementarity. The ROKN needs hybrid assets capable of both defensive and offensive naval operations. By building
an indigenous ASW CV and SSNs, the ROKN can satisfy both strategic aims in
a rapidly changing maritime security environment that presents several pressing
challenges.
This article has summarized the political and operational contexts within which
North Korea’s latest acts of nuclear blackmail—its flight test of an SLBM on
August 24, 2016, and its fifth nuclear test, on September 9, 2016—should be
understood. Its analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSB has
been based on official South Korean (especially MND), U.S., and other sources,
including from the United Kingdom and China.
The results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough
evidence available at present either to confirm or to refute the existence of a
functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. North Korea’s claims about its SLBMs
are undermined by news of several apparently unsuccessful earlier test firings.
Even accepting North Korea’s claims about its SLBMs at face value, there is little
proof that North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warheads,
so the most extravagant fears are not justified. Nevertheless, the North Korean
determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly, as evidenced
by the building of a new and larger SSB and the successful flight test of a solidpropellant SLBM.104
Taken together with North Korea’s announcement of a supposed test of a
hydrogen bomb on January 6 and of an ICBM on February 7, 2016, the KN-11
SLBM claims probably should be seen primarily as part of an effort to establish
North Korea as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to
bolster internal political support for Kim Jong Un’s rule.
In recent years, South Korea has played a subtle and skillful diplomatic game,
balancing the ROK-U.S. military alliance with the ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership. The received wisdom is that continuing this strategy offers the

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 67

2/22/17 9:32 AM

68

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

most plausible chance of ultimately resolving the tensions and threats arising
from North Korea. But for the diplomatic track to succeed, it is essential to prepare appropriate military options as well, both as a backup strategy and to focus
minds and bring urgency to the diplomacy.
The ROKN should formulate a preemptive anti-exit strategy, acquire P-8s,
build an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols,
and extend the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-exit strategy. Other deterrence options could be considered, but surely it is significant that
the ROKN for the first time recently referred publicly to the idea of deploying an
ASW CV and SSNs.
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BLUNT DEFENDERS OF SOVEREIGNT Y
The Rise of Coast Guards in East and Southeast Asia
Lyle J. Morris

W

hat is the role of coast guards in the realm of territorial disputes? Until
ten years ago or so, few policy makers in East and Southeast Asia had to
grapple with this question, because regional navies, not coast guards, were the
central actors asserting sovereignty in disputed areas.1 The decision by states,
most notably China, to build up and employ coast guards as first-line defenders
during territorial disputes has resulted in the following recent trends in the region:
• Rather than employing coast guards as tools of regional peace, countries are
using them, as opposed to naval forces, as aggressive instruments of state
power to assert territorial claims—a new and destabilizing phenomenon in
maritime territorial disputes.2

Lyle J. Morris is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on security developments in
East and Southeast Asia. He has published recently
on maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, U.S. maritime security capacity building in Southeast Asia,
and Chinese military modernization. Prior to joining RAND, Morris was the 2010–11 Next Generation
Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research
and a research intern with the Freeman Chair in
China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Morris received his master’s degree
in international affairs from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs and
a bachelor’s degree in international business from
Western Washington University.
© 2017 by Lyle J. Morris
Naval War College Review, Spring 2017, Vol. 70, No. 2

6827_Morris.indd 75

• Coast guards in the region are acting as “blunt
defenders of sovereignty,” undertaking actions
such as ramming other states’ coast guard and
fishing vessels, rather than acting as traditional
instruments of law enforcement against strictly
civilian actors.
• The use of coast guards—nominally under civilian control—as instruments to protect claimed
territory while conducting peacetime patrols of
disputed maritime territory has blurred the line
between the platforms and missions traditionally associated with “law enforcement” and those
associated with “national defense.”3
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• The employment by states of civilian assets alongside coast guard and naval
vessels as components of state power has blurred further the boundaries
among civilian, government, and military roles in conflict and injected destabilizing dynamics into maritime encounters.
• The protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity has become an increasingly important mission of coast guards in the region.
At the center of regional coast guard growth is China, which recently consolidated four of its five agencies in charge of maritime law enforcement (MLE)
under one civilian bureaucracy called the State Oceanic Administration (SOA),
further unifying Chinese forces and doctrine.4 With this reform and China’s
recent ambitious fleet expansion, the country now boasts the largest coast guard
in the world. China’s rapid enlargement of forces and its increasingly aggressive
tactics have reshaped perceptions fundamentally among regional states.5 Increasingly, such states are turning to coast guards, not navies, to patrol formerly
unregulated maritime zones, demonstrate presence, and consolidate administrative control over disputed territories in the East and South China Seas. These
factors—China’s expansion of its coast guard and increasing administrative control over disputed territory, as well as a desire to combat nontraditional security
challenges such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing near the country’s
coastline—appear to be the central motivation prompting other states such as
Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines to undertake corresponding investments in
coast guard fleets.6
Against a background of growing Chinese coast guard capabilities, this article
seeks to illuminate the complex security environment in East and Southeast Asia,
as seen through the prism of regional coast guards, and to evaluate the implications for regional security and stability. On the basis of interviews with coast
guard officials, naval officials, and academics, as well as open-source materials
such as media and government reports, the article provides an overview of the
key enablers of coast guard expansion in the region; examines existing rulings in
international law on the use of force by coast guards in disputed waters; examines
the history and organization of the coast guard fleets of China, Japan, Vietnam,
and the Philippines; offers short “baptism-by-fire” case studies that illuminate
key confrontations that Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have had with
China; and concludes by examining the ramifications of coast guard expansion
on regional security dynamics.
The four countries examined for this report were chosen for several reasons.
First, they remain the most active parties in the ongoing territorial disputes in
the East and South China Seas. Second, their coast guards increasingly are being
tasked as the first line of defense in asserting sovereignty claims. Finally, the coast
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guards of these four countries are undergoing various stages of development and
reform, revealing the differing priorities the countries have assigned to the varied
roles of coast guards in maritime law enforcement.
IMPETUS BEHIND THE GROWTH OF COAST GUARDS IN EAST
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, for the
first time granted states the authority to regulate jurisdictional zones beyond
their twelve-nautical-mile (nm) territorial seas, in particular in what is known as
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Within 200 nm of their coastlines, states have
exclusive rights to exploit natural resources and fisheries, among other living
and nonliving resources.7 The notion that coastal states had preferential rights
and interests and could manage the resources within a greatly enlarged body of
water created a new maritime consciousness for policy makers charged with the
protection and preservation of their coastal environment.
UNCLOS, however, remains silent on which maritime platform should be
employed for maritime enforcement within states’ EEZs. For most countries in
East and Southeast Asia, this task primarily fell to navies, for two reasons: most
states lacked a dedicated coast guard fleet; and navies had readily available,
large-capacity assets with which states could carry out MLE missions. Yet navies
generally are ill suited for such duties. As figure 1 illustrates, navy platforms and
personnel are tailored for military campaigns and are equipped for high-kinetic
environments—not always appropriate for MLE and fisheries patrols.
Deploying a warship to arrest fishermen, for example, may convey messages
of intimidation and lethality unnecessarily.8 Even taking into account that some
navies in Southeast Asia have the domestic legal authority to carry out policing
functions at sea, the potential remains high for naval action to lead to reaction
from another country’s naval vessels, resulting in escalation, especially in scenarios involving use of force by naval vessels against civilian assets. In contrast,
the platforms, personnel, use-of-force doctrine, and bases in domestic and
international law of coast guards are tailored for the wide array of MLE duties
that modern maritime states require. Nonetheless, until recently the notion of
creating a constabulary MLE fleet to manage, regulate, and enforce domestic and
international maritime laws and conventions remained a relatively new concept
in Asian maritime affairs.9
Recent developments, however, have spurred countries in the region to create, consolidate, or enhance their coast guard forces.10 For one, decades of overfishing have depleted fish stocks, a vital industry for many maritime economies.
Moreover, countries in the region increasingly see the advantages of a dedicated
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FIGURE 1
A COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS OF COAST GUARDS AND NAVIES
Coast Guard

Navy

Platform

• Thinner hull more vulnerable to highkinetic attacks
• Lightly armed with deck-mounted machine
guns
• Less expensive to operate and maintain

• Thicker hull constructed to withstand high-kinetic attacks
• Full array of armaments, radar, and
communications systems
• More expensive to operate and
maintain

Personnel

• Customs, border patrol, fisheries, and counternarcotics officers
• Trained to enforce maritime laws and
regulations

• Weapons officers, navigators, and
commanders
• Trained to prosecute war

Use-of-force vs. rules-ofengagement doctrine

• Use-of-force doctrine; graduated actions
designed to exert minimum force to compel
compliance of civilian actors

• Rules-of-engagement doctrine;
lethal, highly kinetic actions against
combatants

Basis in law

• Enforce domestic and international maritime laws and conventions

• Defend national sovereignty and
citizens from external attack or
aggression

Source: Author analysis based in part on Daniel Patrick O’Connell, The Law of the Sea, vol. 2 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 1062–93, and
Sam Bateman, “Regional Navies and Coastguards: Striking a Balance between ‘Lawships’ and Warships,” in Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia:
Nature, Causes and Consequences, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 246–49.

civilian maritime police authority to carry out nontraditional maritime missions such as search and rescue, port security, environmental protection, and
counterpiracy.
But a third factor appears to be prompting states to build up their coast guards:
as a means to counter China’s unprecedented coast guard expansion, which China
FIGURE 2
TOTAL COAST GUARD TONNAGE INCREASES OF SELECT COUNTRIES IN EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 2010–16
Total Tonnage
(2010)

Estimated Added
Tonnage (2010–16)

Total Tonnage
(2016)

Total Percentage
Increase

China

110,000

80,000

190,000

73% increase

Japan

70,500

35,000

105,500

50% increase

Vietnam

20,500

15,000

35,500

73% increase

Philippines

10,000

10,000

20,000

100% increase

Country

Source: Author estimates based on open-source media reporting and on U.S. Navy, The PLA Navy, p. 45. Estimated added tonnage column takes into
account vessels that are either under construction or anticipated to be delivered by the end of 2016. China’s coast guard calculations do not include vessels from the MSA, which is not considered part of China’s reformed coast guard fleet and typically does not patrol disputed areas in the East and South
China Seas. Vietnam’s coast guard calculations do not include vessels from the VFSF, VINAMARINE, or the VBG. The Philippine Coast Guard calculations
do not include vessels from the PNP-MG, Customs, or the BFAR. Overall estimates of total tonnage are rough approximations of the total capacity and
are meant for illustrative purposes only.
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has been using to assert more aggressively what it sees as its legitimate rights in
the East and South China Seas. As depicted in figure 2, China has increased by a
large margin its total coast guard capacity over the last five years compared with
others in the region, and now has the largest coast guard in the world in terms of
total tonnage, at an estimated 190,000 tons.
China’s massive investment in its coast guard since 2010 has altered fundamentally the security perceptions in the region. By employing what China regards as nonmilitary assets to demonstrate administrative control over disputed
territory in the East and South China Seas, China has attempted to “civilianize”
its expansion of sovereignty protection to strengthen its legal claims over other
claimants. Other countries in the region, as a result, feel compelled to turn to
coast guards, as opposed to navies, to counterbalance China and assert administrative control, so they have sought to bolster their coast guard fleets.
However, most countries in the region other than Japan lack the funds to
match China’s coast guard fleet adequately, and some perceive navies as offering
a more potent deterrent against foreign infringements of their EEZs.11 Whether
developing their own coast guard fleets is the appropriate way for states to respond to China’s coast guard expansion is a matter of ongoing debate among
policy makers in the region.12
Further complicating the operational environment for coast guards is the
existence among states of overlapping maritime claims to maritime features and
adjacent waters in the Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku Islands in the East and South
China Seas, areas that for some states lie far beyond their 200 nm EEZ bound
aries. Using a coast guard to patrol disputed territory far from a nation’s coastline
appears to be a new phenomenon in maritime affairs.13 In relatively recent history, states have employed navies, not coast guards, as the primary instrument
to assert sovereignty claims far beyond their coastal jurisdictional waters. But
China, for example, now relies primarily on its coast guard, not its navy, to patrol
the area within its “nine-dash line,” which covers almost 90 percent of the South
China Sea and cuts into the EEZs of five other countries, as well as covering
thousands of square kilometers of disputed territory. Other countries—Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines—also claim portions of the Spratly
Islands and increasingly are dispatching coast guard vessels to patrol the disputed
area (figure 3).
As a result of these overlapping claims, countries have adopted tactics that
might be considered a deviation from established standard operating procedures
of safety and good seamanship.14 This includes actions such as ramming and using
water cannon against civilian vessels, and in some cases other states’ coast guard
vessels, in an attempt to repel or eject them from a disputed area. Regional states
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for the most part are not interested in employing coast
guards to conduct inspections or prosecute civilian
violations based on domestic
or international maritime
law and conventions because
of the diplomatic fallout that
might result from arresting
violators and sending them
back to host nations. 15 Instead, coast guards are used
primarily to establish presence in disputed areas and
as instruments to repel and
coerce rival claimant vessels.
The greatest weapon in this
“competition for presence”
is the number and size of
vessels countries can bring
to bear in disputed waters.
China
Malaysia
Vietnam
Brunei
Philippines
Taiwan
China, by all accounts, apSource: Wikimedia Commons
pears to be outpacing all
other regional actors in terms of vessel numbers and total capacity.
Before turning to an examination of each of the four coast guards in the study,
it is important to highlight the application of international law to the question
of use of force by MLE entities, so as to understand better the legal principles
governing “policing” versus “national defense” functions at sea.
FIGURE 3
OVERLAPPING CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

USE OF FORCE BY MARITIME LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
What constitutes an act of military aggression against another state, for example,
as opposed to a state simply executing what it considers law enforcement based
on domestic maritime law? When are the actions of MLE agencies considered a
breach of international standards of navigation and safety at sea? These questions
are important when considering the sheer number of MLE vessels operating in
East and Southeast Asia and their use of increasingly assertive tactics. International courts of law have ruled on the issue of use-of-force actions undertaken
by MLE agencies in disputed maritime zones, in particular on which criteria differentiate military actions from police or constabulary actions.
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A starting point in considering the use of force at sea involves an assessment of
whether a state has violated article 301 of UNCLOS, which stipulates that in exercising their rights states shall “refrain from any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations.”16 This provision, while broad in scope, generally is understood to prohibit aggressive actions at sea that threaten or use force in a manner
inconsistent with the UN Charter, with application to both MLE and naval vessels
in peacetime. However, not all use-of-force measures can be interpreted clearly
under UNCLOS as “aggressive actions,” including cases involving MLE vessels
employing less-than-lethal degrees of force against foreign vessels or naval vessels
purporting to be undertaking law-enforcement activities in jurisdictional waters.
The Guyana v. Suriname case involving paramilitary activities, which came
before an arbitral tribunal under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in
2007, provides perhaps the most relevant ruling on the distinction between MLE
and military use of force under UNCLOS. The case involved a use-of-force action
by the Suriname Navy against an oil-drilling platform operating in waters disputed by Suriname and Guyana. The Suriname Navy approached C. E. Thornton,
an American oil-drilling rig retained by the Canadian-owned CGX Energy Inc.,
and warned the rig repeatedly to leave the area or face “consequences.”17 Those in
charge of the oil rig, fearing lethal force, promptly withdrew it from the disputed
area. The tribunal was asked to rule on whether Suriname had violated UNCLOS
by its threat to use “armed force” against state assets operating in the territory of
Guyana. Suriname, on the other hand, maintained that the measures it took did
not constitute such a threat of use of force, but instead had been “of the nature of
reasonable and proportionate law enforcement measures to preclude unauthorized drilling in a disputed area of the continental shelf.”18
To decide on this point of contention, the tribunal had to consider the characterization of the threatened force in the CGX incident. In doing so, it first
affirmed that in international law “force may be used in law enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary.”19 This,
however, did not prevent the tribunal from unanimously ruling that Suriname’s
actions went beyond those appropriate for MLE missions: “The action mounted
by Suriname on 3 June 2000 seemed more akin to a threat of military action
rather than a mere law enforcement activity [and] therefore constituted a threat
of the use of force in contravention of the Convention, the UN Charter and general international law.”20 In other words, the tribunal held that the warning by
the Suriname Navy—which claimed to be undertaking law-enforcement duties
in disputed territory—for the oil rig to leave the area or “face the consequences”
had crossed a threshold that constituted a “threat of the use of force” in violation
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of UNCLOS principles, in particular article 301. (The tribunal did find that Suriname’s actions fell into the category of “less grave forms” of the use of armed
force, like those typical of border incidents.)
The Guyana v. Suriname case admittedly addresses only a small subset of
potential acts of armed aggression. There exists a large range of conduct, constituting a continuum, with armed military force on one end and “less grave” forms
of forcible measures against foreign ships by MLE agents on the other. However,
the case sets a precedent that international lawyers and analysts can use to assess
whether a certain use of force, or threat to use force, by a vessel purporting to enforce maritime law is unavoidable or necessary or both in the particular context
of the MLE mission it is undertaking in disputed waters.
A second important recent legal ruling was not directly related to the use
of force at sea, but merits examination because of its impact on coast guard
operations in disputed areas. An arbitral tribunal under the PCA ruled in July
2016 on a case brought by the Philippines against China regarding the latter’s
maritime claims in the South China Sea.21 In particular, in section VII(F) of the
ruling, entitled “Operation of Law Enforcement Vessels in a Dangerous Manner,” the court examined whether the actions of China’s MLE vessels near Scarborough Shoal had breached articles 21, 24, and 94 of UNCLOS by operating
in a “dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels.”
In rendering its judgment, the court relied on the guidelines in the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
(COLREGS), of which both China and the Philippines are members, as one of
the “generally accepted international regulations” to which flag states are required to conform regarding rules of navigation, avoidance of accidents at sea,
and good seamanship.
In unambiguous terms, the court found that Chinese actions had violated
rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS, thus breaching article 94 of UNCLOS.
In particular, passage 1105 of the report rendered the following judgment:
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Tribunal considers China to have repeatedly
violated the Rules of the COLREGS over the course of the interactions described by
the crew of the Philippine vessels and as credibly assessed in the two expert reports.
Where Chinese vessels were under an obligation to yield, they persisted; where the
regulations called for a safe distance, they infringed it. The actions are not suggestive
of occasional negligence in failing to adhere to the COLREGS, but rather point to a
conscious disregard of what the regulations require.22

In other words, the court dismissed the notion that Chinese actions were
simply a defensive measure undertaken in response to a perceived threat from
the Philippines. Rather, the court found that Chinese maneuvers themselves created an immediate danger, demonstrating a “serious and apparently intentional
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breach” of the requirement that ships take precautions to avoid accidents at sea,
as required under the COLREGS.23
As in all cases before an international court of law, culpability depends on the
specific evidence brought to bear within the case and the specific context of the
scenario examined. However, on the basis of the Guyana v. Suriname and Philippines v. China cases before two arbitral tribunals, it is reasonable to assess that
many of the actions that MLE vessels have been undertaking in the South China
Sea that are the focus of this article would be found in a court of law to be in violation of several articles of UNCLOS that prohibit excessive use or threat of use of
force by MLE actors or state assets undertaking MLE-type missions.
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA COAST GUARDS
The following sections will examine the history and organization of the four coast
guard agencies chosen for this study. The study will also present three case studies
that highlight the role of coast guards in territorial disputes within the region.
China
China is a prime example of a country that has chosen to deploy coast guard assets instead of its navy to assert claims over maritime features and waters in the
East and South China Seas. Interviews with Chinese scholars and officials reveal
that Chinese policy makers employ coast guards to attempt to demilitarize territorial disputes, as well as to show rival claimants that China views these disputed
areas as sovereign Chinese territories subject to domestic laws and regulations.
From the perspective of Chinese policy makers, invoking domestic law as the
basis for China’s coast guard presence in disputed territory confers legitimacy in
areas where naval vessels traditionally might be deployed—subject to international laws of warfare.24
The 中国海警 (China Coast Guard [CCG]) reform of 2013, to be discussed
in more detail below, represents the bureaucratic manifestation of a larger commitment to build the largest and most formidable coast guard forces in the world.
China spent close to U.S.$8.7 billion on its coast guard from 2011 to 2015, an
average of $1.74 billion a year, including both operational and shipbuilding costs
(see figure 4).
China’s spending constitutes the largest expansion among coast guards in the
region over the five-year period. Japan comes in second and remains China’s
only peer competitor in terms of total budget, spending roughly U.S.$7.5 billion
over five years, an average of $1.5 billion a year. Although gaps in data exist for
the coast guards of Vietnam and the Philippines over this period, the author
estimates that they spend an average of U.S.$100 to U.S.$200 million a year. In
comparison, the U.S. Coast Guard spends an average of U.S.$10 billion per year,
by far the biggest spender among coast guards in the world.25
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FIGURE 4
COAST GUARD BUDGETS OF CHINA, JAPAN, VIETNAM, AND THE PHILIPPINES, 2011–15
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Source: Author estimates based on open sources. To estimate the total budget of China’s coast guard, the author used budget figures for “maritime
law enforcement operations” among the various predecessor/constituent agencies available on their websites. This includes spending on “sovereignty
protection” and “law enforcement and surveillance” by the State Oceanic Administration; the total budget of the Maritime Anti-smuggling Police within
the General Administration of Customs; budgets for “border control” by the Ministry of Public Security; and the total budget of the Fisheries Administration within the Ministry of Agriculture. An estimate was then made on the amount of spending on ships—based on number of ships commissioned and
estimates of ship manufacturing costs for each ship dimension—among the various maritime agencies. Finally, these two figures were combined to provide
a rough estimate of the total budget of the China Coast Guard from 2011 to 2015; however, owing to gaps in data, it most likely underestimates China’s
total spending. Except for Vietnam, budgetary estimates for the other countries were derived from budgets published on their coast guard websites or
from media articles. Vietnam’s estimate was based on a rule of thumb estimate of 5 percent of its annual defense budget. Estimates are rough approximations of the total amount spent over time and are meant for illustrative purposes only.

Budgetary outlays correspond with the overall tonnages of regional coast
guard fleets. China’s investment has yielded a total fleet size of around 215 vessels,
of which 105 are considered large (more than one-thousand-tons displacement)
and 110 small (less than one thousand tons).26 In terms of total tonnage, China
boasts the largest coast guard in the world at roughly 190,000 tons, enjoying substantial quantitative overmatch over its Asian competitors (see figure 2).
In January 2016, China laid claim to deploying the largest coast guard vessel in the world, Haijing 3901, with a displacement of 12,000 tons and boasting
several deck-mounted autocannon, including a 76 mm, and two auxiliary and
two antiaircraft machine guns.27 Since the 2013 reorganization, most but not all
CCG vessels have been refashioned with front- or rear-mounted autocannon or
both, ranging in caliber from 25 to 57 mm, depending on the size of the vessel,
and most officers carry light arms on board. CCG air assets remain small, with
only six twin-engine turboprop, fixed-wing aircraft in operation, although more
may be coming on line in the near future.28 Finally, a total of 17,000 personnel
work in the Chinese coast guard, although this is likely a conservative estimate.29
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China’s massive coast guard expansion is an outgrowth of then-president Hu
Jintao’s call for China to become a “maritime power,” as outlined in his Eighteenth Party Congress Work Report in November 2012.30 In particular, Hu’s call to
“resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests” reflected a desire to
bolster China’s presence in Chinese-claimed waters in the East and South China
Seas—areas that Chinese policy makers long believed were poorly regulated and
administered owing to disorganized maritime bureaucratic actors with overlapping areas of responsibility. China’s current president, Xi Jinping, elaborated
on President Hu’s “maritime power” strategy by outlining four components for
China to pursue in the maritime domain: (1) safeguarding China’s maritime
rights and interests; (2) developing the marine economy; (3) protecting the
marine environment; and (4) enhancing China’s capacity for exploiting marine
resources.31 China’s coast guard was envisioned as carrying out the tasks within
the first component.
At the National People’s Congress session in March 2013, policy makers
addressed the diffuse nature of China’s MLE bureaucracies by reorganizing four
of the five MLE agencies and placing them under a new civilian authority. In the
Chinese State Council’s March 2013 announcement of the reform of the CCG,
the council’s secretary general Ma Kai cited a need to “enhance the protection of
ocean resources . . . and safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests” by revamping the State Oceanic Administration and consolidating four of China’s five
MLE agencies (referred to by one Western analyst as the “five dragons”32) under
one unified coast guard (zhongguo haijing) under SOA authority.33
The SOA, the statement continued, would “formulate maritime development
planning, implement maritime sovereignty rights enforcement, supervise the
management of the maritime domain and marine environmental protection.”34
The revamped CCG would “develop maritime rights protection law enforcement
on behalf of the SOA,” a task that aligns with the second of the four missions Xi
laid out in his maritime power speech.35 In other words, policy makers clearly
envisioned sovereignty protection as the top priority for the revamped CCG to
undertake, as part of the broader set of missions assigned to the SOA. Compared
with the missions of the other coast guards in this report, China’s and Vietnam’s
coast guards both emphasize maritime sovereignty protection, while those of
Japan and the Philippines focus more on such responsibilities as marine safety,
search and rescue, and environmental protection.
On June 9, 2013, the State Council outlined the structure, functions, and size
of the reconstituted SOA, referred to as the “Three Decisions Plan” (sanding
fangan).36 The revamped CCG would be one of eleven branches (zong dui) within
the SOA. It would comprise a headquarters, a command center, and operational
branches split among three regions: north, east, and south. The CCG thenceforth
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would have full responsibility for coordinating and carrying out law enforcement
across the full spectrum of maritime bureaucracies, to include fisheries, customs,
immigration, and environmental management. Although it would reside under
the SOA, the CCG would receive “operational guidance” from the Ministry of
Public Security (MPS). Finally, the restructuring plan calls for establishing a
State Oceanic Committee (guojia haiyang weiyuanhui), conceived as a high-level
coordinating body on maritime operations. The SOA reportedly will “carry out”
the committee’s “specific tasks.”37
The placement of the CCG under the SOA reflects China’s attempt to
“civilianize” the agency. Yet two aspects undermine the notion that the CCG
is strictly a civilian entity. First, many new coast guard vessels being deployed
are refurbished naval frigates previously decommissioned by the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), armed with an array of ship-mounted automatic
machine guns. While these vessels were stripped of some of their military-grade,
highly kinetic armaments during decommissioning, much of the armaments
and communications equipment architecture was left behind, as well as the
reinforced, military-grade hull constructed for environments requiring a high
standard of survivability. They thus boast a certain degree of lethality that other
coast guards of the region do not offer.38 Second, many of the officers within the
CCG are either from the reformed Border Defense Coast Guard—a branch of
the People’s Armed Police under the MPS—or receive training within a rank and
grade structure more akin to an armed police force.39
On July 22, 2013, a new “China Coast Guard” sign was unveiled at SOA headquarters in Beijing, officially inaugurating the new agency.40 Most ships from
all four agencies were repainted white with blue and red stripes, complete with
new pennant numbers and with the English name “China Coast Guard” featured
prominently. New uniforms were designed and issued to most officers, along
with new life jackets. The external makeover, while far from complete, was in full
swing within six months of the announcement of the reorganization.
The internal process of merging the various bureaucracies and cultures appears
to be moving slower than expected, however. On the basis of interviews with U.S.
government officials with knowledge of the reform, it appears that vested interests are preventing full integration of the different agencies.41 Individual agencies
do not seem to be operating as one cohesive whole, with each still executing its
own patrols and operating under old command-and-control (C2) structures. For
example, one CCG official noted that officers wear their new uniforms only during “national security” patrols in the East and South China Seas.42 The fact that
the officers wore uniforms from all four “dragons” at the most recent CCG press
conference substantiates the claim that a complete merger has not taken place.43
According to this official, the “Three Decisions Plan,” unveiled in June 2013, still
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is awaiting final approval from senior Chinese policy makers.44 Finally, most vessels still do not mix officers from each of the four agencies, and officers are not
undergoing an expanded course of training in areas such as fisheries, customs,
and immigration enforcement, as would be expected under a unified command.45
Nonetheless, there are indications that the CCG has enhanced coordination
and become more confident as a result of the reform. Patrols of disputed waters in
the East and South China Seas have increased in regularity and scope.46 Their central mission is to assert administrative control over disputed territory. Patrols also
act to defend what the Chinese deem to be legitimate interests by protecting fishing vessels and natural resource and scientific exploration and attempting to halt
“illegal” foreign activities—including foreign fishing and oil and gas exploration.
Furthermore, China’s use of force appears to be evolving—becoming more
assertive. In the past, Chinese vessels adopted a relatively nonconfrontational
approach when they encountered what China regarded as illegal activities of
foreign vessels. Typically they would query the other vessels regarding the
purpose of their deployment, meanwhile verbally declaring Chinese sovereignty
through radio communications (han hua). Only in rare cases did they attempt to
expel foreign vessels, for which they used floodlights; water cannon aimed near
the vessel, as a warning; and close-proximity maneuvering.47 Starting around
2011, two shifts in use of force became apparent. First, Chinese vessels began to
employ more-aggressive actions, such as ramming and the use of water cannon
inside the cabins of opposing vessels.48 Second, Chinese fishing vessels were used
more frequently as proxy arms of the CCG and the PLAN. Vietnamese officials
traced the latter development to 2011, when a Chinese fishing vessel cut a seismic
cable of a Vietnamese civilian survey ship, seemingly carrying out the actions
pursuant to Chinese state policy.49 Both Philippine and Vietnamese officials noted an increased propensity for Chinese fishing vessels to “stand and challenge”
attempts by the countries’ coast guards to arrest Chinese fishermen in or otherwise repel them from designated areas. In the past, according to these officials,
Chinese fishermen usually would depart the scene or acquiesce to boardings.50
Finally, officials also noted an increase in bullying tactics by CCG officers who
boarded Philippine and Vietnamese fishing vessels, such as taunting fishermen at
gunpoint, throwing out catch, and stealing property and money.51
Recent training exercises involving the CCG and PLAN highlight growing
institutional interaction. The first large-scale joint exercise, EAST CHINA SEA
COOPERATION 2012, was held in October 2012. It involved vessels from the
PLAN East Sea Fleet, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) East
China Sea Bureau, and the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) East China Sea
branch. The training involved a scenario in which Chinese fishing vessels were
“followed, harassed, and hindered” by vessels from another country. PLAN
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frigates then “quickly took up positions right and left of the Marine Surveillance
and Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels and warned, monitored, intimidated and
blocked” the foreign vessels.52 A subsequent joint exercise was held in May 2013,
with the PLAN South Sea Fleet participating alongside FLEC and CCG vessels
near the Spratly Islands. The participants reportedly set up “scientific and effective interaction mechanisms” and “jointly formed a line of maritime defense with
military and civilian forces.”53 Finally, CCG vessels participated in an exercise
with PLAN units near Dongguan City in Guangdong Province in November
2013. Participants included local military units alongside customs, maritime police, and security personnel from the Dongguan Maritime Bureau.54 These training exercises highlight the increasing cooperation between the CCG and PLAN
and demonstrate a desire to create C2 synergies between the two bureaucracies.
As recent events make clear, CCG and PLAN vessels appear to be working in
closer coordination to repel Vietnamese vessels from disputed territory in the
Spratlys.55 Since the Chinese State Council has yet to issue a formal coast guard
law, it is unclear whether the CCG retains a war-fighting function alongside the
PLAN similar to that of the U.S. Coast Guard during wartime. One could reasonably assume, given recent CCG-PLAN training, that such a function does exist.
Overall, while reform is still in its early stages, the coast guard China is developing gives cause for both optimism and concern. Chinese policy makers’
decision to replace their navy with coast guard forces as the central actor in
executing what China calls “maritime rights protection” patrols in the East and
South China Seas is, on one level, a positive development in terms of dampening
the potential for escalation. The inadvertent sinking of a naval vessel carries far
more catastrophic consequences, from a crisis-stability standpoint, than does the
sinking of a coast guard or fishing vessel, for example. On the other hand, China
deploys its coast guard as a coercive civilian arm of its military.
China’s numerical superiority over its smaller peers ensures continued dominance within the region. The exception is Japan’s coast guard, whose assets and
experience appear to mitigate the adoption of more-assertive tactics by the Chinese during patrols around the Senkaku Islands.
Japan
The 海上保安庁 (Japan Coast Guard [JCG]) was founded in 1948 as a civilian
MLE entity called the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA). For decades, the agency
played a tertiary role to the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) in executing Japan’s MLE and search-and-rescue (SAR) missions
along the Japanese coastline. The MSA’s role increased significantly with the 1986
U.S.-Japanese SAR agreement that gave Japan sole responsibility over SAR activities within most maritime areas within Japan’s EEZ and beyond.56 In 2000, the
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MSA was reorganized under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and
Tourism and officially changed its name to the Japan Coast Guard.
As an island state, Japan’s combined territorial and exclusive economic zone is
nearly twelve times larger (4,470,000 sq. km) than its land area (380,000 sq. km).
This presents the JCG with a formidable maritime area to patrol. It is no surprise,
then, that among Asian coast guards the JCG boasts the second-largest fleet in
tonnage, is the second largest in numbers of personnel, and has the most coast
guard aircraft. In terms of fleet size, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates
that Japan has approximately fifty-three large and twenty-five small vessels in
operation.57 The largest vessels in the JCG fleet include two PLH-class vessels
with a displacement of 6,500 tons (9,000 tons fully loaded) and two Mizuho-class
vessels of 5,200 tons.58 For comparison, the largest and most capable destroyers
in the JMSDF, the Kongo-class vessels, displace approximately 9,500 tons. Most
of the medium-to-high-endurance JCG vessels are equipped with deck-mounted
autocannon that range in caliber from 20 to 40 mm, and most JCG officers carry
light firearms for self-defense.59 Notably, the PLH-class cutters are only equipped
with two Oerlikon 35–40 mm autocannon and two M61 Vulcan 20 mm six-barrel
Gatling-style guns, compared with the 76 mm cannon on China’s largest cutter,
Haijing 3901.
In terms of aviation assets, the JCG has by far the largest fleet in Asia, second
only to the U.S. Coast Guard in the world, boasting twenty-six fixed-wing aircraft
and forty-eight helicopters.60 Finally, the JCG has roughly 13,500 personnel, second most among coast guards in Asia.61
A 2001 revision of the JCG law ushered in an expanded set of missions for the
service beyond simply SAR at sea. They include the following tasks:
• Patrolling Japan’s territorial seas and EEZ
• Countering smuggling and illegal immigration
• Countering piracy
• Countering terrorism
• Conducting surveillance of illegal operations by foreign fishing vessels
• Acting against suspicious vessels and surveillance ships
• Dealing with unlawful acts by foreign oceanographic research vessels
• Firing on noncompliant vessels that ignore warnings
• Patrolling and guarding waters near disputed territory, such as the Senkaku
Islands62
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While the formal justification for the JCG’s expanded roles and missions focused on the service’s police and maritime safety functions, the 2001 law and the
ensuing evolution from a strictly MLE and SAR entity to one that undertakes territorial protection and can use force for defensive purposes represent a significant
change in Japanese national security strategy. Richard Samuels calls the expansion of the JCG’s mission sets “the most significant and least heralded Japanese
military development since the end of the Cold War.”63
The refinement of the JCG’s role as a frontline defender of Japanese territory
even as the service remains an important element of the enforcement of laws
pertaining to customs, immigration, SAR, and fisheries brings it more in line
with the U.S. Coast Guard in mission and practice. It is no coincidence that the
training and the standard operating procedures of the JCG closely resemble those
of the U.S. Coast Guard. For example, as in the U.S. Coast Guard, most JCG personnel are sworn customs officers and undergo rigorous training in their coast
guard academy in the skills necessary to perform a wide range of MLE duties
in such areas as fisheries regulation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and
immigration.
Article 25 of Japan’s coast guard law states explicitly that the JCG is not a
military organization and that the responsibilities it undertakes should not be
considered similar to those of an “armed force.”64 However, articles 18 and 20
provide sufficient leeway for coast guard personnel to use deadly force as a police
entity against noncompliant domestic and foreign vessels.65 Indeed, months after
the passage of the 2001 coast guard law, the JCG engaged in Japan’s first use of
deadly force since the end of World War II, firing in self-defense on an unmarked
North Korean spy vessel after the North Korean vessel apparently fired on the
JCG vessel using what have been called “military-grade armaments.” The clash,
which became known as the battle of Amami-Ō-shima, resulted in the sinking of
the North Korean vessel and the deaths of fifteen North Korean crewmembers.66
The incident remains the largest maritime conflict in the history of postwar Japan
and thrust the JCG into the spotlight as an important, albeit controversial, arm of
Japanese maritime security policy.67
This was not the first encounter between the JCG and a North Korean spy
ship, however. A lesser-known clash occurred in March 1999, twenty-eight miles
off the Noto Peninsula. In this incident, the JCG had to request assistance from
the JMSDF, which fired warning shots at and pursued several suspected North
Korean spy ships for over twenty-four hours before abandoning the chase on
reaching North Korean territorial waters.68 The military action marked the first
time Japan had fired warning shots since 1953 and the first employment of a 1954
law that allows the prime minister to request assistance for the JCG from the
JMSDF during encounters with foreign naval or spy vessels.
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The 1999 incident forced the JCG to consider how to increase coordination
between MLE forces and the JMSDF when encountering vessels armed with
military-grade heavy weaponry. Up to that point, the JCG law lacked language
legalizing the use of force within Japanese territorial waters against “suspicious
vessels” equipped with “military-grade armaments,” such as the North Korean
spy ship, during the course of which JCG officers might inflict injury or death
on suspects while firing warning or disabling shots. The 2001 JCG law greatly
enhanced the JCG’s ability to use force against suspicious or noncompliant armed
vessels, and increased its ability to call on the JMSDF for assistance when needed.
The JCG also has begun training with JMSDF forces, in June 2015 participating
in a first-ever joint civilian-military “gray zone” exercise that lasted ten days.69
However, Japan’s coast guard law does not assign the JCG a war-fighting function
with the JMSDF during wartime.
Looking to the future, the JCG plans to build an additional twenty-five vessels
over the next five years, in large part to address increasing concern over Chinese
actions near the Senkaku Islands.70 Of these twenty-five vessels, ten mediumendurance vessels (one thousand to three thousand tons) are to be deployed to
Ishigaki Island, site of the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, the closest
outpost with vessels responsible for patrolling the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two
four-thousand- to six-thousand-ton high-endurance helipad vessels already have
been deployed, to nearby Naha Island because of pier constraints at Ishigaki.71
This accretion of vessels near the Senkakus is part of a broader strengthening
of presence in the area, to include the addition of a six-hundred-member unit
exclusively for the Senkaku area of responsibility.72 In March 2016, Japan announced that it had built a radar observation station on Yonaguni Island, about
ninety miles east of Taiwan and south of the Senkakus. According to Colonel
Masashi Yamamoto, military attaché with the Japanese embassy in Washington,
the radar station is part of a “three-phased” approach to contingency planning
for any escalation of tensions around the Senkakus.73 This buildup in manpower
and facilities in all likelihood will continue while China maintains or increases
its rate of incursions into the Senkaku Islands territorial sea.
It is these Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) that are
the subject of this article’s first case study. Both Japan and China claim them. The
Japanese government’s purchase of three of the islands from their private Japanese owner on September 11, 2012, set off a diplomatic dispute over sovereignty
that continues today. After the announcement, the Chinese foreign ministry
called the purchase “totally illegal and invalid,” saying the move “can in no way
change the historical fact that Japan stole Diaoyu and its affiliated islands from
China and the fact that China has territorial sovereignty over them.”74 Four days
after the purchase, the biggest anti-Japanese protests since China and Japan
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normalized diplomatic relations in 1972 broke out in cities across China. The
Japanese embassy in Beijing was besieged by hundreds of protesters throwing
rocks, eggs, and bottles.75
In the days that followed, two Chinese ships, Haijian 46 and Haijian 49 of
the CMS, penetrated the 12 nm territorial sea of the Senkakus.76 China’s actions,
it emerged, were a precedent for a water and air incursion campaign into the
Senkakus contiguous zone, territorial waters, and airspace by China that became
routinized over subsequent years.
By the end of 2012, the JCG reported that Chinese coast guard ships had intruded into Senkaku territorial waters sixty-eight times since September 11, an
unprecedented spike in intrusions from previous years.77 The campaign continued, with 188 vessels penetrating the territorial sea in 2013, 88 in 2014, and 86
in 2015. On the basis of reporting from the SOA, the same eighteen CCG hull
numbers appear to be responsible for patrolling the Senkaku Islands; the ships
range in size from one thousand to four thousand tons.78 Notably, Haijing 3901,
which is assigned to the East China Sea area of operations, has yet to be deployed
near the Senkakus.
China has supplemented its maritime pressure by flying naval and coast guard
surveillance aircraft close to the islands, contributing to a record number of airdefense scrambles by Japanese fighter jets in the area. In fiscal year 2014, Japanese
fighter jets undertook 943 scrambles, 464 of which were to intercept Chinese
aircraft near the Senkakus.79
The sustained level of penetration of Senkaku territorial waters and airspace,
while a clear challenge to Japanese claims of sovereignty and administrative
control, has not had the destabilizing effect on the region that some feared.80
Discussions with JCG officials reveal that China’s coast guard officials and
diplomats appear very aware of Japan’s “redline” regarding Chinese activities in
the Senkakus.81 For example, when entering the territorial waters, CCG vessels
typically deploy in groups of two and follow a fairly predictable pattern of behavior: they either make a pass from one end of the group of four Senkaku Islands
(Kuba-shima, Uotsuri-shima, Kita-Kojima, and Minami-Kojima) to the other, or
circumnavigate the group of islands once, then depart (see figure 5).
The incursions typically last anywhere from three to fourteen hours, and Japan
always sends vessels to shadow the CCG vessels out of the territorial sea. There
have been no instances of CCG vessels loitering, dropping anchor, arresting
Japanese fishing vessels, or charting a path directly toward the islands that would
prompt more-assertive countermeasures by JCG vessels in an effort to repel the
Chinese vessels from the area. Until recently, there also have been very few instances of Chinese fishing vessels penetrating the Senkaku territorial sea, and no
instances of fishing vessels attempting to fish or drop anchor there.82
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FIGURE 5
NOTIONAL DEPICTION OF CHINESE COAST GUARD PENETRATION OF SENKAKU
TERRITORIAL SEA

Kuba-shima
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Source: Author rendering based on Japan Coast Guard annual report on responses to EEZ intrusions from China. See “Responding to China Public Vessels,” “Senkaku Island Waters,” and “Japan Coast Guard Protection of Territorial Waters and EEZ,” in Japan Coast Guard Annual Report, 2013, available
at www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/.

Nonetheless, the CCG’s recent behavior has raised red flags in Tokyo regarding Beijing’s intentions. In November 2015, China for the first time sent a PLAN
surveillance vessel into the Senkaku territorial sea; it reportedly “sailed one-anda-half laps through the waters from east to west before departing westward.”83
The intrusion prompted Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani to announce
that the JMSDF could be called on to conduct “maritime policing activities” if
a foreign warship entered Japanese territorial waters for purposes other than
“innocent passage,” if the JCG was “outgunned,” or if it became “difficult” for
the JCG to “deal with the matter.”84 The following month, China deployed CCG
31239, a refurbished PLAN frigate armed with four 37 mm autocannon, marking the first instance in which China had sent an armed coast guard vessel into
Senkaku territorial waters.85 Japan regarded both actions as a provocative escalation by China, and perhaps a signal from Beijing of a change in strategy. Finally,
beginning in early August 2016 and continuing over several weeks, China sent a
flotilla of CCG and fishing vessels into the contiguous zone and territorial sea of
the Senkakus. A total of thirty-six CCG ships penetrated the territorial sea and
two hundred to three hundred fishing vessels penetrated the contiguous zone—
the largest number of Chinese government and fishing vessels ever recorded by
the JCG in waters near the Senkakus. Of the CCG vessels involved in the August
2016 incident, seven reportedly were armed with cannon.86
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Generally speaking, however, China’s relatively stable pattern of behavior in
the East China Sea contrasts with its behavior against rival claimants to territory in the South China Sea. The CCG has shown little desire to undertake provocative or threatening actions against JCG vessels, such as ramming, and seems
intent only on establishing administrative control near the Senkakus. Chinese
restraint may be a function of the actor involved. Beijing is keenly aware of the
escalation potential with Tokyo and understands that Japan possesses both the
capability and the capacity to respond to Chinese incursions in ways that smaller
claimants in the South China Sea cannot.
Chinese moderation should not be taken for granted, however. As the August
2016 incident makes clear, China has the capacity to inundate Senkaku waters
with government and civilian vessels in such a way as to greatly challenge the
JCG’s capacity to respond. The incident is reminiscent of another standoff that
occurred soon after the Japanese government purchased the Senkakus in 2012, in
which close to fifty Taiwan civilian vessels (with activists aboard, seeking to land
on the islands) and coast guard vessels descended on the islands. In that incident,
the JCG used water cannon and shouldered the civilian vessels to prevent them
from approaching the islands.87 The standoff represented one of the greatest challenges to Japanese protection of its claimed sovereign territory, and serves as a
reminder that other countries, such as China, could again decide to inundate the
Senkaku territorial sea with fishing and coast guard vessels (perhaps, say, on the
anniversary of Japan’s purchase of the Senkakus).88
Vietnam
The Vietnamese Marine Police (Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam) was established in 1998
under the then Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an arm of the Vietnam People’s
Navy (VPN). Before 1998, the VPN carried out constabulary maritime missions,
as the coast guard did not possess the number and type of high-endurance assets needed to undertake primary MLE duties. In 2008, the Marine Police was
renamed the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) and was elevated in status to an armed
service under the joint command of the MoD and VPN.89 During the same year,
the VCG, under the auspices of the MoD, and the Ministry of Transport (MoT)
issued a joint circular under which the two agencies would “coordinate operations and information sharing regarding patrols of Vietnamese waters,” further
stipulating that the VCG would “consult with the MoT on proposed legal documents and coordinate with the MoT on international cooperation, education and
training on maritime expertise for Coast Guard staff, [and] communication of
relevant legal documents.”90 Then, in October 2013, the VCG became a fully independent civilian armed service under the MoD, in part to be eligible to receive
Japanese foreign aid to purchase patrol vessels from Japan.91
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The change to a civilian entity was a symbolic shift for the coast guard, accustomed to being the “forgotten arm” of the VPN. The separation from the VPN
also meant that the commandant of the VCG reports directly to the minister of
defense and to the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, as opposed to just the VPN commander.92 Like the equivalent services in the Philippines and the United States, the VCG retains both civilian police powers for law
enforcement and military duties during wartime. Despite its separation from the
navy, the VCG coordinates closely with VPN ships when operating at sea, and
VCG ships are still dependent on VPN shipyards for maintenance and repair.93
Articles 5 and 6 of Vietnam’s coast guard law detail VCG’s main missions and
responsibilities within Vietnam’s territorial waters, contiguous zone, and EEZ.
These include (1) protecting national sovereignty; (2) maintaining security, order, and safety; (3) protecting natural resources; (4) preventing environmental
pollution; and (5) countering drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking.94 As with China’s coast guard, it is notable that the first task listed for the
VCG deals with national sovereignty, which speaks to the degree of emphasis
Vietnamese authorities place on territorial protection.
The VCG has approximately fifty vessels: five large (the largest displaces 2,500
tons) and forty-five small.95 Soon after the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) incident in 2014, Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced the
allocation of U.S.$540 million to build thirty-two new coast guard ships and
hundreds of aluminum fishing vessels that can withstand ramming better.96 With
the delivery of two five-hundred-ton TT400TP-class patrol vessels in January
2016 and the addition of six one-thousand-ton patrol craft pledged from Japan,
Vietnam will boast the largest coast guard fleet in Southeast Asia.97 Most VCG
vessels have light-caliber deck-mounted autocannon or machine guns (ranging
in size from 14.5 to 23 mm) or both, and most crewmembers carry light firearms
for self-defense.98 The VCG has three fixed-wing CASA C-212 Aviocar patrol
aircraft. The VCG has approximately 5,500 total personnel.99
In April 2014, Vietnam unveiled a Fisheries Surveillance Force (VFSF) under
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development’s Directorate of Fisheries.
The force is tasked with protecting domestic fishermen and with detecting and
managing violations of Vietnam’s fisheries laws and regulations by foreign fishermen within Vietnamese territorial and EEZ waters. At the ceremony marking the
establishment of the VFSF, Vietnamese authorities emphasized that the most important duty of the force is to “safeguard the country’s sovereignty and ensure the
safety of fishermen and their vehicles in the country’s sea areas.”100 Vietnamese
officials highlighted the fact that one million Vietnamese fishermen and 120,000
boats operate in Vietnamese waters, adding that the fishing industry is one of the
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country’s “key economic sectors.” According to Vietnamese officials interviewed,
the VFSF’s MLE responsibilities are limited to inspecting and fining illegal fishing boats or repelling them from Vietnamese waters. They are not authorized to
arrest and transport offenders back to mainland Vietnam for prosecution, for
example.101 The VFSF currently has four small patrol craft of five hundred to one
thousand tons and two medium-endurance cutters, called KN-781 and -782, each
displacing two thousand tons.102
The addition of the VFSF adds another maritime actor with responsibilities for
enforcing maritime law to the Vietnamese roster, which includes the VPN, the
Vietnam Border Guard (VBG), the Vietnam Maritime Administration (VINAMARINE) under the Ministry of Transportation, the General Department of
Vietnam Customs, and the Department of Anti-smuggling under the Ministry of
Finance. Of these actors, only the VPN, VCG, VFSF, VINAMARINE, and VBG
have vessels that patrol Vietnamese waters. The VBG is responsible for enforcing
maritime regulations within Vietnam’s territorial sea and inland waterways and
does not patrol Vietnam’s EEZ. The VINAMARINE undertakes missions related
to SAR, environmental protection, and maritime traffic control. The VPN, VCG,
VINAMARINE, and VFSF all share responsibility for patrolling Vietnam’s EEZ,
while the VPN, which has the most high-endurance vessels, is deployed alongside
the VCG performing the frontline patrols instituted in response to territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.103 Overlapping mandates and jurisdictions of
the above-mentioned agencies have created redundancies in authority, mission,
and jurisdiction like those that continue to confront MLE agencies throughout
the region.
The HYSY 981 incident previously mentioned constitutes the second case
study. From May 2 to July 15, 2014, China deployed an oil-exploration rig designated HYSY 981 off the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea; the islands are
claimed by China and Vietnam. The location of the rig was roughly 200 nm south
of China’s Hainan Island and 120 nm from the Vietnamese coast—well within
Vietnam’s EEZ. The deployment of HYSY 981 triggered the biggest diplomatic
crisis between China and Vietnam since the normalization of relations in 1991,
involving mass protests across Vietnam and attacks on Chinese-owned businesses and citizens in the country. The incident also debuted a new operational
strategy on the part of China that featured the large-scale deployment of Chinese
fishermen and civilian auxiliary vessels working alongside Chinese naval and
coast guard vessels to protect the oil rig and repel advances by Vietnamese vessels.
Soon after the oil rig was deployed, China established a security cordon of
coast guard and fishing vessels 10–11 nm from the rig, with naval vessels maintaining a presence nearby. One Vietnamese report noted the presence of 102–108
Chinese vessels, including 37–39 coast guard vessels, 12–14 transport vessels,
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17–19 tugboats, and 30 fishing boats.104 In response, Vietnam sent coast guard,
naval, and fishing vessels to penetrate the cordon and repel the Chinese vessels
from the area. A test of wills ensued, with Vietnamese vessels advancing to within
10 nm of the rig and Chinese vessels repelling their advance. Over the next few
weeks, China began to deploy greater numbers of fishing vessels on the front line
of the cordon, including maintenance and supply ships, trawlers, and tugboats.105
China also increased the aggressiveness of its tactics, ramming opposing vessels
and using water cannon.106 In one case, a large Chinese fishing trawler rammed
and sank a wooden Vietnamese fishing vessel; all the crewmembers were saved by
a nearby Vietnamese coast guard vessel.107 In another case, a Chinese coast guard
vessel used water cannon against Vietnamese fishing and surveillance vessels for
hours, in an attempt to flood the vessels and disable their engines.108
The employment of Chinese fishing and auxiliary vessels during the HYSY
981 incident is noteworthy not only because it indicates a strategy on the part
of China’s decision makers to use civilian actors as a first line of defense against
other countries’ government and military vessels; it also highlights a high level of
coordination among the different actors. One Vietnamese official remarked that
this was the first time he had seen a coordinated campaign of Chinese fishermen
being “out in front” during a conflict and undertaking “assertive actions such as
ramming and sinking Vietnamese vessels.”109 The official suspected that these
civilian assets and personnel receive guidance, training, and funding from the
Chinese military.110
Fishing, coast guard, and naval assets operating as one loosely coordinated
unit to defend a position injects a new and potentially destabilizing escalation
dynamic into the maritime sphere (see figure 6).
In scenarios of this type, fishing vessels, coast guards, and navies can and often
do clash with vessels of a different kind. The HYSY 981 incident showcased fishing vessels ramming other fishing vessels, fishing vessels ramming coast guard
vessels and vice versa, coast guard vessels ramming another coast guard’s vessels,
and coast guard and fishing vessels coming close to naval vessels patrolling the
area. As one moves up the escalation ladder from civilian assets through coast
guard assets to naval assets, the potential for escalation increases. Yet during the
HYSY 981 incident, operators manning civilian assets exhibited more escalatory
actions precisely because they were not employing the strongest weapons or assets
available, and because of the plausible deniability of state involvement. A greater
willingness for civilians operating civilian assets to undertake assertive actions
may explain partially China’s use of a fishing trawler to ram and sink a Vietnamese fishing vessel, for example. The involvement of civilian, government, and military assets in this case has introduced a new and potentially dangerous escalation
dynamic into the existing maritime environment in the South China Sea.
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FIGURE 6
ESCALATION DYNAMICS OF CIVILIAN, GOVERNMENT, AND MILITARY ASSETS DURING
HYSY 981 INCIDENT
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The outcome of the HYSY 981 incident was a bitter pill to swallow for Vietnamese authorities. Vietnam’s coast guard and navy found themselves severely
outnumbered, and the inclusion of Chinese civilian vessels as proxies for the Chinese state confronted commanders with a fundamentally new combat landscape.
For Vietnam, the incident underscored the need for greater investments in naval
and coast guard assets, as well as the loosening of use-of-force policies governing
its coast guard and fisheries-surveillance forces.111
The Philippines
The creation of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) (Tanod Baybayin ng Pilipinas)
can be traced to October 17, 1901, when Philippine Commission Act No. 266
created the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation (BCGT). The BCGT’s
primary tasks were to maintain lighthouses in different parts of the archipelago,
support the inspection trips of government officials, and prevent illegal entry
of aliens.112 On October 26, 1905, its functions were taken over by the Bureau
of Navigation, and later by the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Public
Works.113
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In 1948, during the early years of the Philippine Republic, the Philippine
Naval Patrol, which eventually became the Philippine Navy (PN), was created;
it absorbed most of the functions of the coast guard. Then, from 1967 to 1998,
under Republic Act (RA) 5173, the coast guard gained the formal name “Philippine Coast Guard” and became a major unit of the PN, part of the armed forces
of the Philippines.114 Perceiving the need to make the PCG a constabulary force
under civilian authority, President Fidel V. Ramos signed Executive Orders 475
and 477 in 1998, paving the way for the PCG to be transferred to the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).115
On February 12, 2010, the Philippine Congress approved the PCG’s statutory place as an armed service under and attached to the DOTC by enacting RA
9993, otherwise known as the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009.116 The PCG
therefore is considered a “paramilitary” force because its personnel and vessels
are armed, and because it would fall under the command of the Philippine Department of Defense during wartime. The separation from the PN in 2010 also
meant that the commandant of the PCG reports directly to the secretary of the
DOTC as well as to the president of the Philippines.117
The PCG maintains a small fleet of eight medium-endurance patrol craft,
mounted with 50 mm autocannon; four buoy tenders; and roughly thirty-two
small patrol vessels.118 Japan’s announcement that it plans to sell eight mediumendurance cutters to the Philippines will mean an almost doubling of the PCG
medium-endurance-cutter fleet.119 The PCG has only two operational aircraft—
one fixed wing and one helicopter—but it is slated to receive two helicopters from
France within the next few years.120 Finally, there are roughly 9,000 personnel in
the PCG, with plans to expand to 13,500 by 2020.121
Although notionally it is the central actor overseeing MLE within Philippine
territorial and EEZ waters, the PCG, like many other coast guards in East and
Southeast Asia, shares that responsibility with a wide range of bureaucracies
within the national government. These include the Philippine National Police
Maritime Group (PNP-MG), Customs, Immigration, the Philippine Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and the PN. The PNP-MG, for example,
retains jurisdiction over Philippine territorial waters and has a small fleet of inshore patrol vessels that police these waters. The BFAR, PCG, and PN share jurisdiction over Philippine contiguous zones and EEZ waters. Furthermore, because
of institutional reliance on the PN, especially its larger assets that are capable of
high-endurance missions in the South China Sea, the PCG plays a secondary role
in patrolling disputed territory in this area.
There are three functional commands within the PCG: Maritime Safety
Services Command, Maritime Security and Law Enforcement Command, and

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 99

2/22/17 9:32 AM

100

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Marine Environmental Protection Command.122 With these three mission sets,
the PCG is, in theory, authorized to carry out all MLE functions while on patrol.
This includes SAR, customs, immigration, and fisheries enforcement. In fact, the
Philippine Coast Guard Law is explicit regarding the various scenarios under
which PCG officials may undertake missions and tasks on behalf of other lawenforcement agencies. However, more training is needed for PCG officers to be
able to perform the full spectrum of SAR, fisheries, customs, and immigration
missions that are required. Furthermore, most PCG vessels are unable to sustain
operations far from shore for long periods.123
The overlapping mandates and command structures of the PCG and BFAR
highlight redundancies that continue to hamper unified MLE action. The BFAR
was established under fisheries law RA 8550 to protect Philippine fisherman
rights and interests at sea as well as to police illegal fishing activities within the
Philippine EEZ.124 The BFAR maintains its own mandate, command, fleet, personnel, and rules for use of force. Soon after the BFAR was created, it signed a
memorandum of agreement with the PCG to coordinate operations, and PCG
personnel frequently man BFAR vessels during patrols. Most BFAR patrols in
the South China Sea, for example, are under the direct supervision of the PCG.125
Furthermore, the majority of inspections the PCG conducts and violations it
encounters in the South China Sea relate to fisheries enforcement, which are
nominally under the purview of BFAR, yet PCG personnel prosecute most cases.
This has created an unnecessary overlap in mission and jurisdiction between the
BFAR and the PCG that continues today.
One case involving the fatal shooting of a Taiwan fisherman by a BFAR vessel
in May 2013 highlights the pitfalls of dueling Philippine MLE actors undertaking
use-of-force actions under loose C2 structures. Known as the Guang Da Xing No.
28 incident, the case involved a BFAR vessel chasing and opening fire on a Taiwan
fishing vessel within an area of overlapping EEZs of Taiwan and the Philippines.
The BFAR vessel was manned by a mix of BFAR and PCG personnel, and Philippine authorities maintain that the officers were undertaking defensive actions
after they were rammed by the Taiwan vessel in Philippine waters; they claim they
were attempting simply to disable its engine.126 However, video footage of the incident appears to show PCG officials indiscriminately shooting dozens of rounds
from a firearm into the hull and windows of the Taiwan vessel.127 A tense diplomatic standoff ensued, with Taiwan imposing sanctions on the Philippines and
conducting a series of naval drills near the area where the incident occurred.128
Ties eventually were mended after a Philippine investigation recommended
homicide charges against eight PCG personnel involved in the shooting, and a
representative of the Philippine government traveled to Taiwan to apologize officially to the victim’s family.129
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The case highlights vulnerabilities created by overlapping command structures and lack of intra-agency standard operating procedures. As a result of the
case, the PCG and BFAR tightened use-of-force procedures and initiated greater
coordination of operations between the two services.130 However, the incident
illuminates the larger coordination issues that exist among the PCG and the PN,
the PNP-MG, and the BFAR. According to one PCG officer, the different agencies
do share some intelligence during patrols and train together occasionally in the
classroom, but they essentially operate independently of one another, with few
direct communication links.131 As will be discussed later in the article, the Philippine National Coast Watch System (NCWS) will alleviate some of these issues by
sharing intelligence across agencies and providing a common maritime domain
awareness picture for operators on patrol. The BFAR also plans to install a million automatic identification system sensors on Philippine fishing vessels, which
would increase greatly coordination with domestic fishermen.132
The Scarborough Shoal incident, discussed below, has resulted in the PCG
being tasked as the primary enforcer of Philippine maritime rights and interests
in the country’s EEZ, a role the PN traditionally filled. This development, along
with the decision to place the NCWS under PCG command, has endowed the
PCG with a greatly expanded set of roles and responsibilities within Philippine
maritime security policy. However, competing bureaucratic interests, undercoordination with other MLE agencies, and chronic underfunding by the Philippine
government continue to hamper the PCG’s development and have forestalled
its realization as the preeminent force protecting Philippine maritime interests.
The aforementioned Scarborough Shoal incident provides the third case study.
The April 2012 standoff between the CCG and the PN and PCG that occurred at
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea was a highly contentious and dangerous test of wills between the respective nations. It began on April 8 when the PN
flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (a decommissioned and transferred U.S. Coast
Guard cutter), attempted to apprehend several Chinese fishing boats suspected
of hauling an illegal catch of corals, clams, and live sharks. PN officers boarded
one vessel and discovered the catch. After the Philippine sailors disembarked,
the Chinese vessels sent a distress call to local officials in Hainan via satellite
phone.133 When PN personnel attempted to board a second vessel, two 1,500-ton
CMS (CMS is now part of the CCG) vessels, Haijian 75 and Haijian 84, arrived
and inserted themselves between the Philippine warship and the Chinese fishing
vessels, preventing an arrest.134
Chinese statements and actions at the outset of the standoff marked a dramatic departure from earlier behavior. This was the first time a CCG vessel had
prevented the PN from arresting Chinese fishermen. More significantly, China
challenged Philippine territorial waters over a shoal that was 124 nautical miles
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from the Philippine island of Luzon and well within the Philippine EEZ. According to Philippine officials, China had never issued such stern warnings about the
shoal being Chinese territory.135
On April 10, Philippine president Benigno Aquino III, realizing that his country was engaged in a dangerous standoff with a militarily superior foe whose
behavior lately had become unpredictable, made a decision that would greatly
influence the development of the PCG. He decided to withdraw Pilar and replace
it with the largest coast guard vessel in the PCG fleet, the thousand-ton mediumendurance cutter BRP Pampanga (SARV 003), to de-escalate the conflict. This
was the first time a PCG asset had been deployed so far from shore.136 Aquino’s
decision was in part a response to Executive Order No. 57 of September 2011
that created the NCWS, an intelligence fusion center housed adjacent to the
PCG headquarters, to integrate Philippine maritime security operations in one
centralized location, in part to promote a “white to white, gray to gray” approach
to dealing with foreign government vessels.137
By the time Pampanga replaced Pilar, China had deployed Yuzheng 310—a
2,500-ton fisheries-surveillance cutter—initiating a tense standoff.138 At that
point, the PCG was outnumbered three to one by its CCG counterpart, not to
mention three Chinese fishing vessels in the area.139 A few weeks later Pampanga
was replaced by BRP EDSA II, similar in size to Pampanga—a move apparently
made out of necessity to replenish Pampanga, which was not accustomed to such
long-distance operations.140 Another, smaller (hundred-ton) BFAR patrol vessel
was deployed to the scene around this time.141 At one point in May, China had
increased the number of its vessels near the shoal to ninety-seven—five CCG and
ninety-two fishing and auxiliary vessels.142
The standoff continued for over three months, with diplomats of the two
countries trading many acrimonious statements, until the U.S. State Department
reportedly stepped in to mediate a resolution to the standoff under which both
parties agreed to pull back from the shoal.143 On June 4, both sides initiated various stages of withdrawal, but each maintained a presence just over the horizon.
After just a few days—claiming that a deal to withdraw had never been reached—
China returned its vessels to the shoal.144 A few months later it was revealed that
China had tied across the entrance to the shoal a rope that blocked entry.145 The
Chinese coast guard presence—along with the rope—remains today.
The Philippine government was shocked at the result of the standoff, not only
having lost a rich fishing ground on which the Philippine fishing industry had
relied for decades, but also having placed false hope in China honoring its commitment to the U.S.-brokered agreement to depart the area. The incident forced
Philippine national security policy makers to reassess both the use of naval assets to conduct MLE duties, such as boardings of foreign civilian fishing vessels,
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and the appropriateness of confronting CCG vessels with naval vessels. In many
regards, the incident was a watershed moment for the PCG. From that point
onward—notwithstanding the Philippines and the PCG coming away from the
incident with a sense of defeat—the PCG has taken on a primary role as enforcer
of Philippine maritime interests in the South China Sea.
The incident also confirmed for the Philippines a new trend in CCG behavior,
starting in 2011: that of CCG vessels practicing more-aggressive tactics and of
Chinese government and fishing vessels being more willing to challenge Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea. Such behavior was on display not
only during the Scarborough Shoal incident but also when Chinese vessels for the
first time blocked two attempts by PCG ships to resupply their garrison of troops
on Second Thomas Shoal on March 9, 2014, during China’s brief seizure of Jackson Atoll in March 2016, and when CCG vessels reportedly rammed a Philippine
fishing vessel near Scarborough Shoal in March 2016.146 According to Philippine
officials interviewed, China now appears intent on disrupting Philippine resupply missions to its garrison on Thitu Island (known in the Philippines as Pag-asa
Island), the largest Philippine-occupied island in the South China Sea and home
to over three hundred Philippine citizens.147
On the basis of the above analysis and examination of the specific case studies,
China’s increasingly aggressive employment of its coast guard as an instrument
of state power and its use of tactics that blur lines between acts of armed aggression and acts of law enforcement are reshaping fundamentally the maritime
security environment in East and Southeast Asia. In contrast to its actions in the
East China Sea, where China appears to have routinized its activities to avoid
unnecessary escalation with Japan, China’s adoption of tactics such as shouldering, ramming, and the use of water cannon to intimidate smaller claimants in the
South China Sea, in conjunction with its increasing reliance on civilian fishing
vessels as proxies, greatly challenges the responses of other actors in the region.
China’s use of civilian vessels provides plausible deniability against claims of
assertive state-sanctioned tactics. The use of fishing, coast guard, and navy vessels in proximity to each other in disputed waters presents an interdependent
web of possible escalation dynamics that are too little studied, yet potentially
destabilizing to Southeast Asia. It will be incumbent on maritime states to continue to exercise restraint if situations involving such a plethora of actors are to
be contained at a manageable level.
China’s desire to consolidate administrative control over the vast majority of
maritime zones in the South China Sea and its unprecedented level of investment in its coast guard fleet have prompted other regional states to turn to coast
guards to counter the threat they perceive to their maritime environment and to
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bolster administrative control over disputed territory. For several of the states
examined in this study, however, chronic underfunding, insufficient training,
underresourced facilities, and legacies of naval jurisdiction over maritime areas
all hinder the proper development of their coast guards and all but ensure a significant quantitative gap in coast guard fleets between China and others in the
region. Among the four coast guards in this study, Japan’s stands out as the most
professional and well organized force, one that has been able to overcome many of
the bureaucratic impediments from which other coast guards in the region suffer.
Furthermore, the existence of unresolved territorial disputes in the South
China Sea makes it somewhat of an anomaly with regard to coast guard missions.
In an environment of competing territorial claims, any exercise of domestic authority in disputed waters by one coast guard has the potential to be contested by
another nation as a violation of its sovereignty.148 Thus, for the foreseeable future,
the budgetary battle will continue to play out among certain countries in Southeast Asia over whether navies or coast guards should be deployed as the primary
asset to combat nontraditional maritime security threats.
In the near term, the disputants should consider two approaches to mitigate
tensions. First, a code of conduct (CoC) negotiated among the claimants in the
East and South China Seas should be pursued, as some have proposed.149 While
efficiencies might be derived from pursuing such agreements within larger, existing, multilateral groupings, such as ASEAN, the author believes a CoC should be
pursued directly by the claimants themselves, either bilaterally or multilaterally.
Second, confidence-building and information-sharing mechanisms may
offer another alternative that seeks to build relationships among coast guard
commanders.150 The creation of the U.S.-initiated North Pacific Coast Guard
Forum (NPCGF) in 2000 stands out as an important success story with potential applicability to Southeast Asia. NPCGF brings together the coast guards of
Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for annual
meetings, information sharing, and multilateral multimission exercises. NPCGF
provides joint-operations components such as a U.S.-Chinese joint fisheries
shiprider agreement and a combined operations manual, in addition to building
trust and permitting information sharing, including law-enforcement best practices, among partner nations more generally.151 A regional forum patterned after
NPCGF but among the coast guards of Southeast Asia and China—to include
both information-sharing and operational components—should be considered as
a prescription to reduce tension and build trust.152 Such a forum could go a long
way toward promoting professionalism across coast guard fleets and perhaps
lessen the use of some of the destabilizing tactics those coast guards have been
employing.
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COMING FULL CIRCLE
The Renaissance of Anzac Amphibiosity
Steven Paget

Australia and New Zealand should look for opportunities to rebuild our
historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements in the Anzac tradition.

I

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEFENDING AUSTRALIA IN THE ASIA PACIFIC CENTURY: FORCE 2030

n 2010, Rod Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote: “With the
return of the more strategically-extroverted Kiwi, it is a good time for Australia
and New Zealand to be putting more meat on the bones of their Closer Defence
Relationship.”1 Various areas of the “closer defence relations” between Australia
and New Zealand are ripe for cooperative enhancement, but one of the most obvious is amphibious operations. Both nations have recognized that their amphibious forces provide a means to further jointness among national service branches,
but the current international interest in amphibiosity means they are also a tool
for effective engagement and for enhancing interoperability.2
Australia and New Zealand are in the unique position of developing their
own amphibious capabilities concurrently, albeit with major differences in size
and scope. The process seems particularly apt, given that the Anzac (originally,
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) relationship was forged during
the course of one of the most notorious amphibious operations in history. The
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has expressly stated: “Since
fighting side by side as ‘ANZACs’ in the Gallipoli
Steven Paget is a senior fellow in strategy at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom. He also has campaign of World War I, New Zealand and Austaught at various institutions in Australia and New tralian defence forces have forged a close relationZealand. His published research in Australia, the
ship.”3 While it would be easy to dismiss Gallipoli
United Kingdom, and the United States focuses on
multinational operations, interoperability, and pro- as an anachronism—which, in many ways, it is,
fessional military education.
in the context of amphibious operations—the
reality is that a shared interest in the South Pa© 2017 by Steven Paget
Naval War College Review, Spring 2017, Vol. 70, No. 2
cific and the close defense ties that Australia and
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New Zealand maintain ensure that cooperation in the area of amphibiosity is
extremely important.4
Since interoperability is a critical concern for the Australian amphibious force,
the requirement to operate alongside the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)
must be considered. As Australia is New Zealand’s closest ally, the former’s development of an amphibious force has been a source of great interest to the latter,
especially given the NZDF’s concurrent development of what was referred to
originally as the Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF), but now is known simply as the Joint Task Force (JTF). A number of measures have been enacted to
facilitate the interoperability of the two amphibious forces, but there is room for
further progress.
This article will consider the utility of amphibious capability in Australia
and New Zealand’s strategic environment and trace the development of both
countries’ forces, including the historical influences on Australian Defence Force
(ADF) and NZDF planning. The achievement of interoperability between the
ADF and the NZDF, as well as with other likely multinational partners, which has
been developed through various means, will be assessed. Ultimately, the article
will contend that, while the ADF and NZDF maintain a relatively high level of
interoperability, further enhancements in the area of amphibious capability could
be achieved through greater integration, specifically through emulating the model adopted by the United Kingdom / Netherlands Amphibious Force (UKNLAF).
THE REQUIREMENT FOR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY:
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The Australian government has established that the nation’s primary operating
environment “extends from the eastern Indian Ocean to the island states of Polynesia, and from the equator to the Southern Ocean.”5 In their comprehensive and
far-reaching assessment of Australia’s approach to amphibious warfare, Beyond
2017, Ken Gleiman and Peter Dean noted that most of the population centers
and strategic infrastructure in Australia’s primary operating environment are
situated within twenty-five kilometers of the coastline. Although just 5 percent
(approximately) of that coastline can be used to unload large ships, 75 percent
can be accessed by hovercraft and 95 percent can be used by small boats. Moreover, approximately 25 percent of the beaches can accommodate landing craft.6 In
short, the ADF’s primary operating environment is “maritime and archipelagic in
nature” and, as a result, is tailor-made for amphibious operations.7
While Australia’s primary operating environment is larger in scope than that
of New Zealand, it is notable that their overlapping areas in the South Pacific
are characterized by “complex riverine systems and archipelagos.”8 When the
assortment of unstable countries along the Pacific Rim and the potential for
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natural disasters are considered, it is not hard to envision that Australia and New
Zealand increasingly may be required to respond to events in the region. Indeed,
Professor Paul Dibb of the Australian National University has observed that there
is likely to be an ongoing requirement for “humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, capacity building and governance, potential peacekeeping operations, and
military intervention” in the South Pacific.9 The 2016 Australian Defence White
Paper acknowledged: “To help countries in our immediate neighbourhood respond to the challenges they face, Australia will continue to play an important
regional leadership role. Our strategic weight, proximity, and resources place
high expectations on us to respond to instability or natural disasters, and climate
change means we will be called on to do so more often. We will continue to play
that role in close collaboration with New Zealand, France, the United States,
Japan, and other partners.”10
The necessary responses to these challenges are likely to require, at least in
part, a commitment of an amphibious nature. Indeed, recent experience has
borne out the utility of amphibious capability, in both domestic and regional
contexts. Both Australia and New Zealand contributed to the Australian-led regional assistance mission in the Solomon Islands in 2003. After Australian forces
had been deployed by landing craft and Sea King helicopters from the amphibious platform (LPA) Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Manoora (L 52), it
was observed that the presence of the ship, in concert with land and air power,
“signalled to criminals and law-abiding citizens alike that the intervention in the
Solomon Islands was to be taken seriously.”11 However, while Australia’s amphibious assets were sufficient for operations in the Solomon Islands, the ADF proved
to be “significantly constrained in what it could offer” to relief operations in the
Aceh region of Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami, largely “because of the
limitations of the amphibious vessels at its disposal.”12
Just a year later, the utility of amphibious capability was demonstrated by operations in both East Timor and Fiji. Following tension between the Fijian military and the civilian government, the ADF deployed three vessels, including the
LPA HMAS Kanimbla (L 51), for a potential permissive withdrawal of Australian
citizens and approved foreign nationals as part of Operation QUICKSTEP. In the
end, the successful coup proved to be bloodless, but QUICKSTEP “reinforced the
potential benefits expected to accrue with the acquisition of more highly capable
helicopter-carrying amphibious ships in the years ahead.”13 During Operation
ASTUTE, which was designed to restore stability to East Timor, Kanimbla and
Manoora formed part of an amphibious ready group (ARG) that managed to land
an infantry battalion and supporting vehicles in three days, even without the use
of Dili harbor.14
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Closer to home, the significance of amphibious capability was demonstrated
when Tropical Cyclone Yasi hit northern Queensland on February 3, 2011. Unfortunately, the heavy landing craft (LCH) HMAS Tobruk (L 50) was unavailable,
as were Kanimbla and Manoora. Two Balikpapan-class heavy landing craft were
available, but they lacked vital capabilities such as enhanced communications,
hospital facilities, and helicopter support.15 Following the Christchurch earthquake in the same year, Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship (HMNZS) Canterbury
(L 421), the sealift and amphibious support vessel of the Royal New Zealand Navy
(RNZN), transported personnel, vehicles, fuel, generators, and stores across a
range of supply voyages.16
Whether one views the South Pacific as an “arc of instability” or an “arc of
opportunity,” it is clear that amphibious capability is inherently useful in that
operating environment, as has been discussed repeatedly in Australian and New
Zealand policy and strategy documents.17 In Future 35: Our Strategy to 2035, the
NZDF asserted that the “JATF will be able to conduct a wide range of tasks and
meet the key requirements expected of it in the Southwest Pacific.”18 Equally, the
2013 Australian Defence White Paper noted that the nation’s amphibious force
will be the “central plank” in Australia’s “ability to conduct security and stabilisation missions in the region.”19
Amphibious forces also provide an inherently useful tool for regional engagement.20 Australia and New Zealand both have contributed to Pacific Partnership,
a U.S.-led humanitarian and civic assistance initiative that has been supported
by Canada, France, Japan, and Malaysia as well. Tellingly, both nations have
contributed amphibious assets to Pacific Partnership. In 2010, Tobruk, one of
three deployed Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships, served as the command
vessel for Pacific Partnership.21 During the 2011 iteration, Canterbury served as
the headquarters for Pacific Partnership and was assisted by HMAS Betano (L
133) and HMAS Balikpapan (L 126), which provided ship-to-shore logistic and
personnel transport.22 In 2013, Australia took charge of the Papua New Guinea
segment, with Tobruk taking the lead, while New Zealand later led the phases in
the Republic of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. Canterbury also served as the
flagship for the Solomon Islands phase of the operation. During those phases,
Australian and New Zealand personnel, as well as those from other nations,
provided medical and dental care, conducted engineering and building projects,
led community-engagement initiatives, and cleared remaining Second World
War ordnance.23 However, Pacific Partnership is just one opportunity to generate
goodwill and enhance interoperability.
Given Australia’s stated desire to increase engagement with a range of regional
nations, including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Japan, amphibious forces offer a platform for increased interaction.24 Notably, the
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concurrent interest in amphibious operations in those nations presents a convenient and relevant avenue for engagement for both Australia and New Zealand.
Ultimately, the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating environments and the tasks the ADF and NZDF are likely to be required to undertake
provide an obvious use for amphibious forces. Thus, national interests combine
with the renaissance of amphibious capability in the Asia-Pacific region to drive
the development of robust amphibious forces.
A “DISTINCTLY AUSTRALIAN” FORCE: AUSTRALIAN
AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
Progress toward the validation of the new Australian amphibious force is well
under way and is scheduled to be completed in 2017. The centerpieces of the
force are the two Canberra-class helicopter landing docks (LHDs), HMAS Canberra (L 02) and HMAS Adelaide (L 01), which are 27,000-ton vessels that can
land over one thousand personnel, their vehicles, and other logistic support by
either helicopter or watercraft.25 As part of Plan BEERSHEBA, the projected landing force will be drawn from 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR).26
The amphibious force will be supported by Aegis-fitted all-purpose Hobart-class
air-warfare destroyers.27
Importantly, Australia has developed a scalable force that will constitute an
amphibious ready element (ARE) or an ARG. The ARG is the more capable
force structure, as it will comprise both LHDs, which will embark an amphibious battle group and the requisite enablers, and be supported by the Bay-class
landing ship HMAS Choules (L 100). It is anticipated that the ARG would be an
element of a joint task force made up of afloat-support ships, escorts, and minecountermeasure (MCM) assets. The ARE most likely will be deployed for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and stabilization operations,
as well as noncombatant evacuations. The ARE will be based on a single LHD
and deploy a combined-arms combat team plus medical, aviation, logistic, and
prelanding force elements. Although war fighting is not the intended purpose of
the ARE, it can perform that function in a limited way.28 Australia already has
certified the ARE, during the SEA SERIES exercises that were conducted off the
coast of northern Queensland between August 17 and October 6, 2015.29 The
certification process will be completed when the ARG is validated in 2017.
In recognition of the importance of interoperability and to develop the most
effective force possible, the ADF has sought input from both the United Kingdom
and the United States. In addition to the lateral transfer of a number of senior
Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel, the ADF has benefited from the input
of liaison officers.30 In fact, a Royal Marines colonel subsequently transferred to
the RAN after completion of his liaison position in the amphibious task force
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headquarters. Most notably, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has assigned a
colonel with amphibious experience to serve as “Colonel, Amphibious,” which
involves acting as the amphibious capability development lead within Deployable
Joint Force Headquarters.31
In view of the fact that Australia and New Zealand share an immediate region and that the defense relationship between the two nations is “built on deep
mutual security interests” and “a willingness to make positive contributions to
regional and global security and stability operations,” efforts have been made to
enhance the interoperability of the amphibious forces of the ADF and NZDF.32
Specifically, the ADF has taken active steps to ensure that integration is possible
with the NZDF’s JTF. Most notably, an NZDF officer is permanently present in
the ADF’s deployable joint headquarters through the J35 position, which involves transitioning plans into operations. Consequently, the ADF and NZDF
are “linked together” in the development of their amphibious forces and for the
planning of amphibious operations.33 Importantly, New Zealand, and particularly U.K. and U.S., input has been refined for the Australian context to ensure
that, rather than replicating the force of another nation, the Australian one is, in
the words of Major General Stuart Smith, Commander, Deployable Joint Force
Headquarters, a “distinctly Australian amphibious force.”34
FROM JATF TO JTF: NEW ZEALAND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
In September 2015, Captain Mark Worsfold, RNZN, opined that the NZDF “must
conduct and lead missions in the South Pacific and it must also enable New
Zealand to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security with
partners and friends.”35 An effective amphibious capability provides an important
means to respond to and shape events in the South Pacific. That notion was evident in the 2011 New Zealand Defence Capability Plan, which was centered on
the intention to develop a JATF.36 It was expected that the JATF would be operational by 2015 and would be “able to conduct a wide range of tasks and meet the
key requirements expected of it in the Southwest Pacific.”37 In 2013, the NZDF
explicitly stated as follows:
By 2020, with the JATF at its core, the Defence Force will be capable of conducting
amphibious military operations and responding to emergencies at home and abroad,
and projecting and sustaining land or maritime forces with increased combat utility,
either on its own or as part of a wider coalition. This combat capability will act as an
effective and credible deterrent for any challenge to New Zealand’s sovereignty and to
stability in the wider Southwest Pacific region.38

Although it was anticipated that the JATF would be combat capable, it was
acknowledged that the likely tasks required of the force would be much more
diverse. It was considered that the JATF would be involved more regularly in
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noncombat missions in New Zealand and overseas, including “search and rescue;
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; resource protection in the EEZ [exclusive economic zone]; maritime border security; and evacuating New Zealand
and approved foreign nationals from high-risk environments.”39
Although the label JATF has been dropped, the NZDF has continued the drive
to generate an effective amphibious force. The JTF will be mission specific and
its composition will vary, depending on the likely requirements of the force. It is
intended that the NZDF will be able to deploy a company-sized force into a lowthreat environment and that the force should be self-sufficient for up to thirty
days. Although the JTF is capable of undertaking a range of roles, it is likely to
be used in three scenarios: in HA/DR operations, in security operations, or as a
component of a multinational force.
Canterbury is the central platform for the NZDF’s JTF. Commander Andrew
Law, Naval Support, Amphibious Lead in the NZDF’s Capability Branch, emphasizes: “There is more to amphibious operations than just Canterbury, but without
Canterbury you don’t really have an amphibious force.”40 The ship is notable for
incorporating the roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) designs of commercial ferries. Canterbury has been the subject of vociferous criticism on occasion and even was
labeled the RNZN’s “problem ship” in the media.41 However, while its features
differ from those of traditional amphibious vessels, Canterbury is actually a capable and flexible ship.
The ship can transport approximately 250 personnel (in addition to the crew)
and has “the ability to land personnel, vehicles, and cargo by landing craft, helicopter, or ramps, as well as conventional port infrastructure.”42 The ship possesses
important command-and-control (C2) facilities and also has a self-contained
hospital with surgical capability.43 Canterbury will be supported by a range of
other surface vessels. The RNZN’s two Anzac-class frigates, HMNZS Te Kaha
(F 77) and HMNZS Te Mana (F 111), are entrusted with a range of tasks, which
include a force-protection role for the JTF.44 Some support also can be provided
by HMNZS Endeavour (A 11), a replenishment tanker, but the capability will be
enhanced when the ship is replaced.45 Currently, HMNZS Manawanui (A 09),
the RNZN’s diving and MCM support ship, can provide limited littoral warfare
support, but its replacement will offer a range of additional capabilities.46
The landing force will be provided by the New Zealand Army, but it will not
be a standing force. The composition of the force will depend on the nature of
the operation. For example, a force consisting predominantly of medics and
engineers could be deployed for HA/DR activities, but for security operations
an infantry company could be used. Although the landing force will be combat
capable, it is not expected to conduct opposed landings. Indeed, in 2015, Rear
Admiral Jack R. Steer, then New Zealand’s chief of navy, affirmed: “You’ll never
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see Canterbury storming onto a hostile beach; that’s not what we do.”47 Inevitably,
there is a limit to what the initial landing force can achieve, and it is likely to be
set a limited objective, such as opening an airport or seaport.
In addition to capability decisions, the generation of an amphibious mind-set
within the NZDF also has been an important focus and has been driven by the
conduct of a range of activities, including the biennial SOUTHERN KATIPO exercises (2013 and 2015) and the JOINT WAKA exercises that commenced in 2016.48
Given the design of Canterbury, a shift in mentality away from sealift and toward
amphibiosity was required. Lieutenant Commander Kathryn Hill, RNZN, the
amphibious operations (maritime) staff officer in the Capability Branch, has
acknowledged that there has been a “culture change” over time as the army has
become more accustomed to operating on Canterbury.49 Rather than just bringing together single-service skills, the JTF needs to be a joint force characterized
by cooperation and cohesion. Practice in the joint environment is essential to
developing an amphibious mentality. Equally, the capacity for the JTF to “plug
and play” in a multinational environment is extremely important.50
Although New Zealand has not followed the Australian approach of using
liaison officers from other amphibious forces, the NZDF has been involved in
extensive knowledge sharing with potential overseas partners and nations with
amphibious experience. Discussions have been held with representatives from a
wide range of nations and organizations, including the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and NATO. Australia, as New Zealand’s most likely
multinational partner, has been the subject of a wider range of discussions and
agreements. Initial doctrine for the development of the new JTF was based on
Australian standards and an interoperability framework was agreed for other
areas, such as equipment. In reference to discussions with representatives from
other amphibious forces, Commodore John Campbell, the NZDF’s maritime
component commander, has asserted that the information is invaluable, as there
is “no point in re-learning their lessons.” However, at the same time, he acknowledged that there is a need to apply those lessons to the New Zealand context, as
not all their experience is relevant to the NZDF, given the variances in capability.51
A PROBLEM SHARED IS A PROBLEM HALVED:
THE LEGACY OF ANZAC AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
As Gallipoli reminds us, amphibious operations are not a new concept for either
Australia or New Zealand. For the sake of accuracy, it should be remembered
that, while Gallipoli has captured the historical consciousness of Australia and
New Zealand, both nations conducted amphibious operations prior to the Dardanelles campaign. The amphibious expeditionary operations conducted in

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 120

2/22/17 9:32 AM

PA G E T

121

1914 in German New Guinea and Samoa by Australians and New Zealanders,
respectively, often are overlooked in the public discourse, but they represent
important markers in the development of Anzac amphibiosity.52 While Australia
has accumulated a more extensive amphibious history since then, both nations
have been involved in operations of an amphibious nature. During the Second
World War, the Australians conducted a range of amphibious operations in the
Southwest Pacific Area, most notably at New Guinea in 1943 and Borneo in
1945.53 New Zealand had less experience with amphibious warfare in that war,
but did participate in some notable operations, not least GOODTIME, which took
place in the Treasury Islands in 1943.54
An examination of all the amphibious operations Australia and New Zealand
have conducted is beyond the scope of this article, especially given that the
composition and purpose of the contemporary amphibious forces differ widely
from those of the Second World War. However, recent events have demonstrated
an ongoing requirement for collective amphibious capability. Indeed, contemporary Anzac military cooperation is far from a novel idea. During the 1990s,
the idea that Australia and New Zealand should be considered a single strategic
entity was floated.55 In retrospect, such a notion may seem excessive, but the nations undoubtedly continue to share strategic interests. The push to establish an
Anzac Ready Response Force / Anzac Ready Reaction Force in 2011, to provide
a joint response to emergencies in the South Pacific, demonstrated an increasing
alignment in outlooks. This had been shaped by the involvement of the ADF and
NZDF in a range of operations, particularly in East Timor.56
Australia’s commitment to the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)
in 1999, to restore peace and security following increasing violence after the
independence vote, prompted General Peter Cosgrove to describe the ADF’s
amphibious capability as one of “first resort.”57 However, from an amphibious
perspective, INTERFET provided a number of lessons about the adequacy of the
ADF’s capability and the importance of having reliable and competent allies. In
his overarching analysis of Australian amphibious operations between 1901 and
2001, Russell Parkin, then a major in the Australian Army, asserted that without
the naval contributions from New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States, the
RAN “would have been unable to cope with the complexities of the operation
because of its limited amphibious and sea lift capability, especially in the areas of
force protection, mobility, and logistics.”58
The determination of which NZDF force elements would be committed was
conducted, in part, through consultation between the Australian and New Zealand chiefs of defense forces.59 From a New Zealand viewpoint, Paul Sinclair of
Victoria University of Wellington has summarized:
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For the first phase of the initial intervention mission in Timor known as INTERFET,
Australia had the full range of military capabilities, the will, and the funding to assume leadership of the multinational coalition. New Zealand could not have done so,
but we did provide a wider range of capabilities than any of the 15 other countries
which participated. We also brought to the table a common doctrinal basis for operations and command and control.60

RNZN ships were placed under Australian control and played varied roles in
operations. The capacity to use Dili harbor was crucial for the conduct of operations, but it did not diminish the importance of amphibious capability or the
contribution of the surface vessels.
Coalition ships performed escort and close-protection functions, monitored
and identified surface and air contacts, provided logistic support for forces
ashore, and delivered humanitarian aid.61 The initial amphibious operations
necessitated protection operations, which were conducted by a range of vessels
from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including HMNZS Te Kaha.62 Even when the initial operations were completed, the
requirement for escorts remained. For example, HMNZS Canterbury (a Leanderclass frigate that was decommissioned in 2005) was involved in escorting thirty
amphibious and supply ships safely into Dili.63
Australian naval historian David Stevens concluded that “close cooperation
proved crucial to getting the best out of scarce assets,” which perhaps was characterized best by the assertion of Canterbury’s commanding officer, Commander
Warren Cummins, that his ship effectively “became an Australian frigate.”64 Tellingly, New Zealand strategic expert Robert Ayson has reflected, “New Zealand’s
largest military deployment since the Korean War helped to underscore the
value of trans-Tasman defence cooperation in the nearer neighbourhood—not
on the basis of a formal agreement but, rather, in terms of real-time cooperation
in regional crisis management.”65 Operations in the region after INTERFET, particularly those of a HA/DR nature, demonstrated the ever-increasing relevance
of amphibious capability.
More recently, the deployment of ADF and NZDF elements to support the
HA/DR operation in Fiji following Tropical Cyclone Winston, which struck on
February 20, 2016, has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to amphibious
operations. From an ADF perspective, Operation FIJI ASSIST (as the Australians
named it) was notable as the first deployment of HMAS Canberra on a HA/DR
operation.66 Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky has posited: “Relief of
Fiji is precisely the kind of operation that Australia envisioned for Canberra and
her sister [Adelaide].”67 The vessel transported three MRH-90 helicopters and
an army engineering element, as well as sixty tons of emergency relief supplies,
which served as a supplement to the preexisting Australian relief effort.68 The
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ship was stationed off Koro Island on arrival and commenced operations on
March 2, following beach-clearance activities being conducted by elements of
2RAR. The landing sites were described as “hives of activity” as “all manner of
berthing and mechanised capabilities came ashore.”69
With almost five hundred personnel being deployed, the operation constituted
“one of the NZDF’s largest peacetime deployments to the Pacific.”70 Canterbury
was deployed with 293 personnel, two NH90 helicopters, an SH-2 Seasprite helicopter, and forty-five vehicles, as well as 106 tons of relief supplies.71 The vessel
served as the “maritime base” for the NZDF’s HA/DR efforts in Fiji’s northern
outer islands.72 HMNZS Wellington (P 55), an offshore patrol vessel, not only
delivered sixty tons of aid and transported seventy-one military personnel; as
the advance force, it also surveyed the entrances into the reef and anchorages to
ensure that Canterbury could operate safely. The ship also identified beaches for
Canterbury’s landing craft to use.73
The assistance the ADF and NZDF provided was invaluable to residents
in disaster-struck areas and demonstrated the logic of enhancing amphibious
capability in the Pacific. The potential for cooperation between the ADF and
NZDF is particularly pertinent, given the opportunity to operate two different
response groups, with one Australian LHD working with Choules, the other with
Canterbury.
INTEROPERABILITY
In 2005, Lieutenant General James Mattis, USMC, declared, “You cannot do anything today without being part of a coalition. . . . This is a military consideration,
not a political one. Coalition warfare is a reality and a fact.”74 Mattis was right to
emphasize the significance of coalition warfare, but the truth is that multinational
cooperation is a reality to be reckoned with across the entire spectrum of operations. Amphibious forces are certainly no exception to this rule.
Given the likelihood of Australia and New Zealand operating alongside each
other, it is essential that their amphibious forces be capable of working together
as effectively as possible. In September 2015, Australia’s then minister for defense
Kevin J. Andrews asserted, “The bilateral relationship with New Zealand is one
of Australia’s most enduring and important defence partnerships. We are committed to deepening our strategic dialogue, practical cooperation, and enhancing
our interoperability with New Zealand.”75
Equally, interoperability with other likely multinational partners in the region
is a foremost consideration for both the ADF and NZDF. Historically, the United
States has stood out as an important multinational partner for both nations, as
they were “united by a common language, similar cultures and institutions, and
the experience of the Second World War.”76 While those factors are still relevant,
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the trilateral relationship among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
(ANZUS) has undergone turbulent times. Nevertheless, the three nations remain
united by a common interest in the Pacific.
Australia and the United States have taken a number of noteworthy steps to
improve cohesion between their militaries and to enhance amphibious capability.
The 2014 Force Posture Agreement, signed by Australia and the United States,
provided for the rotation of 2,500 U.S. Marines through Darwin and an increase
in air cooperation.77 The subsequent announcement by the U.S. Navy’s then Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert that the United States would
elevate the Marine Rotational Force Darwin to Marine expeditionary unit status
and provide amphibious ships to create a U.S. ARG by the end of the decade demonstrated the significance attached to amphibious capability in the region and
the importance of interoperability.78 With the rotation of U.S. Marines through
Darwin, it has been suggested that the area could become a “hub for training”
alongside the amphibious forces of other nations, including New Zealand.79
While similar advancements in relation to amphibious capability have not occurred in New Zealand, significant developments have taken place in defense cooperation with the United States more broadly, which are particularly noteworthy
in the wake of the 1980s ANZUS crisis. Following the New Zealand government’s
decision to reject a visit from USS Buchanan (DDG 14) in 1985, in line with its
policy of preventing nuclear-powered or -armed ships from entering the nation’s
ports, the United States broke off military cooperation and withdrew its security
guarantee.80 Subsequently, George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, declared: “We part
as friends, but we part company.”81
Recent developments have suggested that the United States and New Zealand
are moving closer together again, cautiously. The Wellington (2010) and Washington (2012) Declarations provided for increased security cooperation (including in HA/DR operations) and greater defense collaboration in the Asia-Pacific
(with a particular focus on maritime operations), respectively. The “warming of
ties,” which culminated in Condoleezza Rice describing New Zealand as “a friend
and an ally,” has been viewed as a reflection of New Zealand’s commitment of
forces to Afghanistan and the nation’s willingness to “participate more widely in
the post-9/11 counter-terrorism agenda.”82
New Zealand’s return to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2012
and the NZDF’s participation in a range of other exercises have provided a platform for increased cooperation with the United States. In fact, the analyst Jack
Georgieff has gone so far as to suggest that “the best in bilateral defense relations
may be yet to come.”83 Ayson has surmised that, while a “formal alliance relationship (including a return to full ANZUS relations) still seems most unlikely,” it is
“no exaggeration to say that New Zealand is now an informal ally of the United
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States.”84 Given the deepening defense relations with the United States and the
increasing American commitment to amphibious capability in the Asia-Pacific,
it would be logical for Australia and New Zealand to consider increased cooperation in the area of amphibious operations.
Furthermore, although the U.S. Pacific Command includes over two hundred
vessels, questions have been raised over whether there is sufficient amphibious shipping capacity to support the rebalance toward the Pacific.85 Fitted with
advanced C2 suites, flight decks for rotary-wing operations, a well dock for waterborne craft, and storage for vehicles and logistics materials, the RAN’s LHDs
could alleviate some of the pressure on the United States to deploy amphibious
ships to the Pacific.86 The recent suggestion that USMC personnel might be
deployed aboard foreign vessels provided further indication that capable and
reliable allies with amphibious capacity are of great value to the United States.87
Although Canterbury does not provide the same range of capabilities as the
LHDs, it is still a useful asset, and multinational partners are likely to value highly
any increase in sealift. The increased focus on amphibious capability in the AsiaPacific means that any capacity to contribute meaningfully in that area is of great
significance.
France represents another potential focus of cooperation in amphibious operations, given shared interests in the Pacific. In reference to the Pacific, France’s
2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security contended: “The stakes of our
sovereignty have to be defended there, just as the security of our citizens exposed
to climate hazards needs to be guaranteed, notably through the FRANZ arrangements (France–Australia–New Zealand).”88 The FRANZ arrangements, which
rest on a 1992 exchange of letters, make provision for regional disaster-relief
coordination. The significance of these arrangements has been demonstrated
during a number of operations, including relief efforts in the Solomon Islands
after the 2007 tsunami.89
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade recognized the importance of the tripartite relationship with France and New Zealand, as well as
the complementary liaison with the United States, when it stated an ambition to
“[p]romote long-term strategic cooperation in the Pacific region, drawing on the
Quadrilateral Defense Coordinating Group exchanges between Australia and
France in liaison with New Zealand and the United States, and on preparation
and implementation of joint action under the FRANZ Agreement in response to
natural disasters in the Pacific.”90
Ultimately, the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating environment means that an attentiveness to amphibious capability is entirely logical,
and an ability to interoperate with friendly nations that also maintain interests in
the region is a practical necessity.
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MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION: THE BENEFITS OF EXERCISING
In addition to providing important opportunities for engagement, multinational
exercises provide essential avenues for enhancing interoperability. The ADF and
NZDF actively engage in exercises based in Australia and New Zealand, as well as
farther afield. TALISMAN SABRE, a biennial exercise conducted by Australian and
U.S. forces to enhance capability and improve interoperability across the spectrum of operations up to high-end combat, is a particularly important endeavor,
given the ADF’s expanding interest in amphibious operations.
Over thirty thousand Australian and U.S. personnel participated in TALISMAN
SABRE 2015, in conjunction with forces from Japan and New Zealand.91 Interestingly, NZDF forces participated as part of the ADF element, while Japanese elements were embedded with U.S. units.92 Large-scale amphibious operations took
center stage, and one focal point of the exercise was the amphibious landing of
250 2RAR soldiers and large numbers of U.S. Marines at Fog Bay near Darwin.93
However, it is worth noting that, owing to the unavailability of Canberra, the
ADF’s amphibious contribution to the landings was somewhat more limited than
would have been ideal.94 Within the NZDF, it was acknowledged that TALISMAN
SABRE 2015 had the potential to be a formative exercise. In particular, the involvement of the two NH90 helicopters was seen to be extremely significant, as it was
the first time they had been deployed overseas and led to them being validated
for “operations throughout the Southwest Pacific.”95 Given the shared interest in
amphibious operations, the three nations were cognizant of the inherent value
of the exercise. Ultimately, Commander Michael Posey, the lead USN planner,
noted, “During TS15 we demonstrated our Pacific partnership with the Australians and Kiwis.”96
Exercises hosted in New Zealand also have provided worthwhile opportunities for the regular interaction of amphibious forces. During SOUTHERN KATIPO
2013, forces from New Zealand and nine other nations (Australia, Canada,
France, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Tonga, the United Kingdom,
and the United States) responded to a request from a fictional South Pacific
nation to restore law and order, which resulted in Canterbury evacuating citizens.97 The exercise was designed to assess the NZDF’s ability to conduct a joint
amphibious operation alongside a range of multinational partners. Colonel John
Howard, New Zealand Army, exercise commander, stressed the importance of
amphibious operations: “We have great opportunities here to train for beach
assaults and to conduct non-opposed amphibious landings, to parachute in, and
to spread out for a whole range of tactical tasks.”98
The scenario for SOUTHERN KATIPO 2015 envisioned that New Zealand was
required to deploy a task force to evacuate foreign nationals and assist police
in restoring security and stability. The exercise consisted of 2,500 personnel,
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including from Australia, Canada, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea,
Tonga, the United Kingdom, and the United States, conducting HA/DR and
stabilization operations.99 As part of the exercise, Canterbury, with support from
Wellington, conducted an amphibious landing of NZDF and multinational personnel and equipment, including MAN-produced medium and heavy operational vehicles, at Okiwi Bay in the Marlborough Sounds, located in the northern part
of the South Island of New Zealand.100 Aside from the generic benefits obtained
from exercising with multinational partners, the exercise was particularly valuable in that it provided an opportunity to test the Anzac Ready Reaction Force.
While nationally based exercises such as SOUTHERN KATIPO and TALISMAN
SABRE remain the principal focus of the ADF and NZDF, participation in various internationally hosted multinational exercises provides a range of benefits.
The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps host a multinational exercise that focuses
on enhancing amphibious tactics, techniques, and procedures known as BOLD
ALLIGATOR. The 2012 iteration, in which both Australia and New Zealand participated, involved a Marine expeditionary brigade–sized amphibious assault
from a sea base in a medium-threat environment. BOLD ALLIGATOR 2014 was
centered on strengthening amphibious cooperation in the areas of HA/DR operations, theater security, and noncombatant evacuations. Participants came from all
over the world, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom.101 The benefits to participation in BOLD ALLIGATOR are
twofold. First, both nations have the opportunity to observe the development of
cooperation between their more experienced USN and USMC counterparts. Second, the multinational nature of the exercise provides an opportunity to enhance
interoperability with a range of nations, including a number of potential partners
in operations in their primary operating environment.
The U.S.-hosted DAWN BLITZ exercise offers another avenue for cooperation. DAWN BLITZ 2013 involved exercising core U.S. amphibious capabilities
alongside forces from Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. The event culminated
with an amphibious landing (at Red Beach, Camp Pendleton, California) by
seventy amphibious assault vehicles and six landing craft, air-cushion vehicles.
DAWN BLITZ 2015 incorporated forces from Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
the United States. New Zealand’s contribution consisted of 102 personnel from
the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. In addition, logistics personnel operated on board the ships. Notably, NZDF personnel conducted a beach assault in
eight amphibious assault vehicles. The ADF did not participate in either exercise,
but Australian observers were present to glean lessons for their own amphibious
force. Rear Admiral Daniel H. Fillion, USN, commented, “It’s a chance for our
partners to teach us how they do amphibious operations, and hopefully, they’ll
learn from us how we conduct them.”102 Given New Zealand’s comparatively
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limited resources and the likelihood of the NZDF operating as part of a multinational force, the experience obtained from participation in DAWN BLITZ is
invaluable.
RIMPAC, which is conducted in and around the Hawaiian Islands, is the
largest multinational maritime exercise in the world. During RIMPAC 2012, the
ADF was placed in command of the maritime component—the first time a nation
other than the United States had been responsible for planning and commanding
the maritime aspects of the exercise.103 Throughout the exercise, the Australian
Army worked closely with the U.S. Marine Corps to “further develop” the ADF’s
amphibious capability.104 Notably, Captain Ken Semmens, Australian Army, was
embedded with the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Platoon, Combat Assault Company, 3rd Marine Regiment (USMC) during the conduct of amphibious operations at Kaneohe Bay. The experience was considered invaluable for the exposure
it provided him to mission planning and amphibious capabilities.105 New Zealand
also participated in RIMPAC for the first time in twenty-five years by contributing a range of assets, including two ships and a rifle platoon from the Royal New
Zealand Infantry Regiment, which was integrated with the U.S. Marine Corps
aboard USS Essex (LHD 2), as were various headquarters staff members.106 Major
General A. David Gawn, New Zealand Army, described RIMPAC as a “unique
training opportunity,” particularly given the ability of the infantry platoon to
“embed in a U.S. Marine Corps company and conduct amphibious taskings.”107
The theme of RIMPAC 2014 was “capable, adaptive partners.”108 ADF elements
engaged in a range of activities, including contributing to an amphibious landing. The Australian amphibious task group, which had its headquarters aboard
USS Peleliu (LHA 5), was afforded command of an expeditionary strike group
comprising thirteen warships and a multinational landing force of soldiers and
marines from ten nations, including New Zealand and the United States. Ten
amphibious missions were undertaken in total, including amphibious assaults,
amphibious raids, and noncombatant evacuations. During those missions, Australian soldiers conducted amphibious training with U.S. forces, as well as soldiers and marines from various other nations.109 Commodore Peter Leavy, RAN,
reflected that the exercise provided “an exciting opportunity to prepare for the
new amphibious capabilities being introduced for the Australian Defence Force
over the next few years.”110
The NZDF deployed over 250 personnel and assets from all three service
branches. The most relevant activity, from an amphibious perspective, was Canterbury’s contribution to the HA/DR element of the exercise, which involved
transporting vehicles and supplies to shore via landing craft. The ship also was
used to transport U.S. Army and USMC personnel. A light infantry platoon
from the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment also assisted in a noncombatant
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evacuation operation.111 In addition, it is worth noting that Canterbury transported in excess of one hundred Australian Army soldiers and their kit to the exercise.112 The fact that an RNZN ship docked at Pearl Harbor for the first time in
over thirty years was viewed by the White House as a symbol of “renewed engagement on mutual defense and security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.”113
Ultimately, the combination of the various exercises is fundamental to improvements in interoperability between the ADF and NZDF, as well as a range
of other militaries, which is a central concern for the amphibious forces of both
Australia and New Zealand.
GOING DUTCH? THE U.K.-NETHERLANDS MODEL
Australia has taken a pragmatic approach to drawing lessons from likely multinational partners, but there is an opportunity for the nation to go one step further
by considering a model adopted by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
The UKNLAF, which was established by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on May 9, 1973, is an exemplar of European force integration.
As Europe’s oldest integrated force, the UKNLAF has been labeled an example
of defense avant la lettre.114 The UKNLAF was established to “create a combined
force capable of operating together across the full spectrum of military operations from benign peacekeeping operations right up to sustained, high intensity
war fighting.”115
More recently, its importance has been affirmed by agreement on a new MOU
designed to enhance the UKNLAF, in line with the European Amphibious Initiative at the turn of the twenty-first century and the signing, on the fortieth anniversary of the combined force, of a new letter of intent on future cooperation.116
The UKNLAF emphasizes complete integration, with training, exercises, and operations being conducted under a unified command structure. Importantly, the
UKNLAF uses common doctrine and compatible equipment and C2 facilities.
Recent deployments to the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have demonstrated the
capacity of the force to engage in operations “ranging from low-level intervention
and peacekeeping to high-intensity warfighting.”117
Inevitably, assets available for the UKNLAF have changed over time. Initially
designed with the intention of integrating a single troop of the Royal Netherlands
Marine Corps (Korps Mariniers) and a (British) Royal Marine Commando unit,
the UKNLAF now can call on a brigade-sized force. In total, the Dutch manpower contribution is approximately 1,000–1,100 personnel. In addition to increases
in personnel, there also have been improvements in the platforms available for
the force. Since 1998, the landing platform dock (LPD) His Netherlands Majesty’s
Ship (HNLMS) Rotterdam (L 800) has been available to the UKNLAF. The ship is
fitted with a helicopter deck and a submergible dock and is capable of deploying
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approximately six hundred marines.118 A newer LPD, HNLMS Johan de Witt (L
801), offers a range of capabilities, including the capacity to act as a command
ship, with facilities for a one-star joint headquarters aboard.119 Notably, HNLMS
Karel Doorman (A 833), a multifunction support ship, was commissioned in
2014; it possesses both a RO/RO dock and a helicopter deck. The ship will support the Rotterdam-class LPDs during amphibious operations.120
The UKNLAF model is particularly relevant for New Zealand, as the NZDF is
a comparatively small force. Naval historian and strategist Geoffrey Till has appraised that small navies can “reasonably compensate for their smallness, if they
feel the need to, by banding together.”121 However, they also, of course, can seek to
enhance cooperation with larger militaries to generate a more effective force. In
that regard, the Netherlands provides a pertinent example for New Zealand. U.K.
defense strategist Sir Michael E. Quinlan assessed that the UKNLAF was created
“primarily because the Netherlands could not readily afford its own specialist
shipping.”122 A RAND study on the strengths and weaknesses of the Netherlands
armed forces noted that “[t]hey cannot maintain a full suite of capabilities across
the board, when you consider the scale of the country, the resources they have,
and manpower required,” before observing that they were “canny” in “pooling
assets” when “it suits them.”123 The Netherlands approach should resonate with
New Zealand, given the existence of the Anzac Ready Reaction Force, and there
certainly is scope for greater cooperation with Australia in the area of amphibious
capability. In reality, New Zealand’s amphibious capability is limited compared
with that of the ADF and other regional militaries, so the country must consider
how to maximize the effectiveness of NZDF assets.
The capacity of the UKNLAF to “nip a crisis in the bud” parallels the likely immediate requirements of the Australian and New Zealand amphibious forces.124
Given the existence of the UKNLAF and subsequent examples of defense cooperation, an Anzac amphibious force would not prove quite so novel, but it would
be just as, if not more, relevant, given Australia and New Zealand’s contemporary
strategic environment.
MAXIMIZING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
With the recent centenary commemoration of the amphibious landings at Gallipoli that forged the basis of the Anzac relationship, it would seem an apt time to
endeavor to foster interoperability in amphibious operations. Both Australia and
New Zealand have recognized the importance of amphibious capability in the
Pacific. Although the scale and scope of the amphibious forces being developed
differ widely, the impetus for amphibiosity is the same. Cooperation between
Australia and New Zealand is important for both practical and political reasons.
The same is true for cooperation with other Pacific players, particularly France

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 130

2/22/17 9:32 AM

PA G E T

131

and the United States. Shared interests and the requirement to operate in a region
that may require more amphibious capability than either nation can provide individually mean that cooperation is essential. Equally, the capacity to plug into
wider multinational operations is an important driver.
If Australia is to play a leadership role in the region, it will require willing and
competent partners.125 New Zealand is a natural and logical partner for Australia.
New Zealand defense analyst Peter Greener observed in 2011: “Whilst there are
significant differences in the level of capability each country enjoys, and that gap
is likely to become larger over time, it is clear that Australia values the contribution that New Zealand makes to combined operations.”126 For New Zealand, operating in a coalition provides “legitimacy and capacity.”127 Equally, since the New
Zealand military is comparatively small, its enactment of interoperability with
larger forces can act as a force multiplier. Indeed, Tim Wood of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University has emphasized that “the NZDF
is often described as ‘punching above its weight.’ . . . Nevertheless, the simple fact
remains that the NZDF is expected to do a great deal with comparatively little.”128
When interests align, operations alongside the ADF provide the opportunity to
do a good deal more with significantly greater resources.
While there are numerous aspects of the “closer defence relations” that it
would be logical to strengthen, priority should be accorded to the development of
interoperability between the amphibious forces of the ADF and NZDF. Progress
clearly has been made, but there is still some way to go to maximize the effectiveness of Australian and New Zealand forces during the conduct of bilateral and
multilateral operations. The fact that the Anzac relationship was founded on an
amphibious operation is symbolic, but in a practical sense is irrelevant. That said,
the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating environment and
the contemporary utility of amphibious capability ensure that the prioritization
of amphibiosity is not only a neat bookend but an entirely logical course of action. With that in mind, consideration could and should be given to the concept
of an Anzac amphibious force that would operate analogously to the UKNLAF.
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war”? What defines this supposedly unique approach to warfare? What elements
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is flawed and that an American strategic culture—a culturally framed way of
war—is not historically founded. To the author, the entire concept of a “strategic
culture” is built entirely around vague generalities and caricatures. “The search
for a distinctly American approach to strategy and its core determinants,” he argues, “was based more on myth and conventional wisdom than fact.”
Echevarria’s second argument involves the purported existence of a proverbial
American way of war. He argues that many criticisms of the American way of
war—namely, its alleged apolitical orientation, its astrategic character, and its
emphasis on overwhelming force to obtain decisive results—cannot stand up to
historical scrutiny. Here, over several chapters, Echevarria seeks to demonstrate
that this characterization is inaccurate over the breadth of America’s history.
This argument runs counter to the central thrust of Russell F. Weigley’s writings and my own narrower book on U.S. military culture.1 While both of the
author’s main contentions are argued aggressively, they remain unbalanced and
less than compelling.
STRATEGIC CULTURE’S UTILITY
Echevarria devotes an initial chapter to debunking strategic culture’s analytical
value. He concludes that the entire concept is little more than an elusive fiction.
But the U.S. strategic culture he depicts is an enduring, monolithic, and exceptionally American construct applicable across all the national security institutions, and such a depiction is too rigid—a caricature of how most scholars look
at the role of cultural factors. The author’s narrow interpretation fails to account
for historical influences that impact strategic culture over long and climactic
periods. Surely, the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and the Vietnam War emphatically impacted the way Americans looked at war and the utility of force. Other
scholars, including Sir Lawrence Freedman, accept this view: “Culture, and the
cognition which it influences[,] is rarely fixed but [is] in a process of development
and adaptation.”2
The notion of strategic culture as a frame of reference for beginning to understand one’s adversary and the distinctive (but not predictive) approaches to
conducting war clearly has some analytical value.3 A number of scholars in the
strategic studies community are advocates of the concept’s utility.4 The role of
strategic culture on strategic performance is a staple in the literature.5 A review
of strategic culture often has been an element in net assessments. Historian Williamson Murray concludes that grand strategy—at the highest level of the expression of strategic culture—must “rest on a realistic assessment and understanding
not only of one’s opponents but also of oneself.”6 Michael Howard’s warning is
perhaps the most trenchant: “Wars are . . . conflicts of societies, and can be fully
understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The
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roots of victory or defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield, in political, social, or economic factors.”7 Colin Gray posits that strategic culture is not
determinant, but does cue problem recognition and the search for solutions.8
Thus, Echevarria is pushing back against a body of scholars who contend that
any nation’s approach to strategy and its way of fighting are framed by its culture
and experiences.
Other scholars warn that ideas concerning ways of war tend to be used
prescriptively—as if adversary leaders were completely constrained by them.9
Surely, strategic culture can be taken too far if we presume it to be predictive. The
paradoxical nature of strategy must be considered, and a government may take
steps that are out of character (culture) to generate a surprise advantage.10
However, the reverse side of the argument is equally disconcerting. If strategists, while drawing up a strategy, took Echevarria’s concerns to a logical end,
they would not concern themselves with studying the nature of the government,
values, experiences, geography, or technological focus of a potential adversary.
I doubt the author intended to create that impression. However, intelligence
shortfalls and acultural thinking about the Other are classic shortcomings in U.S.
strategic culture. A flawed conception of Iraqi sociology and the multiethnic divisions found in Iraq in 2003 certainly reinforces Gray’s depiction of the American
way of war as “culturally challenged.”11 Lacking a deep understanding of an adversary’s history, culture, sociology, and government decision-making structures
certainly blinds one to possibilities, if not probabilities.
Dismissing the study of other cultures and their ways of war will only perpetuate a lack of understanding of both adversary culture and the larger context
it offers. Instead of ignoring these elements, we should make them fundamental
considerations in the development of strategy. This conclusion is a key, indeed a
central, insight from recent conflicts.
HISTORICAL SCOPE AND RESEARCH
The book’s scope raises several concerns. First, the author has bitten off quite a
project on which to chew. His overview covers a sweeping range of the nation’s
history. America’s strategic performance over two hundred years, from the defense of Boston to the march on Baghdad, is covered in fewer than two hundred
pages. American strategic planning and execution from World War I through
World War II and the Korean conflict are connected cohesively, but are covered in
a chapter of only twenty-two pages. Even when done by a talented historian such
as Echevarria, it is impossible to address the conduct of U.S. strategy comprehensively in such a compressed manner. Far too much depth and relevant scholarship
were sacrificed for breadth.
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Much of that breadth is irrelevant to today’s debate. The bulk of Reconsidering the American Way of War deals with the first 150 years of the history of the
United States, during which its strategic position and interests were different
than in the post–World War II era. Most of the criticisms of the American way
of war (including Weigley’s classic) were written at the end of the Vietnam War
and generally were critical of the contemporary U.S. military, especially its kinetic
focus and emphasis on conventional application of force.12 It is with regard to this
period that consistently limited strategic performance is blamed on U.S. strategic
culture, military culture, or both.
Even when the more modern sections are examined, the research base is
limited; a lot of relevant scholarship was overlooked. For example, the author’s
section on Vietnam lays the blame on Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
for the strategy of attrition on which the United States based its operations, but
Echevarria admits the U.S. Army maintained its focus on “search and destroy”
operations far too long. Neither Robert Komer’s famous book on U.S. military
culture nor Andrew Krepinevich’s critique of the Army nor Lewis Sorley’s dissection of Westmoreland’s strategy is cited.13
Echevarria’s section on the 1989–90 American intervention in Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE, overlooks shortfalls in planning for what was intended to be
Phase IV of that operation and the subsequent difficulties in establishing order.14
The brief discussion of the first Persian Gulf War and the most recent phase of
U.S. operations inside Iraq also avoids well-documented military shortfalls, particularly poor war-termination planning that reflected a desire to avoid politics.
As the British historian Hew Strachan has observed, the apolitical nature of the
U.S. military is demonstrated by its strong preference for concentration on the
operational level of war, as a “politics-free zone.”15 The U.S. strategy in Iraq for
2003 was far too focused on the initial conventional battle, and again was devoid
of political context. This was demonstrated when Commander, U.S. Central
Command General Tommy Franks told senior Defense Department officials
that he would focus on the day of battle and they could deal “with the day after.”
Such attitudes reflect shortcomings in our understanding of what constitutes war,
as well as in the leadership development of U.S. generals.16 But General Franks’s
comment and memoirs are not cited in the three pages this book devotes to
America’s longest war.
Echevarria concludes that the purported habits that characterize the American way of war are simply erroneous. In his interpretation, American strategy in
practice has been flexible and appropriately crafted for both irregular conflicts
and major wars. He finds (pp. 164, 174) that “the American way of war has been
nothing less than political in every respect and in every period of its history. . . .
It is clear that both policy and politics have influenced U.S. military practice.” If
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there is a consistent mental frame, it is the mistaken belief that “tactical victory
redounds in favor of strategic success.”
This assessment is hard to square with any objective evaluation of the last
fifteen years. The American way of war has influenced profoundly U.S. war
planning and strategic performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, success was elusive. Some of
these failures may be attributed to senior civilian leaders, while others relate to
flaws in strategy or implementation that can be laid at the feet of U.S. military
commanders; both represent components of strategic culture. But Echevarria
never examines subcomponents of a national culture nor alters his level of
analysis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s own conclusions about operational lessons
from those conflicts suggest that U.S. military campaigns were limited by a lack
of understanding about adversaries and by a “Big War” mind-set. These lessons,
including the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s own lessons-learned product, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, are absent from Echevarria’s history and
bibliography.17 Those candid evaluations found that U.S. experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan reflected apolitical thinking, astrategic logic, and ahistorical reasoning. These attributes were not just evident but conspicuous, both at the national
level and within the U.S. military’s plans. They were key contributors to failure, if
one objectively assesses our shortfalls. Others have noted these elements, but the
author does not counter their arguments.18 To contend that flaws in the American
conceptual approach to war and strategy do not exist and do not help to account
for the limited success the United States has obtained in two protracted contests
over the last fifteen years may be the biggest hole in Echevarria’s argument. This
perspective, should it become the revealed wisdom of the last two wars, would
perpetuate shortfalls in how strategists think about war, how the U.S. military
prepares for warfare across the range of military operations, and how students
are taught about their profession.
Dr. Echevarria’s two major arguments are presented cogently, but fall short of
convincing. The author is correct that examining strategic culture offers limited
predictability, but he is wrong to claim that it offers neither insights nor explanatory power. If we ignore a deep grasp of strategic culture—our own as much as
others’—we will ensure that the lessons encountered during the last fifteen years
will have to be dealt with again in our next war(s). Policy makers and military
planners should want to know more about the strategic culture of potential opponents and how it influences their decision making, not less.19
Reconsidering the American Way of War makes a material contribution to the
long-standing debate about strategic culture, especially by highlighting limits
to the construct and its usage. But embracing Echevarria’s perspective about
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strategic culture in general or the American way of war in particular overlooks
extensive evidence and criticism about U.S. strategic competence.20 If you want to
understand why tactical brilliance is undone by slipshod strategic thinking, you
will not find the answer here; those who seek a better American way of war must
look elsewhere.21 There are no arguments here for overcoming, by education or
process, America’s penchant for deficient strategy. Despite an increasingly disordered world, Echevarria apparently perceives neither need nor grounds for altering a paradigm that is skewed heavily toward kinetic solutions and conventional
fighting, regardless of our enemies.22
This book should stimulate a necessary debate as today’s generation of veterans on both sides of the Atlantic steps back to examine the last two wars. Learning
from and modifying entrenched behaviors after major wars are not easy feats.23
With Britain’s Chilcot inquiry there has been at least one serious effort to do so by
one of our allies, but there is little appetite in the United States for such reviews.
Yet tomorrow’s leaders should recognize the limitations strategic culture offers
in predicting how our adversary’s strategy will be formulated, how another actor
may think about war and warfare, and how we should understand our opponent’s
approach to warfare. Just as importantly, we must better understand ourselves.24
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CAPITAL THINKING
American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory, by Robert B. Watts. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 2016. 232 pages. $45 (paperback).

Even though this book is arguably not
a comprehensive study, it deserves to
be read by all naval professionals and
anyone with a casual interest in the
U.S. Navy and how it historically has
defined its mission. I say this up front
because, although this review will be
critical in some areas, such observations
must never be allowed to diminish the
intrinsic value of works such as this:
advocacy pieces that set out to challenge
the prevailing (twentieth-century) naval
orthodoxy, with all its emphasis on platforms and technology. This orthodoxy is
the proverbial elephant in the room that
is rarely challenged in naval circles—and
yet it should be. In this reviewer’s
mind, therefore, it is absolutely healthy
for naval professionals to be exposed
constantly to such variations in thinking
and to be pressed continually to justify
their long-standing beliefs, even if only
to force a more coherent exposition of
the prevailing service position. For this
reason alone, authors such as Watts
provide immense value to the service.
Watts writes in an engaging and readable
style that makes this slim paperback
an easy and enjoyable read. The book
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breaks down naturally into three distinct
sections: a short, theoretical analysis
of Mahan and his effect on U.S. naval
thought a century ago; an examination
of how the U.S. Navy has evolved this
thinking to meet the momentous events
of the twentieth century, specifically
the two world wars and the Cold War;
and finally a look at how the Navy
has fared in the post–Cold War era, a
period characterized by increasingly
complex irregular conflicts on land.
The second section is the largest,
forming the backbone of the book and
containing a very useful summation of
the various iterations of naval thinking
and all the official strategic utterances
since 1945, right up to the modern-day
“air-sea battle.” Throughout it all, Watts’s
premise is that the U.S. Navy, for a
variety of bureaucratic and cultural
reasons, has remained overinvested in
what he calls the “capital ship theory,” a
focus on high-end, expensive platforms.
While these may offer flexibility in
a variety of scenarios, they may in
fact be something of a liability in this
new age of irregular warfare.
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Watts himself is eminently qualified
for this work. A retired captain in the
Coast Guard and an acknowledged
author on naval topics, he can call on
some thirty years of observing how the
services have grappled with the strategic
changes in the post-Vietnam era, not
to mention his firsthand experience
with what some would call the more
“irregular” missions of naval life. Not
surprisingly, he is at his best in describing the difficulties facing the naval
services in the post–September 11th era.
This is not to say there is no awkwardness in the logic Watts employs. For
one thing, he is rather nebulous when it
comes to the actual meaning of the term
“capital ship.” In the text he variously
refers to battleships and aircraft carriers
but also on occasion to “cruisers and destroyers” (p. 110) and, even more specifically, the DDG-51 class (and equivalent)
(pp. 120, 171) as being capital ships.
While in terms of raw combat power
this may be somewhat understandable,
this is not a trivial matter in this case.
The normally accepted definition of a
capital ship would be “one of the largest
and most heavily armed ships in a fleet,
usually understood to be battleships,
battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers,”
or words to that effect. The problem:
including everything from the DDG-51
on up in the definition means there are
precious few USN vessels today that are
not capital ships! While superficially
this may seem to strengthen Watts’s
case, it actually weakens his argument
in a number of important ways. Most
obviously, it might be construed that it
is the very notion of a “capital” ship, as
distinct from any other, that is obsolete
in this case, not the U.S. Navy’s long
adherence to the principles of a theorist
writing in an era in which there was a
clear distinction. If the capital ship idea
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is truly dead and the distinction is no
longer valid or recognized today, where
would Watts’s argument be then? It also
weakens the assertion he makes later
on that other navies have done a better
job of letting go of the capital ship than
the U.S. Navy. While I can think of a
number of navies that have abandoned
aircraft carriers and battleships, on
account of the expenses involved, very
few, I think, have abandoned the DDG
or the advanced FFG as the prime
movers of global influence. If, using his
logic, these are in fact capital ships, then
most navies would seem to be following
a trajectory remarkably similar to that
of the United States. Interestingly too,
Watts seems not to include nuclear
submarines in this mix, yet I know of at
least one navy—the United Kingdom’s
Royal Navy—that has often equated
these vessels to the capital ships of yore
on account of their immense powerprojection and antifleet capabilities.
The second difficulty is the author’s
assumption that Mahan’s theories on
decisive battle and his capital ship theory
are synonymous and interchangeable.
Mahan, of course, was writing about the
preindustrial age and in an era when
the only threat to that determinant of
naval power, the battleship, was another
battleship. Under those circumstances,
the possession of the most up-to-date
and powerful fleet of battleships that
one could afford made a lot of sense,
as did the exhortation to keep the fleet
concentrated. The advent of the industrial age changed all this, however, in
two important ways. First, the extreme
mobility conferred on smaller ships by
turbine propulsion and the development
of new weapons such as the Whitehead
torpedo made the battleships vulnerable
to smaller platforms that cost a fraction
of a battleship’s cost. This was perhaps
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the first time in naval history when a
third-rate navy might threaten the largest fleets in the world effectively. Second,
the industrial powers’ need for resources
and markets on a global scale widened
the scope of naval strategic responsibilities immeasurably. This navies were
slow to appreciate, but (to cut a long
story very short) the likes of Admiral
Fisher in Britain with his battle cruiser
ideas in 1905 and Admiral Fournier
in France with his general-purpose
cruisers (“bon à tout faire”—able to
do anything) a few years earlier slowly
but inexorably moved the focus away
from a defensive clash of battle fleets
around the point of decision toward
the use of offensive power-projection
fleets around the periphery to ensure
protection of these wider strategic
interests. This offensive approach was
taken up most notably by the carrier
power-projection fleets of the U.S. Navy
in the post–World War II era. In other
words, the “capital ship theory” that the
U.S. Navy has held dear through all these
years is this offensive power-projection
version, not the original Mahanian
ideas of a half-century earlier. Watts
does not make this distinction clear.
Watts’s third discontinuity, which is
more of an omission than anything
else, is his lack of consideration of
network-centric warfare (NCW) as a
possible alternative to his capital ship
theory. While he mentions the concept
very briefly in passing (p. 129), he
chooses not to explain that it actually
argues against capital ship theory by
maintaining that, in this era of reliable
and near-instantaneous data sharing, it
is the integrity of the network among the
various platforms that is vital, not the
security of any individual unit attached
to it. No one ship needs to have all the
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“sensors and shooters” in a discrete
package if each can draw what it lacks
from the others in the network. This
again makes it something of an antithesis of capital ship theory, considering the
latter’s focus on the platforms involved.
As such, the NCW concept is worthy of
inclusion here, if only to explore why
the U.S. Navy supposedly rejected it
(although aspects of it have survived in
the current “distributed lethality” idea).
In the end, this reviewer was not
persuaded by the arguments as
presented, but this in no way should
be taken as a rejection of the book’s
core idea itself. Watts’s volume is
valuable insofar as it encourages the
reader to think of alternative organizational strategies for the U.S. Navy; it is,
however, incomplete, in that formulating
a comprehensive conclusion requires
the three objections discussed above to
be addressed at some point. The book
also does not offer any defense for
the generalist position and the many
virtues of capable, multipurpose ships
across the range of military operations,
nor any alternative to this force, which
presumably would have to include a
larger number of specialist platforms.
One hopes this will form a new point of
departure for future work in this area.
ANGUS ROSS

Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, by Henry D. Sokolski. 2nd ed. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015.
159 pages. Free.

Henry Sokolski has been a fixture of
Washington’s nuclear nonproliferation
community for several decades and in
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various roles, including as practitioner,
analyst, educator, and advocate. This
short volume represents his second
effort, after more than a decade and
a half, at encapsulating a holistic
understanding of the long-standing
U.S. nuclear proliferation prevention
project. Sokolski takes up the challenge
of tackling this vast and complex subject
in a monograph-length treatment with
confidence and aplomb. He does so in a
way that is approachable by those who
may not have extensive knowledge of the
subject but is likely to offer new insights
to experts in the field. In doing so, he
succeeds on many levels, though not all.
The greatest strength of Underestimated
is its ability to bridge issues and perspectives that are all too rarely bridged.
For example, Sokolski displays a rare
combination of an insider’s applied
knowledge of what is practical in the
real world of technology, bureaucracy,
and diplomacy with an outsider’s ability
to think creatively outside the box of
official logic. Indeed, over the years he
developed a reputation as a disruptive
—in a useful way—insider. He also
makes a conscious effort to bridge the
policy and academic divide, as well as
what he sees as the loosely associated
ideological divisions between nuclear
hawks and doves. Further, he seeks to
bridge the long-standing conceptual
cleavages among the cognate nuclear
areas of arms control, disarmament,
nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
deterrence, and war fighting, as well as
to treat nuclear weapons and missiles
as two sides of the same coin across all
these areas. Finally, he approaches all
this ranging across geographic regions,
and both casting back in history and
looking out to the future. In doing
so, he helps the reader to consider
all these areas together, as aspects of
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and tools for understanding the same,
larger picture: namely, the enduring and
systematic U.S. interest in curtailing the
threats posed by the spread of strategic
weapons. This alone is an invaluable
contribution to the literature that
should enrich the perspectives of all
types of readers, expert and otherwise.
Unfortunately, the work suffers from
failing to deliver consistently on its
ambition to cast a wide historical,
geographic, and conceptual net. In
part this is owing to the constraints
of trying to cover a great deal within
a very constrained space. Put simply,
this is a very small book taking an
expansive look at a big topic.
However, there are also some specific
weaknesses. Sokolski is not an academic,
and his attempts to engage international
relations theory are unlikely to impress
scholarly readers. For example, while
offering intriguing insights about
competing perspectives that have
emerged within strands of structural
realism—notably, contrasting the differing perspectives epitomized by Kenneth
Waltz and John Mueller—he offers
nothing whatsoever on any applicable
insights from neoliberal institutionalism,
social constructivism, or neoclassical
or liberal (English school) realism.
This represents a serious omission
when one considers that the seminal
English school scholar Hedley Bull is
one of the giants in theorizing about the
differences between arms control and
disarmament; the constructivist lens
has been used extensively to explicate
nuclear proliferation dynamics; and
liberal institutionalism underpins much
of the current thinking about disarmament in its contemporary incarnation in
the “global zero” movement. Likewise,
in the end the author’s real focus
narrows down to his obvious true
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passion, nonproliferation, as becomes
clear when the book concludes with
a series of policy recommendations.
While there are a few ideas involving
nuclear force posture or arms limitation, such as a ban on forward nuclear
deployments, the thrust of the package
is on preventive nonproliferation.
These are real weaknesses. But they
do not detract from the real strengths
here that commend this as a worthy
addition to the nuclear weapons
literature. At its best, Underestimated
succeeds admirably in synthesizing the
swirling policy debates surrounding
these complex and interrelated issues,
framing them in a wider context
that is also widely accessible.
DAVID COOPER

Justice and the Just War Tradition: Human Worth,
Moral Formation, and Armed Conflict, by Christopher Eberle. New York: Routledge, 2016. 252
pages. $140.

War presents many opportunities
and temptations to do wrong and to
choose injustice and evil over good.
How are we to know how to act when
situations are not black-and-white, or
when emotions cloud our judgment?
These questions are not new, and the
discussion surrounding them has been
going on since Saint Augustine of Hippo
penned the first recognizable form of
just war theory in the fifth century.
Philosopher Christopher Eberle brings
his clear thought and humble wit to
the discussion using his particular
viewpoint as both a professor at the
U.S. Naval Academy and a Christian.
Viewing the just war tradition as the best
available framework for reflecting on the
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morality of war, Eberle aims to “provide
a conceptual and propositional resource
that citizens, soldiers, and statesmen can
employ as an aid to moral formation.”
This book is a natural outgrowth of his
weighty responsibility to form the morals of the nation’s future warrior-leaders.
What makes his voice particularly worth
listening to about this topic is that, while
he is a philosopher interested in discussing ideas, he translates these ideas into
practical wisdom using historical and
generic examples that are easy to follow
for anyone interested in the topic. This
book is valuable to a range of people,
from undergraduates through adult
learners who have a basic familiarity with just war theory to seasoned
experts in the field. Dr. Eberle brings
a Christian element into a discussion
that is often bereft of it, as well as an
examination of the interior mind and
intent, which also are often ignored.
Eberle’s Christian faith is valuable in
that he presents just war theory from
the perspective out of which it was
created: the heart of Western Christianity. This brings us to his second aim:
“to provide an understanding of the
morality of war that is open to religious
contributions both to the justification
and limitation of military violence.”
This is particularly important given how
Osama Bin Laden framed the events of
September 11, 2001—as religious “just
war.” It is only by considering a just war
theory reunited with religion that one
can meet these claims accurately and
reveal them as false. This reunification
of just war theory and religion is the
raw material that forms the core of what
Eberle uses to guide all decision making
with regard to right action in war.
In his discussion, Eberle focuses
narrowly on the justificatory and
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motivational core of just war theory.
These are the main concepts that draw
the boundaries or build the framework
for any discussion about whether a war
is just. Their purpose is to shape the way
we perceive and discipline our minds
and hearts about violent communal
conflict so as to conduct ourselves justly
when we find ourselves involved.
One of the basic elements of Eberle’s
application of just war theory is the
idea that every human life has great and
equal worth. Human beings are created
as moral agents who naturally want to
be good and to do good in their moral
relations with others. However, every
human being is also a sinner who at
times chooses evil as a “good”—resulting
in acts of violence around the world.
Morally speaking, any violence that kills
a human being deprives him or her of
this inherent worth and must be seen
as a moral wrong. And just as violence
by one human being against another
is morally wrong, organized violence
by one human community against
another is morally impermissible.
There are times, however, when this
can be overridden, including when one
community commits an act or a series
of egregious acts that seriously injures
another community. According to
Eberle, the victimized community can
incur an obligation for war to correct
the moral injustice. This obligation
can be overridden, however, when the
evils the war would cause or create
exceed the moral good sought.
Eberle shows how just war theory can
be used to determine the threshold
for egregious action that gives
justification for war; what constitutes
a proportional response; what actions,
thoughts, and emotions in warfare are
and are not morally permissible; and
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when warfare must be stopped. His
discussion of each of these topics is
tidy, conversational, and a delight to
read—fulfilling the book’s goal of being
a practical handbook to guide citizens,
statesmen, and soldiers in making right
moral decisions when it comes to war.
The book’s most controversial aspect is
its conclusion. After artfully building
the case for a just war theory, Eberle
muddies the waters by writing: “Reliance
on the [theory] tempts its adherents to
amplify the destructiveness of war in
morally troubling respects. When . . .
human beings are caught up in violent
communal conflict, their adherence
to the just war theory can render
them less likely to fight in accord with
the demands of justice than would
otherwise be the case.” He continues,
writing that “this deficiency is not
merely a contingent fact about the uses
to which some bad actors happen to put
the just war theory. Rather, it derives
partly from enduring facts about the
human condition and partly from the
just war theory’s core justificatory
requirements.” Eberle does allow that
a just war could be escalated by adding
additional war aims. However, given
human nature, this also becomes a
temptation to misuse the theory to seem
to justify escalated warfare and carnage
under the guise of avenging the nowexaggerated precipitating moral wrongs.
Here I believe Dr. Eberle overburdens
his analysis of just war theory with the
problem of human nature. According to
traditional Christian doctrine, humans
are sinful beings who often choose
apparent “goods” over actual goods. As
such, people can choose to misuse or
abuse any doctrine, theory, or instruction, no matter how ironclad. Still, I do
not consider a just war theory that is
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open to abuse to be a defective theory; if
anything, because of that potential it is
a realistic one. I highly recommend this
work as a useful resource for practical
moral formation in just war theory.
ALI GHAFFARI

Rockets and People, by Boris Chertok, ed. Asif
Siddiqi. Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, History Office, 2010. 796 pages.
$65.

In this third volume of his memoirs, ably
edited by acclaimed space historian Asif
Siddiqi, Boris Yevseyevich Chertok, who
was the most senior surviving Soviet
space engineer until his death at age
ninety-nine in 2011, offers a unique,
firsthand window into Cold War history
as he lived it over his six-decade career.
He spent most of it at the uppermost
level of the OKB-1 design bureau (now
S. P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia), where he participated
in every major project though 1991.
In this series, volume 1 details Chertok’s
rise from aviation factory electrician
to official in charge of extracting
Nazi rocket expertise, volume 2 the
post-1946 emergence of the Soviet
missile program. In volume 3, Chertok
recounts and reflects on the golden
age of Soviet cosmonautics, from Yury
Gagarin’s historic orbital flight in 1961
to the death of key figures in the Soviet
space program in and around 1967.
Volume 4, released in early 2012, covers
the U.S.-Soviet moon race. Chertok’s
personable, technically informed,
and somewhat politically detached
perspective, as well as his frankness
regarding credibility of sources and
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where he lacks information, makes for
an accessible, historically useful account.
From his perch in the Soviet missile
bureaucracy, Chertok observed the Cold
War as a scientific-technologicalmilitary competition. Manned spaceflight was regarded as an indicator
of national prestige—and socialist
superiority: “There was an ongoing
battle at the front line of the Cold War’s
scientific-technical front. Rather than
soldiers, it was scientists, engineers, the
‘generals’ of industry, and workers who
determined the battle’s outcome. And
warriors of another sort came on the
scene—cosmonauts” (p. 61). Each side
fed off the other in constant oneupmanship, Chertok stresses: “American
operations had a very strong effect on
our plans. American historians of aeronautics assert that our successes were the
primary reason why the United States
converted its space programs into a toppriority, nationwide challenge” (p. 246).
Central to this competition, for some
time, was a race to land a man on the
moon. On August 3, 1964, Central
Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers Resolution 655-268, “On
Work for Lunar and Space Research,”
recommitted Moscow to “land a man
on the moon and return him to Earth
by 1967–68” (p. 397). This goal was
restated in a similar decree of October
25, 1965 (p. 568). This competition was
very real, and there was no substitute:
“[N]o matter how successful [other]
programs might be, they could not
compensate for our loss of superiority
if the Americans were to become the
first to fly around the moon” (p. 523).
Then, despite suffering a major setback
in the Apollo 1 fire of 1967, the United
States started pulling ahead. The Soviet
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program was held back by a year of
time-consuming yet inadequate ground
testing and the tragic death of Vladimir
Komarov when Soyuz 1 crashed in 1967.
In retrospect, there were larger reasons
for these results. The Soviet defense
industry that Chertok depicts suffered
from both direct involvement by party
organizations throughout the production process and limited government
capacity, ruinous bureaucratic and
interpersonal struggles and fingerpointing, overly ambitious deadlines,
lack of systematic review of decisions,
and lack of politicians who understood
the benefits of a comprehensive militarycivilian approach. So much depended
on a single individual. Chief Designer
Sergey Korolyov was a microcosm of
Soviet society, having both suffered
significant repression and marshaled
significant technical resources. His
untimely death in 1966, itself partly a
result of medical malpractice, devastated
the Soviet space program. Korolyov’s
successor Vasily Mishin would prove
far less effective at cultivating the
Kremlin bureaucracy. Obsessive
secrecy reigned. The Central Committee
maintained a categorical prohibition
on acknowledging space failures, even
when detected by foreigners. Inefficient
use of limited resources imposed
additional burdens: “For a long time
during the post-Khrushchev period,
we continued to develop and produce
several parallel lines of strategic missiles,
allowing unjustified redundancy” (p.
155), their overproduction camouflaged
by creative budgeting (p. 146).
The United States led significantly in
missile numbers, accuracy, and nuclear
weapons—a tremendous disparity during the Cuban missile crisis, although
subsequently the Soviets worked to
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reduce the gap. Spaceflights served
propaganda purposes, in part to
cover up missile limitations. Risky space
spectaculars were attempted, including
—on Khrushchev’s personal orders via
telephone to Korolyov—the 1964 cramming of three cosmonauts without space
suits and with only limited life support
into a Voskhod capsule whose “new
landing system had only been tested
once” (p. 237). Soviet mission-control
facilities were less advanced: “[T]he
mission control centers at Cape Canaveral and Houston seemed like a fantasy
to us” (p. 599). The USSR fell behind
in integrated circuits, microchips, and
computers, in part because of a lack of
civilian applications. Quantity reflected
lack of technological integration:
“[T]he first Soyuzes had so much varied
radio technology on board that they
required twenty antennas” (p. 580).
Looking to the present and beyond,
Chertok condemns the present Russian
government’s “crime” of dismantling
the nation’s great technological
infrastructure (p. 331). He makes
fascinating future projections: by 2015,
“China (and perhaps India) will become
superpowers, surpassing Russia in terms
of military-strategic might.” Future
conflict may center on resource access;
the United States, Europe, and China
may covet Russia’s unparalleled reserves
of oil and gas, China its fresh water and
eastern territory as well. “Under those
conditions, it appears that the strategic
significance of high-precision, nonnuclear weaponry together with intermediate and even short-range tactical nuclear
weapons might become a factor in
deterring a large war just as ICBMs were
in the 20th century” (pp. 156–57). Chertok judges further that “Chinese rocket
and space technology will overtake the
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Russian space program in ten to twelve
years; and perhaps it will overtake the
American program as well” (p. 585).
As in previous volumes in the series,
Chertok documents the toils of Soviet
designers, who were remunerated
poorly, subjected to difficult working
conditions, and hidden from foreign
sight and contact. Chertok learned of his
nation’s deployment of missiles to Cuba,
for instance, from Kennedy’s speech (p.
95)! Driven in part by heartfelt ideals
tempered by knowledge of the horrors of
the Stalin era, these designers achieved
so much, so quickly, under such
formidable constraints—truly amazing
accomplishments. Theirs is not only a
Soviet legacy, rooted now in a bygone
era, but a part of a larger human legacy
that will inspire further exploration as
mankind moves farther into space.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York:
Random House, 2016. 453 pages. $30.

The most recent book by Andrew
Bacevich—a retired U.S. Army colonel
and now-retired professor of history
and international relations at Boston
University—details the history of
the four-decade U.S. involvement in
“the Greater Middle East,” a region
Bacevich defines as encompassing
areas of the Persian Gulf, North
Africa, and the Balkans.
The book starts with the formulation of
the Carter Doctrine: how the OPEC oil
embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and
the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, combined with America’s need for
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oil and the fact that most of the world’s
oil at the time came from this area, led
then-president Jimmy Carter to declare
the security and stability of this region
to be a vital national interest. Bacevich
believes the doctrine created a broad,
open-ended commitment that expanded
with time. Early in the book he describes
the decision making, strategy and
policy development, and organizational
changes that positioned the United
States as the guarantor of regional
security. This was the context for the
formation of U.S. Central Command,
which included in its geographic area of
responsibility not only the Persian Gulf
states but a total of nineteen countries,
including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya, and Pakistan. Bacevich argues
that this new combatant command
created both an expectation of and the
pretext for future military intervention
in the Central Command region. The
“Soviet threat of the 1980s served as a
placeholder, providing a handy rationale
for developing capabilities subsequently
put to other purposes”; that “posture justified by the need to defend the Persian
Gulf from outside intrusion positioned
the United States itself to intrude.”
Bacevich offers a broad overview of
significant events in this area of the
world over the last thirty-five years. In
addition to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and America’s
support of the mujahideen “freedom
fighters,” Bacevich discusses the Marine
Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon,
the U.S. attack against Mu‘ammar
Gadhafi in Libya, and the war between
Iraq and Iran. His broad synthesis
similarly includes Somalia, Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the
ensuing Gulf War, the conflict in the
Balkans, and, of course, the attacks of
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September 11 and the subsequent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
current fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS.
One of the great strengths of this book is
the way Bacevich brings all these events
together in sufficient detail to enable
the reader to take in “the whole picture.”
It allows one to put these events into
greater context and see the patterns that
have developed. In short, it performs
a very complete assessment of where
we have been, what assumptions the
leaders of the United States have made,
what policy decisions were made on the
basis of those assumptions, and what
the outcomes have been to this time.
Toward the book’s end, Bacevich asks
two very pointed questions. First, why
“has the world’s mightiest military
achieved so little even while itself
absorbing very considerable losses and
inflicting even greater damage on the
subjects of America’s supposed beneficence?” Second, why, “in the face of
such unsatisfactory outcomes[,] has the
United States refused to chart a different
course?” Bacevich goes on to offer what
he believes are the answers to these
questions, then ends by arguing that, in
light of new technology that allows more
oil reserves to become accessible in the
Western Hemisphere, the United States
would be better served by securing
its “own neighborhood rather than
vainly attempting to police the Greater
Middle East.” The question that comes to
mind—one with which I’m sure our national leaders wrestle—is this: What will
happen to this region, and subsequently
the world, if the United States stops its
involvement in the Greater Middle East?
This well-researched book is a mustread for all of us who study, plan, and
execute the military arm of national
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power—and especially for those who
make decisions about national policy.
ROGER DUCEY

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War,
ed. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins.
Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press,
2015. 486 pages. $21.95.

Augmenting the literature of firsthand
accounts by senior leaders such as
General Stanley McChrystal and
Ambassador Christopher Hill, National
Defense University faculty members
Richard Hooker and Joseph Collins
assembled a strong team to make sense
of the last fifteen years of war. The editors appreciate the challenges of writing
current history, but offer the book as “an
assessment of two unfinished campaigns, written for future senior officers,
their key advisors, and other national
security professionals.” With more than
three million U.S. and coalition veterans
of Iraq and Afghanistan, few undertakings are more important. Veterans of
today will shape the future of defense
over the next twenty years, just as their
forebears, such as Anthony Zinni, Colin
Powell, and Richard Holbrooke, were
shaped by their Vietnam experiences.
The chapters are at their best when
they leverage insights from both senior
military and civilian leaders to reach
important conclusions, such as the
following: “Civilian national security decisionmakers need a better understanding of the complexity of military strategy
and the military’s need for planning
guidance. Senior military officers for
their part require a deep understanding
of the interagency decisionmaking
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process, an appreciation for the perspectives and frames of reference of civilian
counterparts, and a willingness to
embrace and not resist the complexities
and challenges inherent in the system of
civilian control” (p. 71). On this point,
it would be important to learn from the
productive relationships of Lieutenant
General David Barno and Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad in Kabul during 2003,
and General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad during
2007. The editors capture the important
civil-military relations discussion in
their conclusion, writing that “there is
no ‘purely military’ question . . . [yet the
advice of senior military personnel as
experts] was not used in full” (p. 407).
The book raises—and sometimes challenges—persistent myths, such as the
belief that the presence of an additional
battalion at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in
2001 would have enabled the capture
of Osama Bin Laden. Others addressed
include the belief that Kabul could have
stood on its own in the early part of last
decade, and that a post-Saddam Iraq
would be lawless. Further, the book
reminds us that these two wars did not
begin as insurgencies; that military
gains were disconnected from political
goals; and that the U.S. government has
neither the capacity nor the disposition
to promote political and economic
development on par with its capacity to
develop foreign military forces. Neither
U.S. presidential administration could
agree on the scope of the problem
nor could either generate the unity
of effort that we see—in hindsight—
would have been needed to stabilize
either country. Consequently, the
United States abandoned its grandiose
national objectives and shifted
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its emphasis to training Iraqis and
Afghans to fight their own civil wars.
Among the volume’s contributors and
chapters, the reviewer particularly
notes the following:

• Thomas X. Hammes explores well the

challenges of security force assistance,
concluding that “the personnel system
never really adjusted . . . [and advisers
and trainers were] working against
incredible handicaps” (p. 335).

• Collins’s chapter on initial planning

for the wars lays out the assumptions made and the ill-conceived
expectations that developed. At times
he reconciles Beltway and theater
perspectives; for instance, “DOD
civilian leadership did not want to
admit—perhaps for public relations or
legal reasons—that by mid-summer
2003, there was an insurgency going
on” (p. 65).

• Frank G. Hoffman and G. Alexander

Crowther follow with an important
assessment of the Iraq and Afghan
surges, providing a rich narrative that
illustrates strategic adaptation. They
conclude that “war is an audit of how
well states have formulated policies
and strategies, and how well prepared
their armed forces and other tools are”
(p. 146).

• To examine the political context of

strategy formulation during the wars,
the chapter by Christopher J. Lamb
and Megan Franco analyzes senior
leaders’ decisions. The authors “conclude that critical strategy handicaps,
insufficient unity of effort, and, to a
lesser extent, missing or late-to-need
capabilities for irregular warfighting
offer a compelling explanation for
why the United States was not able to
fully achieve its goals in Afghanistan
and Iraq” (p. 168).

• Nicholas Rostow and Harvey

Rishikof identify legal lessons from
the wars, noting that “lawyers should
be regarded as essential participants in
the planning process” (p. 378).
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To be sure, there are limits to how
much we should draw from these two
conflicts, especially since they have not
ended yet. Furthermore, the editors
acknowledge that whatever lessons
might be learned will not necessarily
prevent future failures. While the two
conflicts are linked temporally, differing
rationales for beginning them, different presidential administrations, and
different adversaries limit the value of
larger comparisons. Inputs from our
allies and erstwhile partners—absent
here—also would be beneficial to
study. Yet the book is rich in detail and
analysis, all underscoring the lesson of
a decade-plus: that, while the United
States might be able to support and
enable its international partners, it
cannot solve all their problems by itself.
DEREK S. REVERON

Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter
Dombrowski. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press,
2015. 328 pages. $29.95.

As a collective voice on the topic,
Regional Missile Defense from a Global
Perspective offers a comprehensive
discussion of the history, development,
and present state of ballistic missile
defense (BMD), infused with a distinctive blend of technical aspects and
analysis of the geopolitical forces that
shaped it. Using the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
as an initial framework for discussion,
the works of several notable experts
in the fields of international studies,
nuclear policy, national defense,
foreign affairs, and political science are
combined to yield a nuanced overview
of the subject, expertly delineating the
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parallel development of technological
advances and ongoing political realities
for participating nations. Threaded
throughout the book are significant
discussions on the implications of a
regionally based missile-defense system
having more than just a regional impact.
On the basis of operational concepts
developed to protect London from
V-2 rockets during World War II,
U.S. efforts initially were envisioned
to protect select cities from Soviet or
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) attacks. When this proved to be
technically and financially prohibitive,
scaled-back systems designed primarily
to defend ICBM sites and their capabilities for strategic offensive operations
were constructed. Arms-limitation
talks between the superpowers during
the early seventies further reduced
the scope of this capability. However,
because of President Reagan’s concern
during his presidency about the lack of
an effective BMD for the country and
his preference for a strategic alternative
to mutually assured destruction, SDI
was developed. With the overall goal of
eliminating the threat posed by Soviet
ICBMs, all aspects of ongoing research
were combined under one program.
This point in history is the starting point
for the book; from there it begins to
construct the foundation for an examination of the technological challenges of
developing a missile defense and the political realities these developments foster.
Part 1, “U.S. Policies and Programs”
(p. 17), starts with an examination of
BMD policies as they evolved during the
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations and some of the documents
that defined the actual threat, examined
technical controversies, and captured
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congressional debates. This section
concludes by documenting succinctly
the Obama administration’s challenges
in developing a limited missile-defense
capability while effectively integrating
with our NATO allies in implementing missile defense in Europe.
Part 2, “Regional Dynamics” (p. 105),
begins an engaging discussion by experts
on the development, deployment, and
subsequent policy impacts of BMD in
the European, Levantine, and Middle
East theaters. Contributing authors then
examine issues such as the weakening of stability and a proliferation of
additional BMD systems and associated
counterefforts, which at times have
led to a “one-upmanship” competition
among regional players. The collection
of essays builds the appropriate situational awareness for students of missile
defense, and in 313 pages provides
the reader, whether actively engaged
in BMD responsibilities or merely
interested, with an extensive and focused
analysis by experts in their respective
fields. The absence of an overemphasis
on technological details enhances a welcome breadth of viewpoints that makes
this volume a valuable addition to the
curriculum of any BMD course of study.
The book also would serve well as the
basis for an annual review and update of
the complex issues surrounding missile
defense, thereby providing a valuable
resource as other, associated defense
concepts mature. Its comprehensive
scope could leave the reader questioning
the appropriateness of a regionally based
missile-defense system mind-set, given
the global strategic impacts evident in
not only the main players conceiving,
constructing, and operating such
systems but the interconnectivity that
comes with the existence of partner
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nations, the reality of international
military-industrial complexes, and
the difficulty in limiting the effects of
any BMD mission on the stability of
cooperative security agreements. As a
whole that is greater than the sum of
its parts, Ms. Kelleher and Mr. Dombrowski’s effort clearly delineates the
blurring of lines between regional and
strategic missile defense on many levels.
As the United States continues to evolve
existing systems, enhancing integrated
capabilities and international cooperation becomes even more important.
A convincing case for this is made
evident beginning in part 3, “Critiquing Global Analyses” (p. 239). The
editors’ summation of the future of
BMD describes the challenges facing
future U.S. administrations as they
endeavor to keep pace with rapidly
evolving views on the effectiveness of
BMD with regard to strategic defensive
postures. Given the public scrutiny that
continues to focus more closely on the
consequences of major military applications of capabilities such as BMD, it will
be difficult to act regionally without
immediately considering global stability
and strategic partnerships, as well as to
work within the financial constraints
existing in any national economy.
Although not a focal point of this
book, perhaps the next edition could
address the consequences of nonstate
actors acquiring some limited BMD
capability and the security challenges
that would come with this development.
Regional Missile Defense from a Global
Perspective yields a comprehensive
set of knowledgeable viewpoints and
constructs the appropriate framework
for ongoing discussions on a timely
and complex defense issue.
LLOYD A. MALONE JR.
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The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern
Front, 1914–1917, by David R. Stone. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015. 368 pages. $34.95
(Kindle $19.99).

With the centennial of World War I,
interested readers can choose from
among a surging wave of new books
about the World War I experience and
its impact on modern history. Most
of these have focused on the western
front, but a small number reexamine the
war in Eastern Europe. Among these,
David Stone’s The Russian Army in the
Great War is the first new historical
overview of the Russian military on the
eastern front since Norman Stone’s The
Eastern Front, 1914–1917 was published
forty years ago. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, historians have enjoyed
more access to Russian archives and
accounts of the war. While this new
research is already familiar to specialists,
Stone sets out to make it accessible to
the general reader. He is clear from
the outset that his work is a military
history, so while social and economic
factors frame military operations, they
are not the focus of the volume.
Most general histories of World War I
describe the Russian army in a narrative
of failure. The “Russian steamroller,”
feared by its adversaries for its huge but
slow-to-mobilize peasant armies, fails
owing to poor leadership and equipment, setting the stage for chaos and
revolution. While conceding the Russian
army’s failings, Stone asserts that
focusing solely on the negative ignores
essential historical context. Four empires
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and
the Ottoman Empire) went to war in
Eastern Europe—and none of their royal
houses survived the experience. All four
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empires experienced military failure,
hunger, economic and social collapse,
and loss of territory. The Russian
experience was unique only in that the
subsequent civil war led to an enduring
Communist regime. On the battlefield,
Russian troops generally performed
as well as the Austro-Hungarian units
that were their primary adversaries
in the first half of the war. Only when
fighting German troops were Russian
units clearly outclassed. Stone observes,
however, that no nation consistently
matched the quality of the German army
on a unit-against-unit basis. The Russian
army was plagued by a lack of artillery,
machine guns, and ammunition—as
was every army in the war. No military
had anticipated fully the requirements
of modern industrial warfare, and
entire societies were mobilized to meet
these sudden demands, with varying
degrees of success. Russia’s industrial
mobilization was less successful than
some, but what success it achieved
was notable considering the country’s
relatively backward starting point.
The Russian army’s first moves in the
war are remembered for the defeat
of two Russian armies at the battle of
Tannenberg—often the only eastern
front battle nonspecialists can name.
Tannenberg has been remembered in
part because the two victorious German commanders, Hindenburg and
Ludendorff, later emerged to lead the
overall German war effort. Less appreciated is that at the same time the Russian
army achieved significant initial success
against Austria-Hungary. These territorial gains were reversed in 1915, as the
Russian army endured the series of defeats known as “the long retreat.” Despite
this reversal, however, the Russian army
remained intact and effective. In 1916, it
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launched major offensives, coordinated
with its allies, to divert German forces
from combat on the western front. In the
process, the Russian army pushed deep
into Austria-Hungary and essentially
removed the Austro-Hungarian army
from the war as an effective fighting
force. Subsequent Austrian resistance
would continue only because of direct
support by German army units.
Readers generally familiar with the war
on the eastern front will enjoy Stone’s
coverage of campaigns in the Carpathian
Mountains and on the Turkish front, as
well as the disastrous impact on Russia
of Romanian entry into the war on the
Allied side. Stone’s previous research
on the early Soviet military allows
him to identify continuity between
the imperial and Soviet militaries and
frame how the new Soviet army drew
lessons from World War I combat.
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Combat on the eastern front was more
mobile than the trench warfare in the
west. This is a story in which terrain
matters, and most of it is not familiar.
In this context, the book suffers from
the generally low quality of its maps.
For the reader already versed in the
events of late imperial Russian history,
The Russian Army in the Great War
fills a gap by explaining the nuances
of military events. If, however, these
events are unfamiliar, or if the reader
is more interested in the interplay of
military, economic, and social factors, a broader history of Russia
in World War I, such as W. Bruce
Lincoln’s Passage through Armageddon,
would be a better starting point.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-
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ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

e could try scrying with an orbuculum . . . or, in the current vernacular,
we could attempt to see into the future using a crystal ball. This form of
pseudoscience traces its roots back to the earliest days of recorded history, when
soothsayers made a living predicting the future. The veracity of their projections
was always suspect, but even so there was some value in thinking about the world
to come. But perhaps there is a better way to consider possible futures.
In the Spring 2016 issue of the Naval War College Review, we shared some
thoughts about the power of fiction to energize thinking. We also provided a link
to download War Stories from the Future from the Atlantic Council’s Art of Future Warfare project. We return to the subject in this issue to expand on the role
that reading (and writing) fiction can play in a sailor’s professional development,
and to provide a link to more great think pieces.
In early 2016, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) teamed
three acclaimed science fiction authors with seventeen service members to create
compelling and credible narratives of what the world might look like thirty years
in the future. The results of this effort can be accessed at www.mcwl.marines.mil/
Divisions/Futures-Assessment/. The fascinating and strikingly illustrated sixtytwo-page publication is a worthy read for all maritime professionals. Brigadier
General Julian Dale Alford, the MCWL Futures Directorate commanding general, noted that the Science Fiction Futures Project offers “possible tactical- and
operational-level vignettes of the distant future through the medium of science
fiction. We proceed with full knowledge that we will not get it perfectly right;
tempered with the understanding that we cannot afford to ignore possibilities
that may come sooner than anticipated.” Alford continued, “Open your mind and
enjoy. The future is coming, ready or not.”
The preface to the publication states, “Good futuring is about projection, not
prediction. It stimulates thought and debate. The best futures are the ones which
prompt the reader to say, ‘That will never happen.’ It makes the reader consider
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the possible (and plausible) and apply rational thought to what events may or
may not enable that world to come to pass. We don’t have to get it right; we just
can’t afford to get it too wrong.” The Science Fiction Futures: Marine Corps Security Environment Forecast 2013–2045 project developed three short stories, each
dealing with conflict in a future—and troubled—world.
• The first story, “Water Is a Fightin’ Word,” postulates a world in which a scarcity of fresh water has resulted in massive domestic and international migration. A platoon of Marines goes ashore in North Africa to assist an international aid agency that has been attacked. Alongside “leatherneck Marines” we
are introduced to “metalneck Marines”—combat robots that fight at the side
of their human partners.
• In the second story, “Double Ten Day,” Marines are deployed to an Asian
island following a massive earthquake. They find themselves in a fight in
and around megacities in which tens of thousands of people live in towering
skyscrapers. Robots, drones, and high-tech communications help them deal
with adversaries that include bioengineered special operations troops who
are bred and trained from birth to be powerful killing machines.
• In the third story, “The Montgomery Crisis,” Marines seek to destroy an
enemy who caused a global crisis (“The Great Panic”) by using a biological
weapon to infect America’s crops. As more and more food became inedible, food riots occurred in major cities. Attempts to import grains from the
Balkans were hindered by the closure of the Strait of Gibraltar by a caliphate
in West Africa. The Marines are put ashore to reopen the strait and help feed
America.
Each of these stories provides a vivid depiction of conditions that might arise,
in a visceral way that neither analytical reports nor scripted scenarios can match.
A similar project with an Army focus has been launched by the Modern War Institute at West Point, and preliminary plans are being formulated to get sailors to
think about possible futures that might lie somewhere between the Fleet Forces
Command of today and the Starfleet Command of the future!

JOHN E. JACKSON
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